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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates and demonstrates the value of using 
Derrida's "two interpretations of interpretation" (the Rousseaui"tic and 
the Nietzschean) to enrich the reading ofliterature in Religious Education 
with reference to I.e Guin's A Wizard of Earthsea. Religious Education 
has responded in recent decades to developments in pedagogy, theology, 
and various other disciplines such as psychology and sociology. However, 
religious educators do not seem to have considered the question of the 
impact of modern literary theory on Religious Education. Such theories 
have influenced the way in which literature is read and studied in the 
English classroom. Such developments should be of interest not only to 
the English teacher but also to the Religious Education teacher. 
The hypothesis underlying this thesis is that the Derridean 
common ground of the Rousseauistic and Nietzschean interpretations will 
broaden and enhance the reading of literature in Religious Education by 
facilitating both the search for the centre (search for finite meaning) and 
the free play of signifiers (pursuit of infinitely deferred and pluralistic 
meaning). 
Generally, Post-Structuralism, with its emphasis on the 
impossibility of absolute meaning, seems antithetical to Religious 
Education, with its emphasis on the search for meaning. However, 
Dzrrida's common ground of the two interpretative positions suggests a 
reading of literature that allows for both the Rousseauistic concern with 
centre and definitive meantng and the Nietzschean concern with free play 
and provisional meaning. 'rhis thesis, then, establishes that the value of 
'story' in Religious Education is considerably enriched by the adoption of 
Derrida's "two interpretations of interpretation" as an approach for 
reading literature, whether secular or sacred, in Religious Education. 
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CHAPfERONE 
Introduction to the Study 
Overview 
In Religious Education considerable effort has been made in recent 
decades towards developing teaching methods that are child-centred and 
religiously inclusive. Emphasis has been placed both on developing 
curricula appropriate to the child's experience and on acknowledging the 
plurality of religious traditions (Moore & Habel, 1982; Rossiter, 1981, for 
example). Religious Education does not exist in isolation from the rest of 
the world. Grimmitt (1978; 1987) has contributed significantly to the 
development of Religious Education by acknowledging the relevance of 
such disciplines as theology, pedagogy, and sociology to Religious 
Education and by demonstrating how they may be adopted and utilized. 
However, religious educators do not seem to have considered how modern 
literary theory may also impact on Religious Education. 
The way in which literature is now read and studied in English has 
been strongly influenced by modern literary theory. For example, Cohan 
and Shires (1988) discuss the way in which signs can both disrupt and 
facilitate the passage of meaning while O'Neill (1993) examines how 
critical reading is encouraged by Cultural Criticism. Modern literary 
theory can also be of considerable value to religious educators concerning 
how literature is read and studied. 
Modern literary theory is as rich as it is broad, and even various 
developmental strands can be diverse. While it would indeed be wor'".hwhile 
to examine the value of other areas of modem literary theory for reading 
literature in Religious Education this thesis concentrates exclusively on 
one aspect of the work of French philosopher Jacques Derrida (1930- ), 
whose name is virtually synonymous with Post-Structuralism. 
In this thesis the value of using Derrida's "two interpretations of 
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interpretation" (Derrida, 1978, p. 292), the Rousseauistic and the 
Nietzschean, to enhance the reading ofliterature in Religious Education is 
examined in detail. This is demonstrated by a close textual analysis of Le 
Guin's novel A Wizard of Earthsea. The area of study undertakBn in this 
thesis is considered original as it does not seem to have been previously 
explored. The hypothesis of this thesis is that the Derridean common 
ground of the Rousseauistic and Nietzschean interpretations will broaden 
and enrich the reading of literature in Religious Education by facilitating 
both the search for the centre (search for finite meaning) and the free 
playofsignifiers (pursuit ofinfinitelydeferred and pluralistic meaning). 
The relevance of this thesis is in its examination of the value of 
Derrida's two interpretative positions for reading literature in Religious 
Education. The Nietzschean interpretation, with its emphasis on the 
impossibility of absolute meaning, seems to undermine if not obliterate 
the assurance and certitude facilitated by the Rousseauistic 
interpretation, with its emphasis on definitive meaning. However, Derrida 
points to the common ground of these two irreconcilable interpretative 
positions. The Derridean common ground allows for a reading ofliterature 
that accommodates both the Rousseauistic concern with absolute 
meaning and the Nietzscheao concern with provisional meaning. 
Defining Religious Education 
Definitions of the term 'Religious Education' are varied, evolve over 
time, and are influenced by vroious issues. Alves (1975) considers that 
differences in views about Religious Education arise from "different views 
of the relationship between the individual and the society into which he 
has been born", which subsequently influence general opinions regarding 
education (p. 23). While expressing a similar opinion, Moore and Habel 
(1982) also emphasize that Religious Education should be multicultural, 
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comparative, open-ended, critical, and affective (pp. 34-36). Horder (1975) 
discusses four approaches to defining Religious Education: confessional, 
anti-dogmatic, implicit, and explicit (pp. 176-178). The confessional 
approach is concerned with the passing on of a belief system, while the 
anti-dogmatic approach fosters an objective and dispassionate giving out 
of information. Horder considers both of these approaches unacceptable 
because either it is, respectively, exclusive or it disallows consideration of 
the subjective and emotional nature of belief. Horder suggests a 
combination of the implicit (the "quest for meaning and purpose") and the 
explicit (the "quest for understanding of religion and religions") (pp. 177-
178). Similarly, Hull (1982) observes that today religious educators, while 
trying to avoid "the inert imparting of facts", also express a desire "that 
pupils should learn from religion in ways which will enrich them and 
deepen their humanity, rather than merely informing them" (p. xv). 
Grimmitt (1978) highlights the need fm· consideration of both the 
affective and the cognitive in his two-level conceptual framework for 
teaching Religious Education: the existential approach (use of"the child's 
feelings, acts and experiences as the basis for developing religious 
concepts") and the dimensional approach (presentation of "selected 
religious concepts by way of the six dimensions of religion") (p. 50). 
Grimmitt (1987), like many religious educators, deplores the 
indoctrinational approach insisting that what "religious education ... 
seeks to further are pupils' capacities to take responsibility for their own 
beliefs and values - to 'own' them" (pp. 215-216). 
Marvel (1982) also emphasizes the need for both the 'implicit' 
approach (affective) and tne 'explicit' approach (cognitive), which he feels 
is facilitated by the phenomenological method (pp. 73-74). 1n a similar 
vein, Wilson (1982) suggests that there must be a combination of the 
rational and the emotional in Religious Education. ln contrast, Robinson 
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(1982) considers th»t despite any practical aims in Religious Education 
its achievements will be small if it does not also enable and facilitate 
children to experience the religious, while Attfield (1982) is concerned with 
the teaching of age-appropriate concepts (pp. 81-83). Groome (1980), 
while writing about Christian Religious Education, does acknowledge the 
need for inclusivity in Religious Education generally, which he describes as 
"a deliberate attending to the transcendent dimension of life" lp. 22). 
Nevertheless, such a definition does not acknowledge the secular nature 
of society, which is of concern for many religious educators. 
Cox (1982) discusses the importance of critical understanding in a 
pluralistic society, describing fr.e function ofReligious Education as being: 
to help pupils to understand the nature of our present secular, 
pluralistic society, to help them to think rationally about the 
state and place of religion in it, to enable them to choose 
objectively and on sound criteria between the many conflicting 
religious statements ... and to work out for themselves, and 
to be able cogently to defend, their own religious position or 
their rejection of the possibility of having one. (p. 56) 
Finding similar concerns in his research, Rossiter (1981) notes that 
various Australian Government reports "recommended broad, open-
ended, descriptive and objective courses in religious studies" (p. 11). These 
reports consider that Religious Education is not to be aligned with any 
religion or church, is concerned with education in religion and the place of 
religion in culture, and provides the "opportunity for clarifying meaning in 
life" (p. 12). Rossiter lists the aims of Religious Education as including 
learning about "religious aspects of culture, becoming aware of different 
belief systems in the community, understanding the different dimensions 
of religion, [and] clarification of the individual's own beliefs" (p. 12). 
While the term 'Religious Education' can be variously defined, then, 
there is, overall, a conser.:;us of opinion on the need for Religious 
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Education to be defined and practised in ways that are broad and 
inclusive and to incorporate both the affective (implicit) and the cognitive 
(explicit) dimensions. Drawing on such writers the following working 
definition of 'Religious Education' is suggested for the purposes of this 
thesis: 
Religious Education should encompass an exploration of th•' 
myriad ways in which meaning and purpose in humdn 
existence has been and is sought; such an exploration wou.ld 
emphasize (but not exclusively) an examination of religior. 
(and religions), philosophy, literature (sacred and secular), and 
culture and would incorporate (but not necessarily 
concurrently) an overall concern with both the cognitive and 
affective dllnensions. 
This thesis is concerned exclusively with the use of literature as 
one of the many ways in which meaning and purpose is sought. While 
both secular and sacred texts constitute the literature that is read and 
studied in Religious Education, this thesis uses as an illustrative example 
a piece of secular fantasy literature. The use of close textual analysis 
emphasizes the cognitive but does not exclude the affective. The value of 
the approach to reading a secular text demonstrated in this thesis could, 
and should, equally be applied to the reading of sacred texts. 
Other Studies 
Investigations of published and dissertation material in the area of 
Religious Education and modem literary theory indicate that no work has 
been attem1>ted in this potentially exciting nexus of subjects. Critical 
works on Post-Structuralism, Derrida, and deconstruction are plentiful 
and include such topics as: an exploration of literary theory, ideology, and 
institutions (Culler, 1988); a theoretical examination of the nature of 
change in philosophy, history, and culture (Barker, 1996); discussions 
about Derrida and deconstruction (Silverman, 1989; Wood, 1992); and, an 
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investigation of deconstruction, philosophy, and theology (Hart, 1991). 
Dissertations (Dissertation Abstracts International) include such topics 
as: a critique of the epistemology of Post-Structuralism (Brodribb, 1988); 
the contribution of the work of Derrida to ethics (Conlon, 1994); 
extensions of Post-Structuralism into contemporary discourses 
concerning curriculum (Hwu, 1993); a Freudian critique ofDerridean Post-
Structuralism (Barbour, 1996); and, Post-Structuralism and literature 
education in grade five schooling (Mesheau,. 1991). 
Crt tical works on A Wizard of Earthsea have tended to concentrate 
on it as literature for young adu1ts. For example, Jenkins (1985) and 
Cummins (1990) explore the novel as about coming-of-age while Molson 
(1979) discusses it as ethical fantasy for children and young adults. 
Dissertations tend to be more vaned and include such topics as feminism 
(Clarke, 1992), coming of age (Stevens, 1990), and moral education 
(Wayne, 1993). 
There seems to be no work, either published criticism or 
dissertation, produced in the area of Religious Education and Post-
Structuralism, or specifically focussing on Religious Education and 
Derrida's theories, let alone with reference to A Wizard of Earthsea. 
Notwithstanding the worthwhile studies about Earthsea, the important 
developments in Religious Education, and the notable work in Post-
Structuralism, reading a novel like A Wizard of Earthsea from a 
background ofDerridean theory can be of significant value for Religious 
Education. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Background to the Study 
Developments in Religious Education 
Religious Education has changed considerably as it has responded 
to changes in society. In the earlier part of this century, it was little more 
than indoctrination, either fervently or perfunctorily, and was rightly 
criticized and challenged. However, considerable effort has been expended 
over recent decades towards developing teaching methods in Religious 
Education that are child-centred, religiously inclusive, and abreast of 
modern pedagogical and theological developments. These developments 
acknowledge that societal changes are relevant to Religious Education 
and demonstrate how they may he utilized. 
There has been a great deal of research and work produced in the 
area of Religious Education in England, reflecting the needs of teachers 
working in a country where the 1944 Education Act made the teaching of 
Religious Education compulsory in all state schools (Rossiter, 1981, p. 
14). 1n contrast, the situation in Australia varies between States. In 
Western Australia, for example, Religious Education is provided in State 
primary schools by visiting clergy and lay persons. ln State high schools 
chaplains provide support for teachers and students. Australian Church 
schools provide kindergarten to year twelve Religious Education, with 
ethos dependent on the school's denominational background. 
Hull (1975), in his examination ofReligious Education syllabuses in 
England, indicates how they have ch&nged from those in the 1920's and 
1930's concerned with a historical study of Christianity to those in the 
1950's that emphasized the "centrality of the experience of the child" (p. 
101) to those in the late 1960's and 1970's that recognized the necessity 
for religious inclusivity. He also notes that some syllabuses consider the 
inclusion of non-religious life stances to be necessary (p. 115). Elliott 
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(1982) discusses the problems of producing syllabuses acceptable for use 
in a democratic and pluralistic society, emphasizing that their content 
"has to be selected for its relevance to problems about religion which arise 
at the boundaries of belief and unbelief' (p. 132). Gooderham (1982) also 
discusses the need for Religious Education curricula to be inclusive and 
open-ended, while Cole (1982) concerns himself with a consideration of the 
treatment of religion in schools where students come from a variety of 
faith backgrounds. 
Moore and Habel ( 1982) have produced a valuable Australian 
contribution in their creation of a typology of religion for use in Religious 
Education. Another notable Australian work is Rossiter's 1981 empirical 
study which explores approaches to Religious Education in State and 
Church schools. Rossiter provides a detailed examination of issues and 
developments in :Religious Education practices. As with developments in 
England, Religious Education in Australia has moved towards more 
inclusive and broader considerations of religion and religious issues. 
Hull \1982) considers that, like other educational disciplines, 
Religious Education has been dramatically effected by rapid social change 
(p. xv). As a result there has been much discussion, even argument, about 
what 'should' constitute Religious Education. "Sometimes this ferment of 
new ideas and approaches is described as 'confusion' and religious 
education is criticized for 'not knowing where it is going"' (p. xv). Such 
'confusion', suggests Hull, is actually a sign ofvitalit;y and responsibilit;y in 
the meeting "between the religious and the secular outlooks" (pp. xv-xvi). 
The need for a balanced, pedagogically sound approach to Religious 
Education underlies much of the work produced from the 1960's onwards 
and can be particularly seen in the work of Grimmitt. 
Grimmitt (1978; 1987) argues for the recognition of the impact of 
developments in other disciplines on Religious Education. 1n his 1978 
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study he discusses the failure of Religious Education in England to 
function adequately, and examines twentieth century changes that have 
impacted on the teaching of Religious Education: 
The impetus for change in the teaching of religion ... stems 
not simply from our awareness of the failure of traditional 
'religious instruction' but also from three aspects of change 
unique to the mid 20th century. These are: theological change, 
educational change and social change. Together they have 
created a force which ... has led to a remarkable revolution in 
the field of religious teaching. (p. 5) 
In a later book Grimmitt (1987) continues his discussion of the 
impact of other disciplines on Religious Education, finding it necessary to 
use advances in other fields "which, until now, have not been a particular 
feature of the work of religious educators • most notably the sociology of 
knowledge and philosophical anthropology" (p. 9). Grimmitt draws on the 
work of Berger and other sociologists in discussing the concept that 
"human beings construct reality" (p. 25). He observes that humans are 
seen as shaped by culture and society, knowledge is seen as a social 
construct, and meaning is seen as constructed through language: 
the way in which meanings are assigned to a common 
'objective' world is through a common interpretational system 
. . . . The chief and most powerful way in which these 
categories and typicalities are organised or given meaning is 
through language. (pp. 25-26) 
Grimmitt's examination of the social construction of reality and its 
influence on Religious Education indicates how far Religious Education 
has developed this century: from the confessional/indoctrinational 
approach that tended to position itself in splendid isolation to approaches 
that acknowledge, respond to, and utilize developments in other 
disciplines. The overall result of such developments is that now Religious 
Education is firmly rooted in advances and developments in other fields. 
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This thesis very much arises from, and is considered a part of, this 
developmental direction. 
In particular, Grimmitt's discussions were germinal in suggesting a 
possible direction for this thesis. He argues that Religious Education 
needs to acknowledge and respond to contemporary theory in other fields. 
However, while he examines the social construction of reality he does not 
pursue the notion of meaning constructed through language or the ways 
in which this may impact on how literature is read in Religious Education. 
This thesis studies this relationship oflanguage and meaning by exploring 
a particularly influential aspect of Post-Structuralism, namely Derrida's 
"two interpretations of interpretation". Through its investigation of the 
value of Derrida's two interpretative positions for reading literature in 
Religious Education this thesis is very much a part of the continuum of 
development in Religious Education championed by Grimmitt. 
Story, Imagination and Fantasy in Religious Education 
Complementary to these developments have been a burgeoning 
interest in, and development of, the place and role of story, imagination 
and fantasy in Religious Education. Story is a particularly appropriate 
literary form and process for use in Religious Education because, as a 
central and vivifYing part of life in all human cultures, it helps to explain, 
give meaning, nourish, and sustain. "The impulse to story ... consists in 
the need to respond to a challenge; and the challenge is one that lies in the 
simultaneous shapelessness and shapefulness of life" (Blishen, 1979, p. 
31). Story helps make sense of a seemingly chaotic world by giving 
direction, meaning, and security amidst the chaos. "Stories bind us 
together; human community depends on them" (Staudenmaier, 1988, p. 
314). Stories inform cultures, nations, communities, families, and 
individuals about themselves and each other and the interrelationships 
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between them. Through stories people can be "validated as persons" 
(Bausch, 1991, p. 46). This is why literature, both secular and religious, 
has so much value for human society. 
Moore (1991) discusses how narrative connects people to each 
other, how sharing stories roots people in a cultural background, and how 
narrative teaching "gives meaning to abstract concepts" (p. 131). For her, 
narrative is "a significant mode of human communication, a bearer and 
critic of culture, and a potentially profound and far-reaching educational 
method" (pp. 132-133). Moore emphasizes the relationship between 
education, narrative, and imagination, arguing for the importance of story 
in life and education, and the value of the narrative method in Religious 
Education. From a different pers~ective, Navone (1977) discusses links 
between theology and story, emphasizing "the narrative quality of 
religious experience" (p. 9). Story is considered vital to faith and in what 
he terms "biblical travel stories of God", Navone explores how "we have a 
multiplicity of travel stories that disclose who God is and who we are" (p. 
53). Navone suggests storytelling is involvement in several different, "but 
interpenetrating, levels of meaning, communicating a fullness of cognitive, 
effective [sic], and imaginational experience" (p. 11). For Navone "our 
stories and symbols reflect how we grasp ourselves and our world and how 
. . . they reflect the quality of our interrelatedness with reality" (p. 34). 
Similarly, Bausch (1991) suggests that "every story is religious" in his 
discussion of the relationship between faith and storytelling (p. 46). 
Crossan (1988) examines parable as 'story' with a subversive 
nature. He interprets the parables of Jesus as "intended to shatter the 
structural security of the hearer's world" (p. 101). The purpose of 
parables is to change us by challenging and upsetting deeply-held 
convictions about the way in which the world is ordered (p. 39). Bausch 
(1991) also examines the "disturbingly paradoxical and challenging" power 
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of parables (p. 117). Crossan (1988) suggests that parable is "necessary, 
logically, as the binary opposite of myth: myth proposes, parable 
disposes" (p. 47). There seems to be a potentially interesting correlation 
between this binary opposition, in which the opposites require each other, 
and Derrida's two interpretative positions, which although oppositional 
must exist together. For Crossan, the parable shatters the safely 
constructed vision of life that myth/religion perpetuate, thereby creating 
the possibility of transcendence. Crossan considers it is not possible to: 
get outside language and outside story. But one can sail as 
close as possible into the wind .... My suggestion is that the 
excitement of transcendental experience is found only at the 
edge oflanguage and the limit of story and that the only way to 
find that eT-citement is to test those edges and those limits. 
And that ... is what parable is all about. (pp. 29-30) 
Cupitt (1991) explores the importance of story in philosophical and 
religious thought. He feels the somewhat bad reputation that story has of 
being not 'true' has changed because truth is no longer seen as "outside 
the text, but ... is inherent in ... the text" (p. 23). In particular, Cupitt's 
discussion of the anti-story is a valuable study of story as 'not story'. He 
explores notions of language, reality, and truth from the perspective of 
Zen and its use of anti-stories or non-stories: 
More than any other faith Zen has recognized the absurdity of 
attempting altogether to escape from language. There is 
Nothing outside language, there is nothing outside language, 
there is nothing outside language ... yet Zen still obstinately 
follows nearly all other faiths and philosophies in locating 
salvation outside language in an effable Beyond. It is clever, 
yet it continues trying to point us beyond the text, even 
though it perceives that there is nothing to point to and no 
wayofpointingtoit. (p. 136) 
The concepts In Zen regarding story and language make it virtually an 
Eastern 'version' of the ideas in much Post-Structuralist literary theory. 
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II 
Concurrent to developments in Religious Education about story 
has been a growing interest in, and concern with, the place of imagination 
and fantasy. Imagination has a central place in Religious Education 
because, as Fischer (1983) argues, it "provides access to the deepest 
levels of truth and allows us to live in the 'real' world" (p. 6). Similarly, 
Bausch suggests that in story and storytelling can be seen "the power of 
imagination to proclaim the truth" (19~1. p. 47). Le Guin (1979) also 
points to achieving truth through imagination, maintaining that "it is by 
such beautiful non-facts [imaginative 'true' fantasy] that we ... may 
arrive ... at the truth" (p. 45). She believes that imagination leads to an 
understanding that fantasy, while not factual, is true. Fischer values 
imagination in Religious Education because to her it is "essential to 
Christian faith" (1983, p. 7). She describes imagination as the "inner 
rainbow", a bridge connecting the sacred and the secular (p. 7). This 
concept of 'bridge' is similar to Le Guin's ideas concerning the process of 
fantasy writing which involves making a bridge between the conscious 
and the unconscious so that the "readers can make the journey too" 
(1979, p. 79). Imagination, according toLe Guin, is one of the best ways of 
making this journey, where reason alone cannot lead. 
Le Guin distinguishes between what she calls 'true' fantasy and 
'false' fantasy. For her fantasy is not escapism and she observes that 
'true' fantasy, like the great myths, speaks "from the unconscious to the 
unconscious in the language of the unconscious" (1979, p. 62). To use 
Tolkien's terminology, escapist fantasy tells of the 'Flight of the Deserter' 
instead of the 'Escape of the Prisoner' (1964, p. 56). Fischer (1983) points 
to problems also associated with the UE1 of the word 'imagination', which 
stems from fear that it is illusory and unreal because of the tendency to 
"associate the imagination with emotion and intuition, and we in the West 
are schooled to regard these as sources of error and deception" (p. 5). Zuck 
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(1975) considers that "imagination in the form of the fantasizing process 
is one of our primary instruments for seeing beyond" (p. 589). He argues 
for the use of imaginative fantasy in Religious Education because fantasy 
"can enlarge our sense of what is 'real' or of value, and this movement is a 
necessary part of any response to the religious dimension of experience" 
(p. 590). Warnock (1976) believes that "the cultivation of imagination ... 
should be the chief aim of education" (p. 9). For her imagination "allows us 
both to express and to understand ideas" (p. 72) and also to create. While 
her discussion concerns education generally her emphasis is on the place 
and role of imagination "to go beyond .... [which] is an absolute 
necessity" (p. 201). 
Harris (1987) celebrates "fantasy as an epistemological power, as 
a unique form of imagination", and as the "capacity to enter into 
inwardness" (p. 8). For ber imaginative fantasy encourages the touching 
of "one's own human inwardness" (p. 14). Le Guin (1979) expresses 
similar views in her belief that fantasy "is the language of the inner self' 
because it allows us to make an inward journey (p. 70). Like Harris, 
Robinson (1982) also believes imagination to he essential for religious 
experience, "for feeling after the mystery oflife" (p. 87). He is concerned 
that "imagination is starved by those who wish to protect children from 
any aspects of reality hut the nice" (p. 88). In a similar vein, Le Guin 
deplores 'false' fantasy because it sanitates, trying to fix evil as if it were 
a problem rather than presenting it as it is: all the pain and suffering that 
is part of the human condition (1979, p. 69). 
In Religious Education concern with the place and role of fantasy 
and imagination adds considerably to the potential dimensions and value 
of 'story'. A variety of 'story' can be used and, in particular, the use of 
fantasy stories allows for consideration of the human situation in a way 
that is non-threatening to all children in an increasingly pluralistic 
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society. 'Story' may be variously used to teach about faith, explore issues 
of responsibility, exall'ine meaning, or question belief. It seems clear, 
then, that the impact of modem literary theory on how 'su>ry' can be read 
and studied should be ofconsider•.ble interest to religious educators. 
Modem Literacy Theory 
At the turn of the century literary theory was influenced by the 
emphasis in Humanism on the logocentric. Eagleton (1983) observes, for 
example, that for Husserllanguage was "a secondary activity which gives 
names to meanings" that are already possessed (p. 60). Both Leavis, who 
devised the literary canon of'great' literature, and Richards, who isolated 
the text from its historical context, promoted close reading of the text and 
this new critical approach held sway well into the 1970's (Barry, 1995, p. 
30). The author's intentions were considered irrelevant to the text's 
'meaning', as was the reader's subjective feelings. Although this type of 
critical approach to the literary text rejected the God-like status of the 
author, the 'essentialist truth' nature of literary theory remained and was 
vested in the critic. The critic now became a 'grand interpreter', revealing 
'the' meaning of the text for the reader. In the work ofHirsch, for example, 
literary meaning is considered "absolute and immutable" only because 
"his theory of meaning ... is pre-linguistic" (Eagleton, 1983, p. 67). 
Saussure strongly influenced the development of modern literary 
theory. In theorizing language as a system of signs he undermined "the 
notion that 'man' is the centre, source and origin of meaning" (Rice & 
Waugh, 1996, p. 6). For Saussure language did not just record or label the 
world but actually"constitutes our world .. -.Meaning is always attributed 
to the object or idea by the human mind, and constructed by and 
expressed through language" (Barry, 1995, p. 43). The Humanist idea 
that language expressed 'existing' meaning was thus severely ruptured by 
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Saussurean theory. The "hallmark of the 'linguistic revolution' ... is the 
recognition that meaning is not simply something 'expressed' or 'reflected' 
in language: it is actually produced by it" (Eagleton, 1983, p. 60). The 
effect of new literary approaches "was so powerful as to produce, by the 
late 1970's and early 1980's, a situation which was frequently referred to 
as a 'crisis' ... in the discipline of English" (Barry, 1995, p. 33). Literary 
theory would now stem from linguistic theory in which language was seen 
as pre-existing any order that humans make of the world. 
Saussure (1996) was the first to posit the idea that "in language 
there are only differences" (p. 14). Eagleton (1983) notes that for 
Saussure meaning can arise only from difference: 
Each sign ... has meaning only by virtue of its difference from 
the others. 'Cat' has meaning not 'in itself, but because it is 
not 'cap' or 'cad' or 'bat' . ... [Meaning is not] immanent in a 
sign but is ... the result of difference from other signs. (p. 97) 
A sign is comprised of a signifier (sound/image) and a signified (mental 
concept). In Saussurean linguistics "elements of language acquire 
meaning not as the result of some connection between words and things, 
but only as parts of a system of relations" (Selden, 1985, p. 53). Because 
the relation between the signifier and signified is a matter of convention 
the sign, and therefore meaning itself, is always arbitrary and relational. 
Culler (1981) points out tlhat: 
In analyzing signification Saussure and his later followers 
insist that forms and concepts do not exist indepen<l·•ntly of 
one another but that the sign consists of the union of a 
signifier and signified. Moreover - and this is the important 
point - both signifiers and signifieds are purely relational 
entities, products of a system of differences. (p. 40) 
The legacy of Saussure's ideas is most clearly seen in Structuralism and 
Post-Structuralism, but also influenced other modern literary theories. 
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Structuralists argued "that the structure of language produces 
'reality'" (Selden, 1985, p. 68). There is a rejection of the Humanist "myth 
that meaning begins and ends in the individual's 'experiencem (Ea~leton, 
1983, p. ll3). Langu~e 'pre-exists' any order that individuals make of the 
world. Meaning "isn't a kind of core or essence inside things: rather, 
meaning is always outside" (Barry, 1995, p. 39). Understanding arises 
from knowing what something is not rather than what it is. Structuralists 
tried to scientifically dissect language like a specimen. Meaning was then 
determined in relationship (difference) of sign to sign. "Meaning is 
dependent upon differential relations among elements within a system" 
(Rice & Waugh, 1996, p. 22). In Structuralism stability is produced, and 
play is contained, in the fusing of the signifier to the signified to produce 
the sign: like two trains on converging tracks that meet at one point - the 
sign. Thus, Structuralism, "while rejecting the idea of a unified meaning 
occupying the text, ... still seeks unity or unification in the literary 
system as a whole, r~.course to which can then 'explain' the individual 
work" (Rice & Waugh, 1996, p. 23). In practice, then, there is still a 'right 
meaning' in application. This 'right meaning' comes from "the operations 
and oppositions which govern language" (Selden, 1985, p. 68). 
Post-Structuralism grew out of Structuralist theories concerning 
instability of signification. There is considerable disagreement, however, 
about what constitutes Post-Structuralism and also about its relation to 
Structuralism. Nevertheless, it is the radical changes in ideas concerning 
language and meaning, stemming from Saussure and Structuralism, that 
underpin all Post-Structuralist theories. "Post-structuralists have in 
various ways prised apart the two halves of the sign" (Selden, 1985, p. 
73). In Post-Structuralism, unlike Structuralism, there is no fusion of the 
signifier and the signified to produce the sign: like two trains on parallel 
tracks that never meet. "If structuralism divided the sign from the 
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referent ... 'post-structuralism' ... divides the signifier from the signified" 
(Eagleton, 1983, p. 128). Post-Structuralism. because it views language 
as considerably Jess stable than Structuralism does, sits between the 
signifier and the signified. "The sign is not so much a unit with two sides, 
as a momentary 'fix' between two moving layers" (Selden, 1985, p. 73). 
1o Post-Structuralism there are no signifieds, only endless chains of 
signifiers. Meaning is apt to slip as signifiers enmesh with each other in 
the matrix of language. Post-Structuralists argue "that the sign is not 
stable, that there is an indeterminacy or undecidability about meaning 
and that it is subject to slippage from signifier to signifier" (Rice & Waugh, 
1996, p. 116). In the absence of the signified, Post-Structuralism 
applauds the play of textual signification and, unlike Structuralism, does 
not propound a monolithic 'methodology'. It operates from the premise 
that there are nv referential points by which to determine meaning, hence 
it "tries to deflate the scientific pretensions of structuralism" (Selden, 
1985, p. 72). Meaning is found not only in difference, as the Structuralists 
argued, but is also infinitely deferred. Textual meaning: 
is always somehow suspended, something deferred or still to 
come: one signifier relays me to another, and that to another 
... and although the sentence may come to an end the process 
oflanguage itself does not. (Eagleton,1983, p. 128) 
Post-Structurlilists relish in digging beneath the surface of t.lJ.e text 
as they are concerned with the difference between what a text says and 
what it purports to say. Selden (1985) observes that they tend to ask 
questions rather than provide answers, make the text work against itself, 
and refuse to make it mean something: "We may be irritated by the post-
structuralists' failure to arrive at conclusions, but they are only being 
consistent in their attempts to avoid logocentrism" (p. 102). In a Post-
Structuralist world "we can never quite close our fists over meaning, 
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which arises from the fact that language is a temporal process" 
(Eagleton. 1983. p. 128). In Post-Structuralism "everything is to be 
disentangled. nothing deciphered" (Barthes. 1996a, p. 121). Barthes 
describes this process as like following a thread in a stocking (p. 122). 
There is no beginning and no end, only traces of the journeying. Meaning: 
is scattered or dispersed along the whole chain of signifiers: it 
cannot be easily nailed down, it is never fully present in any 
one sign alone, but is rather a kind of constant flickering of 
presence and absence together. (Eagleton, 1983, p. 128) 
For Post-Structuralists the restrictions imposed by language 
cannot be escaped, hence their emphasis on the decentred (world, self, and 
text). There are no points of contact between signifiers and signifieds to 
produce signs, resulting in an absence of stable reference points by which 
to determine anything with any certainty. With no fixed points from which 
to view the world it becomes a "gravity-free universe, without upside down 
or right way up" (Barry, 1995, p. 62). Although Post-Structuralism can 
seem painfully devastating and rupturing as it undermines logocentrism it 
can be viewed positively: 
Post-structuralism's iconoclastic nature can be uplifting. One 
might grieve the passing of textual absolutes and the tradition 
of critical reading they supported, but there must also be room 
for the euphoric giddiness produced by Barthesian readings, 
which illustrate the potential for creativity unleashed by the 
playing oftext. (Moon, 1990, p. 20) 
One could also add Derridean interpretations to this Post-
Structuralist pre-occupation with the giddy play of language within the 
text. While the early Barthes is associated with Structuralism, the later 
Barthes, like Derrida, is considered a major exponent of Post-
Structuralism. In particular, Derrida's ideas contributed strongly to the 
development of Post-Structuralism, which in some instances "has almost 
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become synonymous with the name of Derrida and the mode of analysis 
he inaugurates- 'deconstructionm (Rice & Waugh, 1996, p. 114). Derrida's 
emphasis on the "joyous affirmation of the play of the world" (Derrida, 
1978, p. 292) celebrates a liberation of the text from logocentrism just as 
Barthes' death of the author celebrates a liberation of the text from the 
clutches of the "Author-God" (Barthes, 1996a, p.121). However, Post-
Structuralism "is not a homogeneous entity" (Moon, 1990, p. 8) and this 
makes definition difficult but also facilitates the various, sometimes 
antithetical, theoretical directions. For example, according to Barthes 
(1996a) it is in the reader that a text's unity lies: "the birth of the reader 
must be at the cost of the death of the Author" (p. 122). In contrast, 
Foucault (1984b) is interested in what the author ;deologically represents, 
warning that "we must locate the space left empty by the author's 
disappearance" and watch for what fills these gaps (p. 105). 
In addition to Post-Structuralism, some of the many other areas of 
modern literary theory include Marxism, Feminism, Post-Modernism, and 
Post-Colonialism. The great expanse of modern literary theory is not 
contained or static. It continually expands as new ideas are presented, 
older approaches are re-appraised, or existing theories are fused together 
or split still further. From the plethora of theories available Derrida's "two 
interpretations of interpretation" is considered a particularly valuable 
approach for reading literature in Religious Education. It has been 
demonstrated that Religious Education has responded to developments in 
other fields of human learning and there is no reason why it should not 
also respond to developments in modern literary theory. This thesis is 
very much situated in the literary critical arena. 
Developmenta in Engliah Education 
The way in which literature is read and studied in English has been 
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strongly influenced by modem literary theory. Cohan and Shires ( 1988) 
discuss narratives and the way they "structure the meanings by which a 
culture lives" (p. 1). In an examination of Saussurean linguistics they 
demonstrate that in a discourse a sign can disrupt as well as facilitate the 
passage of meaning because "the relation of signifier to signified is 
unstable" (p. 19). Medway and Stibbs (1990) argue that because the text 
is a signifier it is neither a window on the world nor a reflection of it. They 
discuss how deconstruction reveals a text's pretendedness and 
encourages an "awareness of the textuality of text" (p. 78). 
Gilbert (1991) e':plores narrative as a social practice that needs to 
be placed in a socialllanguage framework to see its role in regulating social 
meaning. She observes that stories "take place within a particular 
cultural semiotic" and discusses the way both narratives and narrators 
are "socially and culturally situated" (p. 38). Burgess (1988) is also 
concerned with the social framework of language and text and argues for 
"renewed attention to classroom discou, se, guided by a social view of 
language and development" (p. 167). Freebody, Luke, and Gilbert (1990) 
are interested in the social construction of reading, emphasizing the way 
in which texts can operate to conceal their ideologies by covertly 
positioning readers so that the apparently 'natural' organization of 
material "authorizes particular ideologies" (p. 441). 
O'Neill (1990) discusses the promotion of resistant readings, and 
advocates 'molesting' the text to alert students to the constructedness of 
texts and the cultural values endorsed by them (p. 90). Mellor, O'Neill and 
Patterson (1990) investigate the need for new types of questions to be 
asked in order to show that texts are not a slice of life nor a reflection of it. 
Such questions also reveal the wconstructedness' of a text", the "plurality 
of a text's meaning" (p. 9), and how "language constructs particular 
versions of reality" (p. 4). Corcoran (1992) examines the Cultural Critical 
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practice used in :O:nglish to construct critical readers rather than 
responsive readers. He considers teaching methods where the teacher 
sees his/her role as "unravelling the one true meaning" of the text or as 
"curator of canonic treasures" are problematic (p. 72). 
O'Neill (1993) investigates Cultural Criticism, which "derives from 
post-structuralist literary theory and linguistic theories in which language 
is regarded as a construct that assigns meaning arbitrarily" (p. 20). 
Language, texts, and readings are seen as culturally constructed: 
Practices which promote the capacity see the text as a 
construction, rather than as a reflection of reality, allow 
readers space in which to challenge the bases of the 
construction, rather than accepting it as given. (p. 24) 
O'Neill discusses how different readings privilege or suppress particular 
ideas or values. "Different ideologies construct different relationships 
between the writer, the text, and the reader in terms of production and 
legitimation of meaning" (p. 19). Cultural Criticism asks such questions 
as: "What are possible readings of the text? How are readings of character 
constructed?" (p. 20). O'Neill argues that this approach to literature seeks 
to construct critical readers instead of responsive readers because 
"responsive readers are prisoners of the text, while critical readers have 
the option to resist the text and take up alternative, even oppositional, 
reading positions" (p. 24). Cultural Criticism allows for a multiplicity of 
meaning. It does not detract from what may be considered the preferred 
reading but furnishes a variety of readings. Meaning, in either text or 
society, is not final or absolute. The Cultural Critical practice conc'<iers 
"reading is a learned practice of making meanings" (p. 19) and !.alps 
students to understand that society, text, and meaning are ccnstructs 
and meaning is culturally defined. Fnr O'Neill, personal growth towards 
wholeness and meaning does not take place in a vacuum but in society: 
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Texts, rather than being regarded as the repositories of 
putative meanings or as offering universal statements dbout 
the human condition, can be perceived as culturally located 
artifacts, potential sites for the production of competing or 
conflicting meanings. (p. 24) 
Understanding the interrelationship between tbe individual and society is 
vital in any quest for meaning and purpose in life. 
The influence of modern literary theory on how English is taught 
impacts directly on English Education in Western Australia. Since the 
1980's there has been an emphasis in English Education on developing 
critical readers and fostering an understanding that a "text is a 
construction, not a reflection of reality that is 'truem (O'Neill, 1990, p. 93). 
Intertextuality now forms part of year eleven and twelve literature 
courses and is an examinable part of tbe Literature TEE examination. In 
tbe Draft Curriculum Framework for Kindergarten to Year 12 Education 
in Western Australia (1997) the learning 11rea statement for English 
states that language "is influenced by the context of its production .... 
[and) influences the context and how it is perceived" (p. 6). In English 
"students learn . . . that language operates as a social process" (p. 7 4 ). 
While English still necessarily includes functional literacy as one of its 
main aims, it also includes critical literacy, which involves: 
knowledge about language and how it works, .... an 
understanding that language is a dynamic social process, ... 
an awareness that the meaning of any form of communication 
depends on context, purpose and audience .... [and an) ability 
to reflect on and critically analyse one's own use of language 
and tbe language of others. (p. 75) 
The Draft Curriculum Framework is indicative of the fact that English 
orientates itself towards developing student understanding and awareness 
oftbe constructedness oflanguage, text, readings, and meanings. 
As with developments in Religious Education, particularly 
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Grimmitt's work, developments in English Education concerning 
treatment of the text and meaning were also seminal in suggesting a 
possible direction for this theois. Through an investigation of the value of 
Derrida's "two interpretations of interpretation" for reading literature in 
Religious Education, this thesis is very much a part of the continuing 
development of the impact of modern literary theory on how literature is 
read. There are compelling reasons why modern literary theory should 
also be of interest to teachers of Religious Education. A situation where a 
student has to 'learn' that reading literature in English means utilizing 
certain approaches to texts but has to employ quite different approaches 
to texts in Religious Education would be educationally untenable. 
Moreover, the application of modern literary theory has the potential to 
considerably enrich the reading of literature li1 Religious Education rather 
than undermine it or hijack its pre-eminent concern with the search for 
meaning and purpose. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Methodology: Derridean Post-Structuralism 
Derrida's theoretical output is vast and complex and has 
significantly impacted on modern literary theory as a whole, though he is 
primarily linked with Post-Structuralism. Derrida "has been seen as 
almost synonymous with the post-structuralist enterprise ... [and] is 
perhaps best known for inaugurating 'deconstructionm (Rice & Waugh, 
1996, p. 173). While the methodology utilized in this thesis stems 
generally from Post-Structuralism, the particular direction taken is that 
ofDerrida's "two interpretations ofinterpretation" (Derrida, 1978, p. 292). 
Although Post-Structuralism's concern with the impossibility of final 
meaning is contrary to Religious Education's concern with the search for 
definitive meaning Dert'ida furnishes an ap;oroach to reading literature 
that accommodates both of these oppositional positions. By examining A 
Wizard ofEarthsea using Derrida's "two interpretations of interpretation" 
its value as a methodological approach for reading literature in Religious 
Education is effectively demonstrated. In this thesis the methodology also 
necessarily incorporates and builds upon recent developments in Religious 
Education and English Education. 
Derrida is often cited as the instigator of Post-Structuralism. 
Indeed, its "starting point ... may be taken as his 1966 lecture Structure, 
Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" (Barry, 1995, p. 
66). This lecture was delivered at a conference at Johns Hopkins 
University intended to introduce Structuralism to American intellectuals 
and academics. "In fact, and prim !lrily in the person of Derrida himself, 
the conference was announcing not the advent of structuralism, but its 
demise" (Salusinszky, 1987, p. 9), and the advent of Post-Structuralism. 
For both Derrida and Post-Structuralism in general the world is 
considered decentred: there is a decentring of world and self and text: "we 
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cannot know where we are, since all the concepts which previously defined 
the centre ... have been 'deconstructedm (Barry, 1995, p. 62). Barry uses 
an apt analogy to explain how in this decentred world there is a lack of 
reference poinL' by which to know anything with certainty: 
Without a fixed point of reference against which to measure 
movement you cannot tell whether or not you are moving at 
dll. You have probably at some time had the experience of 
sitting in a stationary train with another train between 
yeurself and the far platform. When that train begins to move 
you may have the sensation that it is your train which is 
moving and only realise this isn't so when the other train has 
gone and you again see the fixed point of the platform. (p. 61) 
Post-Structuralism is concerned with the textual play of signification and 
the provisional nature of meaning. It is considered by both Derrida and 
Post-Structuralists that it is not possible to escape the restrictive 
parameters of language, hence the impossibility of the existence of both 
the signified and absolute meaning. Post-Structuralists occupy their time 
and energy"tracing the insistent activity of the signifier as it forms cross-
currents of meaning with other signifiers and defies the orderly 
requirements of the signified" (Selden, 1985, p. 73). In the Post-
Structuralist world-view there can be nothing 'outside' language so 
investment in concepts that rely on a logocentric outlook are rejected. 
Post-Structuralism and the Derridean position challenge "not only 
Saussurean structuralism but aU discourses which purport to be 
grounded in values external to their own structures" (Moon, 1990, p. 14). 
The Derridean Position 
Derrida discusses his two interpretative positions in his prestigious 
paper Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences: 
There are . . . two interpretations of interpretation; of 
structure, of sign, of play. The one seeks to decipher, dreams 
of deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play and the 
order of the sign, and which lives the necessity of 
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interpretation as an exile. The other, which is no longer turned 
toward the origin, affirms play and tries to pass beyond man 
and humanism, the name of man being the name of that being 
who, ... throughout his entire history - has dreamed of full 
presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of 
play. (Derrida, 1978, p. 292) 
One interpretative position Derrida terms the Rousseauistic 
interpretation, which seeks the centre (searches for the signified), and the 
other is the Nietzschean interpretation, which affirms free play (free play 
of endless chains of signifiers). It is crucial to an understanding of 
Derrida's two interpretative positions to follow his movement from a 
logocentric world in which the centre of the structure was fixed to a world 
where this way of thinking was shattered. 
Derrida views the episteme, the entire Western tradition of 
scientific and philosophical thought, as caught up in determining 
fundamental principles hy fixing centres into every structure. The centre 
functioned "not only to orient, balance, and organize the structure ... but 
above sll to make sure that the organizing principle of the structure would 
limit what we might call the play of the structure" (Derrida, 1978, p. 278). 
The centre, according to Derrida, permits play of elements within the 
structure because it orients and organizes the coherence of the system, 
but the centre also closes off play because it stabilizes the structure: • At 
the center, the permutation or the transformation of elements ... is 
forbidden" (Derrida, 1978, p. 279). The centre is both inside and outside 
the structure: it fixes the structure from the inside but authenticates the 
meaning of the structure from the outside. The centre "cannot be 
implicated in the very languages which it attempts to order and anchor: it 
must be somehow anterior to these discourses" (Eagleton, 1983, p. 131). 
Because the centre is both foundational to the structure and the source of 
authority for meaning in that structure it must be beyond the structure. 
The centre "governs the structure but is itself not subject to structural 
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analysis (to find the structure of the centre would he to find another 
centre)" (Selden, 1985, p. 84). 
Derrida points to the Western preoccupation with the centre as 
clearly evident in the drive to find fundamental principles. He views 
thought systems as metaphysical if they depend on "an unassailable 
foundation, a first principle or unimpeachable ground upon which a whole 
hierarchy of meanings can be constructed" (Eagleton, 1983, p. 132). The 
centre has historically received different names in the Western concept of 
structure and "must be thought of as a series of substitutions of center 
for center, as a linked chain of determinations of the center" (Derrids, 
1978, p. 279). As each new thought system became established a new 
centre replaced the old centre but whatever form the centre took it 
always centred on the human. In the West there are "innumerable terms 
which operate as centering principles: being, essence, substance, truth, 
form, beginning, end, purpose, consciousness, man, God, and so on" 
(Selden, 1985, p. 84). The Derridean concept of centre always represents 
a fixed point and always points to a presence, which is seen as outside the 
structure or system. Derrids (1978) argues that the matrix of Western 
thought, particularly metaphysics, is "the determination of Being as 
presence .... [All] names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the 
center have always designated an invariable presence" (p. 279). 
For Derrida thought systems are logocentric if they rely on a 
metaphysics of presence which validates the centre, thereby fixing 
meaning that is beyond questioning. Culler (1983) considers alllogocentric 
concepts "involve a notion of presence" and in oppositional pairs such as: 
positive/negative, transcendental/empirical, ... the superior 
term belongs to the logos and is a higher presence; the inferior 
term marks a fall. Logocentrism thus assumes the priority of 
the first term and conceives the second in relation to it, as a 
complication ... or a disruption of the first. (p. 93) 
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The dual function of the centre was to determine meaning and validate it 
by referring to a presence outside the structure for its authority, thereby 
placing it beyond debate. Logocentrism yearns for the sign which will 
furnish meaning to all other signs"- the 'transcendental signifier'- and for 
the anchoring, unquestionable meaning to which all our signs can be seen 
to point (the transcendental signified')" (Eagleton, 1983, p. 131). Fixing 
linguistic meaning within the structure places it beyond play: it becomes 
'the' meaning, at lea'"': until a new centre replaces the old one. The centre 
operates to restrict "the text's potential to mean" (Moon, 1990, p. 16). 
Derrida points to an historical 'event' (the process of decentring 
logocentric thought patterns) that ruptured this safe and reassuring way 
of thinking, after which language was seen as preceding and producing 
meaning and reality. "Derrida sees in modern times a particular 
intellectual 'event' which constitutes a radical break from past ways of 
thought" (Barry, 1995, p. 66). Derrida (1978) considers this 'event': 
was the moment when language invaded the universal 
problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a center or 
origin, everything became discourse ... that is to say, a 
system in which the central signified, the original or 
transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a 
system of differences. (p. 280) 
While Derrida (1978) describes the movement away from a logocentric 
way of thinking and seeing the world as an event or rupture he also 
considers it symptomatic of an historical era and specifically links it with 
a number of influential thinkers, includint 
the Nietzschean critique of metaphysics, the critique of the 
concepts of Being and truth, for which were substituted the 
concepts of play, interpretation, and sign ... ; the Freudian 
critique of ... consciousness ... ; and, more radically, the 
Heideggerean destruction of metaphysics. (p. 280) 
Central to Derridean theory are the distinctions made between a 
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logocentric world, in which the structure's centre both determined 
meaning and referred to a presence outBide the structure for it." authority, 
and a world where such intellectual frames of reference were severely 
fra~ented. If there is no direct correlation between the signifier and the 
signified, and if the text "cannot be legitimately grounded in external 
points of origin, how then can we arrive at final, complete meanings? The 
simple answer is that we cannot" (Moon, 1990, p. 16). After the 'event' 
the world was decentred, without fixed reference point or absolute 
meaning. The centre, which had previously 'operated' the structure like an 
axis or drive-shaft and 'fixed' it in place like a lynch pin or key stone, was 
no more. In this new world there are "no absolutes or fixed points, so that 
the world we live in is 'decentred' or inherently relativistic. Instead of ... a 
known centre, all we have is 'free play'" !Barry, 1995, p. 67). 
The rupturing of logocentric thought patterns does not indicate 
that the centre, which used to exist, no longer exists but that 
logocentrism fostered the illusion that there were such things as centres 
in the first place. Nevertheless, even rejecting logocentrism it is not 
possible to completely move beyond the use of centring principles that 
are reflected in such terms as God, Word, consciousness, and truth. 
Indeed, "Derrida does not assert the p•ossibility of thinking outside such 
terms; any attempt to undo a particular concept is to become caught up 
in the terms which the concept depends on" (Selden, 1985, p. 84). It is not 
possible to return to a 'before-this-event' position, hence the sadness and 
anxiety associated with the loss of the centre. The loss of the ideal of 
logocentrism implies the impossibility of the centre and therefore of 
meaning itself. After the 'event' Derrida (1978) points to a world where: 
it was necessary to begin thinking that there was no center, 
that the center could not be thought in tlhe form of a present-
being, tlhat the center had no natural site, that it was not a 
fixed locus but a function, a sort of nonlocus in which an 
infinite number of sign-substitutions came into play. (p. 280) 
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Accepting the world as decentred does not mean that logocentric concepts 
'cannot' exist, but that they cannot be 'proved' to exist and should 
therefore not be invested in. "People desire a centre because it guarantees 
bein{!as presence" (Selden, 1985, p. 84). Nevertheless, for Derrida (1987): 
Logocentrism is ... fundamentally, an idealism. It is the 
matrix of idealism. Idealism is its most direct representation, 
the most constantly dominant force. And the dismantling of 
logocentrism is simultaneously- a fortiori ·a deconstitution of 
idealism or spiritualism in all their variants. (p. 51) 
Once the transcendental signified is accepted as being absent the 
reign of play marks a new epoch. Play is "equivalent to an absence, the 
absence of a founding origin ... [but functions to] cross, somehow envelop 
and exceed the question of being" (Haar, 1992, p. 63). Meaning, instead of 
being absolute as in a logocentric world, becomes disseminated along 
chains of signifiers. For Derrida and Post-Structuralists "meaning is not 
something located within a text; rather, it is a thing chased through a 
text. It is not an ending but a journeying" (Moon, 1990, p. 17). Derrida 
(1978) describes the methodology of play as "the disruption of presence" 
(p. 292). The metaphysics of presence demands an escape from play that 
is achieved by the centre closing off play other than the play of elements 
that forms the invested and transcendentally signified. Bass (cited in 
Haar, 1992, p. 63) observes that "the concept of play ... announces ... 
the unity of chance and necessity in calculations without end". In the web 
oftextuality the play of multiple chains of signifiers is never-ending. 
It is the contrast between the 'before' and 'after', between the 
logocentric and decentred worlds, that is reflected in the contrast between 
the 'restricted' play of the Rousseauistic position and the free play of the 
Nietzschean position. Although Derrida rejects logocentrism, he does 
acknowledge that the human desire for meaning, even security of belief, is 
understandable. On the basis of the certitude afforded by logocentric 
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thought systems, observes Derrida (1978), "anxiety can be mastered" (p. 
279). Nevertheless, Derrida applauds the free play that is only possible at 
the edge of the linguistic abyss of Post-Structuralism where play "is 
always play of absence and presence" 0978, p. 292). The interpretative 
contrast Derrida makes is represented by the binary opposition between 
Rousseau and Nietzsche. Hart (1991) observes that this dichotomy could 
just as easily have been between the standard oppositional pairing of 
Kant and Nietzsche (p. 118) What is import.ant to note is that Derrida is 
drawing a contrast between grounded (Rousseauistic) and ungrounded 
(Nietzschean) modes of interpretation that are clearly inverse to each 
other. 
Derrida's "two interpretations of interpretation" ensures a 
methodological approach for reading literature in Religious Education that 
encompasses both the search for the centre (the Rousseauistic 
interpretation) and the play of signifiers (the Nietzschean interpretation). 
The Derridean approach fosters a much broader consideration of meaning 
and the meaning-making process than would be possible with only 
pursuing either the Rousseauistic or the Nietzschean interpretation. 
Culler (1981) observes of interpretative entanglements and 
disagreements that "to understand the ambiguity or openness of literary 
meaning, one must study the reading process. No other area of literary 
criticism offers such an interesting and valuable program" (p. 79). By 
pursuing two different reading processes, or interpretative positions, a 
valuable and challenging encounter with the text is guaranteed that 
ensures an accommodation of both the search for absolute meaning and 
the play of many provisional meanings. 
The Rousseauistie Interpretation 
This interpretation dreams of finding the centre. In practice its 
application for reading literature results in a process seeking to centre the 
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structure of the text. For example, in A Wizard of Earthsea this process 
can be seen in centring the novel on the concepts of the Jungian shadow 
or Taoist balance. Derrida terms this position Rousseauistic because of 
his reading of Rousseau's philosophical stance concerning language and 
origins. "Rousseau is preeminently the philosopher of origins, one who 
sought by every possible means to restore language to a natural state of 
simplicity, innocence and grace" (Norris, 1987, p. 103). Rousseau looked 
back to an idyllic time of humans living in a 'natural' state of grace, before 
civilization wrought social evils. "Rousseau wants to think that there is 
(or once was) a perfect adjustment between man's social and his natural 
needs" (Norris, p. 107). 
Hence, in his Rousseauistic interpretation Derrida (1978) sees this 
position as one that "seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or 
an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign" (p. 292). In this 
backward looking stance there is a melancholy longing for the lost centre, 
for the ideal oflogocentrism. Derrida calls such an interpretative position 
sad because he sees it as seeking certainty that is simply not possible 
given the constraints of the linguistic world that humans inhabit. Implicit 
in this backward looking stance towards the lost centre is the belief in the 
existence of a centre in the first place. The Rousseauistic interpretation is 
necessarily separated from what it seeks, hence the sad longing for the 
centre and the nostalgic dreams of deciphering a truth, "the full presence, 
the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of play" (Derrida, 1978, 
p. 292). Similar to Derrida's view of the Rousseauistic interpretation as 
sad and negative is Nietzsche's description of philosophical perspectives 
that rely on the transcendental. Nietzsche describes as: 
'woeful wisdom' any view that rates life inferior to some 
supposed transcendental state. All such views - that is to say, 
almost all the great philosophies and religions of the human 
past- link life's meaning to fulfillment in an imaginary beyond. 
(Novak,1996,p. 19) 
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While Derrida considers the Rousseauistic position sad he is not, 
however, actually saying that there is no transcendental signified; there 
may or may not be. What Derrida is saying is that it cannot be proved to 
exist from within the parameters of Post-Structuralist linguistics. As a 
process, then, while a Taoist reading of A Wizard ofEarthsea may appeal 
to Taoism as the transcendental signified by which to understand the 
text's meaning, Taoism itself cannot be proved to exist outside language. 
The Rousseauistic interpretation represents the logocentric impulse that 
looks for the centre, or origin, or truth of the structure. Derrida considers: 
this Rousseauist mythology of origins and presence still very 
much at work in the modern sciences of man. And nowhere 
more so, he argues, than in structuralist thinking about 
language, society and cultural history. (Norris, 1987, pp. 127-
128) 
In Religious Education there is a heavy investment in reading 
literature in a way that affirms foundations and uses the centre to fix a 
structure and provide definitive meaning. Such an interpretative stance, 
which is rejected by Derrida and Post-Structuralism, operates on "the 
idea that texts are validated by something outside themselves, that they 
serve as pointers for concepts separable from their own structures" 
(Moon, 1990, p. 15). The methodology involved in reading a text from the 
Rousseauistic interpretation is a process directed at deciphering 'the' 
meaning in its search for the transcendental signified. For example, as 
applied to A Wizard of Earthsea this search for the transcendental 
signified suggests either a Taoist centre or a Jungian centre. Although 
Derrida considers the Rousseauistic interpretation sad he does, however, 
acknowledge the human need for fixing centres in structures in order to 
give meaning and assurance. The logocentric impulse to centre structures 
furnishes certitude which helps master anxiety (Derrida, 1978, p. 279). 
The Rousseauistic position necessitates an end to any potential 
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play within the structure. In addition to escaping from play there is also 
an escape from the order of the sign since it is presence as Being that is 
desired and not affirmation of infinitely variable signs where, in essence. 
there is no finite meaning. For Derrida (1978). this interpretation is 
turned "towards the lost or impossible presence of the absent origin, this 
structuralist thematic of broken immediacy is therefore the saddened. 
negative. nostalgic, guilty, Rousseauistic side of the thinking of play" (p. 
292). Bernasconi (1992) notes that, for Derrida, Rousseau is seen as 
concerned with conceiving and promoting concepts that bear the 
metaphysical mark of preoence, hence the Derridean description of the 
Rousseauistic interpretation as concerned with the presence of Being: 
Derrida regards Rousseau as always wanting to opt for the 
chain of concepts that beard the mark of presence .... 
Rousseau is thus understood in terms of a contemporary 
discourse ... that identifies Western metaphysics with the 
priority of presence. ( p. 144) 
The Rousseauistic interpretation relies on a metaphysics of presence 
which not only validates the centre but also fixes meaning that is beyond 
questioning. Meaning is thus determined by the centre, which also refers 
to a presence external to the structure for its authority. 
Although human history attests to the drive towards locating a 
firm foundation that gives reassurance and stability, Derrida considers 
such positioning idealistic. Norris (1987) observes that "bound up with 
the :Rousseauist mystique of origins and presence .... [is] the supposed 
evils of modern 'civilized' existence cut off from the primitive state of 
commtmal grace" (p. 122). In his philosophy Rousseau looks back to an 
idyllic state of the 'noble savage', now lost to modern society. Hence, 
Derrida's description of the Rousseauistic interpretation as negative 
because it is concerned with the presence of what is absent. Moreover, in 
seeking that which is now rendered idealistic and absent this 
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interpretative position "lives the necessity of interpretation as an exile" 
(Derrida, 1978, p. 292). Derrida does not favour this position because he 
feels it is sad, negative, and exiled since it is necessarily removed from 
what it seeks. However, what religious educators would seek to add is 
that there is 'hope' and 'faith' that 'something' beyond this world does exist 
even if it cannot be proved to exist; in addition to sadness, exi]e, and 
negativity, then, there is faith and within this is affirmation and joy. As a 
methodological process the value of this interpretation for reading 
literature in Religious Education, as illustrated in Chapter Four with 
reference to A Wizard of Earthsea, lies in its pre-eminent concern with 
the search for definitive meaning and as such it becomes one of the 
"tnyriad ways in which meaning ... is sought" (supra vide, p. 11). 
Application of the Rousseauistic interpretation undertaken in this 
thesis involves a process of examining A Wizard of Earthsea for ways in 
which the text can be centred and definitive meaning sought. ln the 
classroom the teacher would direct the reading process. having previously 
decided how the text will be read and interpreted. However, in this study 
several examples of the Rousseauistic interpretation of the novel have 
been selected to illustrate the type ofRousseauistic interpretation likely 
to be chosen by the Religious Education teacher and to demonstrate this 
Derridean interpretative position in operation. Chapter Four contains a 
study of the novel from the Jungian concept of the shadow and the Taoist 
concept of balance, which are the most obvious examples of this 
interpretation that the reader will encounter. 
The Rousseauistic interpretation of A Wizard of Earthsea is 
accomplished by closely reading and studying the text as either a story 
about Ged who finally recognizes and accepts his dark side in his journey 
towards wholeness or a story about Ged who learns about the 
importance of balance in his journey towards a holistic and balanced life. 
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The novel so 'naturally' lends itself to either of these readings that they 
'appear' to constitute its 'meaning'. Both examples centre the structure of 
the text by appealing to an external authority (Jungian psychology or 
Taoism) to validate the sought-after definitive meaning. In centring the 
novel in this way any potential play is closed off. The Rousseauistic 
interpretation of the novel as exemplified in Chapter Four indicates the 
logocentric impetus to search for absolute meaning. 
In this thesis the methodological process of applying the 
Rousseauistic interpretation is achieved by centring the novel, which 
limits the focus, confines the possibilities, and restricts the reading 
process. The examples used in Chapter Four demonstrate how the text 
can be read and interpreted in a directed, contained, and closed manner. 
This methodological process would translate into a teaching process that 
is narrowly focussed and directed. Approaching A Wizard of Earth sea as 
illustrated in Chapter Four reflects the type of Rousseauistic 
interpretative approach that could he utilized by the Religious Education 
teacher in selecting and directing the teaching and interpretation of the 
novel. This process is a grounded interpretation that closes the novel by 
centring the text in the search for definitive meaning. 
The Nietzschean Interpretation 
Derrida sees in Nietzsche a rejection of logocentrism, of absolute 
truths and meanings. For Nietzsche there "is only a perspective seeing, 
only a perspective 'knowing' (Novak, 1996, p. 49). Nietzsche was 
interested in truth, perception, and language. He considered that "people 
first decide what they want and then fit the facts to their aim: 
'Ultimately, man finds in things nothing but what he himself has imported 
into them'" (Selden, 1985, p. 98). Nietzschean philosophy points to the 
error of 'false' causality. Although it is generally believed that causation is 
understood Nietzsche asks "but whence did we derive our ... belief we 
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possessed this knowledge? From the realm of the celebrated 'inner facts', 
none of which up till now been shown to be factual" (Novak, 1996, p. 63). 
Nietzsche radically upset the Western pre-occupation with causality and 
its insistence on providing explanations, reasons, and origins. Culler 
(1983) outlines Nietzsche's ideas on "the concept of causal structure [as] 
... the product of precise tropological or rhetorical operation" (p. 86). 
Nietzsche also undermined the Western historical perspective in his 
concept of 'false' causality. Foucault (1984a) discusses Nietzsche's 
understanding of history as involving a rejection of cause-and-effect 
continuity and instead an emphasizing of its responding to "haphazard 
conflicts" (p. 88) and its "affirmation of knowledge as perspective" (p. 90). 
Niet.zsche (1977) attacked temporal ideas regarding causality, arguing 
that cause and effect as "a duality probably never occurs" and is not a 
continuum but "a capricious division and fragmentation" (p. 62). 
Nietzsche's renouncement of logocentric thought patterns 
constituted a powerful and wrenching influence on subsequent thinking. 
Kung (1980) observes of Nietzsche that he "pierced through to the 
foundations of human knowledge and questioned them as no one had done 
before him. No one has equalled him in the acuteness, depth, and 
radioalness of his thought" (p. 410). It is not surprising, then, that Derrida 
should call his radical interpretation of interpretation after Nietzsche. 
This Derridean interpretative position, as with Post-Structuralist thought 
in general, reflects Nietzsche's "famous remark 'There are no facts, only 
interpretations'" (Barry, 1995, p. 63). Such interpretations are 
"orchestrated by the will to power" (Novak, 1996, p. 11). In Nietzschean 
philosophy Derrida found an understanding of the limitations oflanguage: 
Every candidate for 'truth' must first be expressed in 
language, and language, Nietzsche reminds us, is notoriously 
unable to get at reality. It oversimplifies and distorts, 
concealing at least as much as it reveals. (Novak, 1996, p. 
10). 
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Nietzsche's concern with the problems and restrictions oflanguage 
can be seen reflected in the playful approach U> language so central to 
Derrida's Nietzschean interpretative position. Derrida describes this 
position as not concerned with trying to find centres but rather with the 
impossibility of meaning contained in the endless chains of signifiers. The 
Nietzschean position, "which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms 
play and tries to pass beyond man and humanism" (Derrida, 1978, p. 
292). There is a rejection of, and movement beyond, anthropocentricism 
to a position that neither seeks the centre nor centres on the human but 
exhibits a "joyous affirmation of the play of the world" (Derrida, 1978, p. 
292). Such play is only possible without the centre. In the concept of play 
Derrida refers to the ideas of Nietzsche for whom "reason has no 
foundation other than the play of the non-ground ofinterpretation" (Hart, 
1991, p. 73). Nietzsche denied the existence of truth considering it "the 
name we give to that which agrees with our instinctual preferences; it is 
what we call our interpretation of the world, especially when we want to 
foist it on others" (Novak, 1996, p. 11). His rejection of 'truth' attacked 
the foundations oflogocentric thought. Nietzsche "raises the question of 
truth ... more radically than anyone before him" (KUng, 1980, p. 383). 
The Nietzschean interpretation does not celebrate a lost centre 
but affirms the noncentre: "This affirmation then determines the noncenter 
otherwise than as wss of the center" (Derrida, 1978, p. 292). It does not 
seek to re-centre the human in another way because such centring is 
deemed an illusion. Nor is this position interested in re-gaining the lost 
centre because it does not consider there ever was a centre, it just looked 
as though there was. Nietzsche challenged the logocentric pursuit of 
origins: "What is found at the historical beginning of things is not the 
inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of things. It is 
disparity" (Foucault, 1984a, p. 79). Derrida sees in Nietzsche's rejection 
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of origins a joyous affirmation of the noncentre. For Derrida (1978), then, 
the Nietzschean interpretation is positive, an: 
affirmation, that is the joyous affirmation of the play of the 
world and of the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a 
world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin 
which is offered to an active interpretation. (p. 292) 
Such positive affirmation in this interpretative position reflects the 
Nietzschean ~Joyful Wisdomm at the rejection of logocentrism and its 
investment in transcendental signifieds (Novak, 1996, p. 19). Derrida 
considers the 'event' that disrupt€d the logocentric world, as seen from the 
Nietzschean position, as a joyous event because it facilitated free play. ln 
Derridean terms 'play' enters a new era once the transcendental signified 
is accepted as being absent: play is now "the disruption of presence" 
(Derrida, 1978, p. 292). No security or reassurance is offered in this 
position; play is risky, but is considered productive and pleasurable. The 
Nietzschean interpretation "plays without security .... In absolute 
chance, affirmation surrenders itself to genetic indetermination, to the 
seminal adventure of the trace" (Derrida, 1978, p. 292). 
In the Nietzschean position there is no longer a decipherment 
based on a centre, on an authority that translates the meaning. Rather, 
the emphasis is on the free play of signifiers. Nietzsche (1977) considered 
that truth is entirely a matter of one's perspective and in his time saw a 
giving way of absolute truth to a position where truth is relative (p. 9). 
Hence the Derridean description of the Nietzschean interpretation as 
concerned with deconstructing the text and exposing the free play of 
endless chains of signifiers. The methodology involved in this 
interpretation is a process concerned not with deciphering 'the' meaning, 
as in the Rousseauistic interpretation, but with exploring the text's 
multiple provisional threads of meaning. Derrida emphasizes the joy to be 
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had in this affirmative position. "The absence of the transcendental 
signified extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely" 
(Derrida, 1978, p. 280). For Derrida there is an infinite impossibility of 
meaning that underpins the ineffability of the deconstructive process of 
the Nietzschean position: "What deconstruction is not? everything of 
course! What is deconstruction? nothing of course!" (Wood & Bernasconi, 
1988, p. 5). 
Deconstruction, 
Deconstruction is a typical Post-Structuralist mode of reading. It 
seeks to show textual disunity by exposing the "textual 'subconscious'" 
(Barry, 1995, p. 73). Deconstruction is concerned with reading the text 
against itself and "is created by repetitions, deviatione, disfigurations" 
(Culler, 1983, p. 228). In practice the Nietzschean deconstructive 
process fosters an oppositional reading of a text. This "is not a subverting 
of the text but rather a demonstration that the text is already subverted 
by its own language" (Moon, 1990, p. 18). Deconstruction, rather than 
being a body of theories, is a practice, a process, a way of reading, even a 
'methodology'. However, Derrida resists calling deconstruction "either a 
'method', a 'technique' or a species of 'critique"' (Norris, 1987, p. 18). 
Nevertheless, in practice deconstruction discloses itself as concerned with 
revelation; that is, a process directed at revealing the unsaid in the text. 
Caputo (1989) describes deconstruction as "a parasitic practice": 
what it does is to inhabit the discourse of those who have 
something to say and to make trouble for them. It needles its 
way into the discourse of others and shows them h<>w much 
trouble they have br<>ught upon themselves. Dec<>nstruction 
does not want to deny that something exists, but only to show 
the difficulty we have getting that said. (pp. 30-31) 
While Derrida may shy at defining deconstruction, particularly as a 
meth<>d, in practice his deconstructive work exhibits certain 
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characteristics that are suggestive of a methodological process. For 
example, Norris (1987) postulates a definition reflecting Derridean 
deconstruction which sounds very much like a method: 
deconstruction is the vigilant seeking-out of those 'aporias', 
blindspots or moments of self-contradiction where a text 
involuntarily betrays the tension between rhetoric and logic, 
between what it manifestly means to say and what it is 
nonetheless constraiMd to mean. (p. 19) 
Much of Derrida's work involves close attention to texts which he 
deconstructs, demonstrating that they are not the holistic and coherent 
entities they are generally assumed to be. Derrida feels that his 
"grammatological project .... must deconstruct everything that ties the 
concept and norms of scientificity to onto-theology, logocentrism, 
phonologism" (Derrida, 1987, p. 35). The Nietzschean interpretative 
position can be utilized to deconstruct all texts, as well as point to 
intertextuality between texts. Culler (1981) points out that although 
Derrida's works involve a very close engagement with texts they rarely: 
involve interpretations as traditionally conceiveu. There is no 
deference to the integrity of the text . . . . Derrida . . . 
concentrates on elements which others find marginal, seeking 
not to elucidate what a text says but to reveal an uncanny 
logic that operates in and across texts. (pp. 14-15) 
Post-Structuralism maintains that language, rather than being 
'solid', is actually liquid· "signs float free of what they designate, meanings 
are fluid, and subject to constant 'slippage' or 'spillagem (Barry, 1995, p. 
64). This results in marginal slips and spills which collapse the text 
against its 'intended' meaning. Such slips and spills, or textual gaps, are 
entrances into the text's sub-conscious. In practice, then, the process of 
applying the Nietzschean interpretation results in a methodology that 
concentrates exclusively on exposing textual gaps through which entry to 
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the underside of any text, such as A Wizard of Earth sea, is facilitated. 
Eagleton (1983) describes deconstruction as showing how oppositions 
"are sometimes betrayed into inverting or collapsing themselves, or need 
to banish to the text's margins certain niggling details which can be made 
to return and plague them" (p. 133). It should be emphasized that 
deconstruction is not actually destruction of the text and textual meaning. 
Rather, it seeks to demonetrate that it is the fluid nature of language 
which actually works against itself. Johnson (Salusinszky, 1987 J 
observes that deconstruction "is not synonymous with destruction": 
It is in fact much closer to the original meaning of the word 
analysis, which etymologically means 'to undo' .... The de-
construction of a text ... [proceeds] by the careful teasing out 
of warring forces of signification within the text. (pp. 164·165) 
It is this unravelling of text that characterizes the deconstructive 
process, which is sometimes referred to as "textual harassment" (Barry, 
1995, p. 72). The Nietzschean interpretative position deconstructs a text, 
for example A Wizard ofEarthsea, by a process of oppositional reading in 
which the 'unified' face of the text is undermined by an unmasking of 
textual conflicts, paradoxes, contradictions, and inconsistencies. Barry 
notes that texts which were "previously regarded as unified artistic 
artifacts are shown to be fragmented, self-divided, and centreless. They 
always turn out to be representative of ... 'monstrous births'" (1995, p. 
68). The previously unnoticed 'chasm' in the text can then be explored. 
"Deconstruction can begin when we locate the moment when a text 
transgresses the laws it appears to set up for itself' (Selden, 1985, p. 87). 
Deconstruction demonstrates the irreducible plurality of text, which 
underpins the plurality of textual meaning. This pluralism signals the 
impossibility of absolute meaning, something that can give rise to what 
Barry (1995) describes as "terminal anxieties" (p. 64). Moon (1990), 
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however, tries to emphasize the positive potential of Post-Structuralism, 
particularly the deconstructive process: 
Deconstruction need not be destruction. What post· 
structuralism does is to remind us that our cultural systems 
and practices are not the seamless, self-evident entities we 
take them for: they embody gaps and contradictions; they 
perpetuate injustices even as they seek justice; their surfaces 
have been worn sensuously smooth by years of use but their 
internal contradictions remain. In language and in our cultural 
systems we paper over these cracks so automatically that we 
forget they are there. Deconstruction forces us to confront the 
gaps, contradictions and inequalities in our society; whether or 
not we then do something about them is up to us. (p. 21) 
While no definitive meaning is achieved, as in the Rousseauistic position, 
the Nietzschean interpretation 'plays' with the text, producing multiple 
threads of provisional meaning. In this new Nietzschean world facts have 
no guarantee. Instead there are interpretations which have no "stamp of 
authority ... since there is no longer any authorative centre to which to 
appeal for validation of our interpretations" (Barry, 1995, p. 67). 
The Nietzschean deconstructive process, by pursuing endless 
chains of textual signifiers, facilitates the exploration of many provisional 
meanings. Culler (1983) observes that deconstruction is not an end to 
distinctions but as the "play of meaning is the result of what Derrida calls 
'the play of the world', in which the general text always provides further 
connections, correlations, and contexts" (p. 134). Deconstruction burrows 
beneath the textual surface, exposing inconsistencies, playing with 
meaning, and bringing "out what the text excludes by showing what it 
includes" (Silverman, 1989, p. 4). The deconstruction of A Wizard of 
Earthsea undertaken in Chapter Five burrows beneath the novel's 
surface by looking for gaps and inconsistencies facilitated by such words 
as ~sourcem or "power". This process is not something limited to textual 
criticism but can be used as a methodological approach for exploring and 
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analyzin~ many issues in life. Johnson (Salusinszky, 1987) suggests that 
every time one is tempted: 
to conclude what seems natural, or what seems satisfYing, or 
what seems commonsensically true, you arrest your 
movement towards that for a moment, and examine what you 
are putting together .... [Even] to the point of as kin~ yourself, 
'Could the opposite also be true?' (pp. 159-160) 
Practising the deconstructive process in everyday life exposes what lies 
beneath the surface of society, its institutions and practices. It could be 
said of deconstruction that it is a valuable process, in that it facilitates a 
unique method of examination, but in itself is of no particular value, in 
that it reaches no conclusions, resolutions, or solutions. Perhaps the value 
ofNietzschean deconstruction lies in its being, to return to Derrida, both 
"everything" and "nothing" (Wood & Bernasconi, 1988, p. 5). 
Deconstruction, then, is the Nietzschean interpretation in practice. 
Derrida's reluctance to describe deconstruction as a methodology is 
typical of much modern literary theory's aversion to being aligned with 
any definitive sort of process or methodology, particularly of a prescribed 
or 'scientific' nature. For example, Post-Structuralism rejects the 
scientificity of Structuralist methodology. Nevertheless, in execution, 
deconstruction can be seen as a methodological approach for textual 
reading. As a process it applies the Nietzschean interpretation to the 
practice of reading literature, or any 'text'. In application this 
interpretation, as undertaken in Chapter Five, involves a process of 
examining A Wizard of Earthsea for textual threads of provisional 
meaning. In the Religious Education class;·oom both the teacher and 
students would individually and corporately expose and pursue these 
Nietzschean threads. For the purposes of this thesis, however, of the 
infinite number of threads facilitated by the Nietzschean interpretation 
this study examines only a sample to illustrate this interpretative 
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position in operation. The material in Chapter Five, then, is expressive of 
the deconstructive process as may he practised in the classroom and is 
not indicative of definitive application. 
The process involved in the Nietzschean interpretation of A Wizard 
of Earthsea, unlike the process involved in the Rousseauistic 
interpretation, is not directed and controlled by the teacher. Rather than 
the one voice of the teacher determining how the novel is read and studied 
the many voices of the students and teacher would deconstruct the novel 
in a plethora of directions, resulting in a playful cacophony of provisional 
meanings. Instead of a centred classroom it would be, in the process of 
applying the Nietzschean interpretation, a decentred classroom. 
As a methodological process the deconstruction of A Wizard of 
Earthsea involves DU!'saing threads of meaning by selecting certain words 
or phrases through which the text can be examined for gaps, 
contradictions, and inconsistencies. In this way the apparent unity of the 
novel is thrown into disarray, language is demonstrated to be unstable, 
and the meaning-making process is explicated. Deconstruction proceeds 
by a close textual analysis of the novel in which slips and oddities are 
teased out and examined for a while. In Chapter Five discussions about 
the contradictory use of the word "light", inconsistencies in the use of the 
word "shadow", confusion over use of the word "dark", and gaps afforded 
by the word "cast" facilitate an examination of the unsaid lurking in the 
sub-conscious of the novel. As a methodological approach deconstruction 
puts into practice the Nietzschean interpretation's emphasis on 
decentring, on a playful approach to language, and on a concern with 
provisional meaning. This process is necessarily always tentative and 
incomplete as, by definition, it is infinite. 
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CHAPI'ERFOUR 
The Rousseauistic Interpretation in Practice 
While Derrida's Rousseauistic interpretation can be used as a 
methodological approach for reading any text, whether it be a newspaper 
advertisement, a film, a play, or a sacred text, this examination will apply 
to Le Guin's fantasy novel A Wizard of Earthsea (1993). From a close 
textual analysis of this novel two of the most obvious Rousseauistic 
interpretations would be Jungian, in the novel's concern with the concept 
of the shadow, and Taoist, in the novel's concern with balance. Both these 
Rousseauistic interpretations seek to centre the structure of the text. 
The centre both determines meaning (whether the Jungian concept of the 
shadow or the Taoist concept of balance) and refers to a presence outside 
the structure for its authority (whether Jungian psychology or Taoism). 
Such interpretations are extremely attractive to religious educators 
because they are implicitly concerned with the search for meaning and 
wholeness, and provide e. firm foundation on which to pursue this search. 
However, from the Derridean perspective such firm foundations are only 
possible in the Rousseaulstic approach because it affirms logocentrism 
and denies the decentred world of Post-Structuralist theory. 
iJgngian Shadow 
In the Rousseauistic interpretation of A Wizard of Earthsea that 
seeks to centre the structure of the text by referring to Jungian 
psychology the shadow would be seen as the centre (the truth) around 
which the fantasy story revolves. The presence of the J1mgian concept of 
the shadow in the novel has been noted by many critics, though Le Guin 
claims not to have read Jung until after the publication of A Wizard of 
Earthsea (Bucknall, 1984, p. 49). Nevertheless, having read Jung, Le 
Guin agrees with him on the necessity to integrate the shadow and is very 
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much concerned about the dangers of people denying their profound 
relationship with evil because the shadow "is a tight passage, a narrow 
door, whose painful constriction no one is spared" (Jung, 1991, p. 21). 
For both Le Guin and Jung the shadow is the means whereby the 
individual is able to achieve full potential and wholeness. The guide for this 
journey "to self knowledge, to adulthood, to the light" is the shadow (Le 
Guin, 1979, p. 65). For Le Guin the shadow "is the animal within us ... 
the dark brother, the shadow soul" (p. 67). Echoing Jung, Le Guin deems 
the shadow as "not simply evil. It is inferior, primitive, awkward, 
artimallike, childlike; powerful, vital, spontaneous" (p. 64). In addition, Le 
Guin feels it is her shadow that guides her in the discovery of her fictional 
characters and worlds (pp. 59-71). Le Guin's ideas can be seen reflected in 
Ged, whose shadow 'guides' him towards wholeness and balance. 
Slusser (1976) discusses the origin of Ged's shadow as coming 
"from within himself" (p. 36), while Cummins (1990) notes that Ged's 
wholeness comes from recognizing both the good and evil within himself 
(p. 37). Scholes (1986) observes of Ged that the "shadow was himself, his 
own capacity for evil .... To become whole he had to face it ... and accept 
it as part of himself" (p. 39). Shippey (1986) also considers that the 
shadow is part ofGed, being "equal and opposite to the man who casts it", 
and his wholeness comes from accepting it as a necessary part of himself 
(p. 106). Lasseter (1979) points toLe Guin's concern with the dual nature 
of humankind and the balancing of light and dark as the most religious 
theme in her tales (p. 91), while Molson (1979) also comments on the 
duality of human nature and the need to accept "oneself as a finite 
creature made up of good and evil" (p. 135). Bittner (1984) discusses Ged's 
shadow as "a helpful though fearful guide and an integral part of Ged's 
Self" (p. 11) and Wood (1986) observes that forGed to control and accept 
his shadow "he must journey ... into his own spirit" (p. 207). 
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In Jungian psychology the shadow refers to those aspects of 
personality and behaviour that are repressed by the ego. These repressed 
traits are considered by the ego to be dark, inferior, and unacceptable. 
"The development of the shadow runs parallel to that of the ego" (Jacobi, 
1973, p. 110). AB the ego develops throughout childhood and adolescence 
the shadow also develops. The act of repressing the shadow during 
childhood is "a necessary protective function that allows ego development 
to take place" (Cannon, 1985, p. 32). Where a problem with the shadow 
does arise is when, as an adult, the act of repression is the major defence 
mechanism in coping with faults and failings of the ego. There are five 
areas that can be explored in terms of the Jungian concept of the shadow 
and A Wizard of Earthsea. The shadow in both Jungian psychology and 
the novel is dark and inferior, is projected onto others, needs to he 
recognized and assimilated, is frightening, and is unrelenting. 
(1) The shadow is dark and inferior 
The shadow in Jungian psychology is seen as containing inferior, 
repressed, primitive, and vital aspects rejected by the ego. Moreno (1974) 
sees the shadow as "the inferior personality made up of everything that 
will not tit in with the laws and regulations of conscious life. It is a 
darkness ... the hidden, repressed, and guilt-laden personality" (p. 3 9). 
Jung describes the shadow as "the face we never show to the world" 
(Jung, 1959, p. 304) and as containing "dark characteristics [and] 
inferiorities" (Jung, 1971, p. 145). The shadow contains "unknown or little-
known attributes of the ego" and can indicate its existence: 
in an impulsive or inadvertent act. Before one has time to 
think, the evil rewark pops out, the plot is hatched, the wrong 
decision is made, and one is confronted with results that were 
never intended or consciously wanted. (Jung, von Franz, 
Henderson, Jacobi & Jaffe, 1978, pp. 174-175) 
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The shadow contains "repressed dispositions" and "rejected aspects of the 
developing ego" which are experienced by the ego as liabilities (Stevens, 
1990, p. 43). Nevertheless, the shadow, although a dark aspect of the self, 
is an essential part of the individual and is not necessarily an evil entity. 
It is "inferior and unadapted, not wholly bad .... but it also displays a 
number of good qualities such as normal instincts, appropriate reactions, 
realistic insights, and creative impulses" (Moreno, 197 4, pp. 39-40). 
Ged's shadow consists of his pride, arrogance, temper, and ambition 
but also the impetus towards union and wholeness. Ged displays 
considerable arrogance and desire for power in his thirst for knowledge. 
Both as a new apprentice to Ogion and a student on Roke Ged's actions 
indicate that deep within him lurks ambition and greed for power. When 
first apprenticed to Ogion, Ged thinks this will be his entrance into a world 
of power, but he is bitterly disappointed: 
Ged had thought that as the prentice of a great mage he would 
enter at once into the mystery and mastery of power. He 
would understand the language of the beasts and the speech of 
the leaves of the forest, he thought, and sway the winds with 
his word, and learn to change himself into any shape he 
wished. Maybe he and his master would run together as stags, 
or fly toRe Albi over the mountsin on the wings of eagles. 
Bnt it was not so at all .... They entered no mysterious 
domain. Nothing happened .... [Ged) kept back his 
resentment and impatience, and tried to be obedient, so that 
Ogion would consent at last to teach him something. For he 
hungered to learn, to gain power. (p. 25) 
As a student on Rake, Ged is still greedy for power. He asks the Master 
Hand how to lock changing-spells so that he can perform more than mere 
tricks of illusion. However, the Master Hand merely: 
looked down at the pebble again. 'A rock is a good thing, too, 
you know,' he said, speaking less gravely. 'If the Isles of 
Earthsea were all made of diamond, we'd lead a hard life here. 
Enjoy illusion, lad, and let the rocks be rocks.' He smiled, but 
Gedleftdissatisfied. (p. 48) 
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In Ged's relationship to the daughter of the Lord ofRe Albi can also 
be seen his desire for power as well as his pride. He is driven by a need to 
impress and boast. Ged "had a desire to please her, to win her admiration" 
(p. 28). He fears that she is mocking him and that she considers him 
afraid. "That he would not endure. He did not say much, but he resolved 
that he would prove himself to her" (p. 30). It is thls desire to impress and 
not have his pride hurt that sends him off to look in Ogion's Lore-Book. 
Ged's pride is also aburrdantly evident in his relationship to Jasper. 
Ged desperately wants to show off hls powers to Jasper. "Ged's pride 
would not be slighted or condescended to. He swore to prove to Jasper . . . 
how great his power really was -some day" (p. 46). Also in his relationship 
to Jasper can be discerned his temper. Ged has a dreadful temper that 
erupts at the slightest feeling of injury: "The younger boys [were] used to 
seeing his black temper break out at the least hint of slight or insult" (p. 
61). His barely stifle<! rage at Jasper results in him challenging Jasper to 
a duel in sorcery, something strictly forbidden on Roke (p. 60). 
Repeatedly Ged's pride is referred to: Ogion says of Ged ,"'your 
power is great. Greater even than your pride, I hopem (p. 32); Ged seeks 
to "hide his ignorance and save his pride" (p. 46); "bolstering up hls [Ged's] 
pride, he set his strong will on the work they gave him" (pp. 46-4 7); and, 
Vetch says to Ged '"Pride was ever your mind's masterm (p. 146). This 
pride is indicative of Ged's shadow, of his sin of hubris, as is his ambition 
and desire for power. Ultimately, this leads to his undoing. After Ged has 
released his shadow Lord Gens her severely reprimands him: 
'And you were moved to do this by pride and hate. Is it any 
wonder the result was ruin? You summoned a spirit from the 
dead ... Uncalled it came from a place where there are no 
names. Evil, it wills to work evil through you. The power you 
had to call it gives it power over you: you are connected. It is 
the shadow of your arrogance, the shadow of your ignorance, 
the shadow you cast.' (p. 68) 
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However, Ged's shadow does not only contain negative qualities. It 
also displays live-saving instincts when as a boy Ged saves his village 
from attack by the Kargad warriors (pp. 19-22). It is also from the 
shadow that arises Ged's enormous power. After the loosing of his shadow 
he is ill, and even after he has recovered his power is weak and clumsy: 
The boys he had led and lauded over were all ahead of him now, 
because of the months that he had lost, and that spring and 
summer he studied with lads younger than himself. Nor did he 
shine among them, for the words of any spell, even the 
simplest illusion-charm, came halting from his tongue, and his 
hands faltered at their craft. (p. 69) 
It is the shadow's instinct of union with Ged that is strong, not the other 
way around. After being released from Ged the shadow desperately clings 
to him, but Ged is so terrified he screams (p. 64). The shadow, being 
rejected, fought back but still "clung to Ged" (p. 64). 
(2) The shadow is projected onto others 
In Jungian psychology the shadow is projected onto other people of 
the same sex. "The shadow appears ... in projections as when we burden 
our neighbours with the faults we obviously have ourselves" (Moreno, 
197 4, p. 41). Shadow projection results in the opinion that it is the other 
person who is lazy, proud, and irresponsible and not oneself. "That is why 
the 'other fellow is always to blame' as long as we are not aware that the 
darkness is in ourselves" (Jacobi, 1973, p. 113). If the projection of the 
shadow continues unchallenged these projections eventually "change the 
world into the replica of one's own unknown face" (Jung, 1971, p. 146). 
Extreme emotional reaction (hate, jealousy, and the like) indicates 
that the shadow has been projected. "We can tell that a weakness of our 
own has been projected onto our neighbours when we notice in ourselves a 
strong compulsion to correct or criticize their behaviour" (Cannon, 1985, 
p. 34). It is only possible to deny that the shadow exists by projecting it 
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onto others. In this way the individual denies any faults or failings but is 
quick to criticize the other person onto whom has been projected the 
shadow. Not only do "we deny the existence of our shadow and project it 
onto others .... [but in] this way we deny our own 'badness' and project it 
onto others, whom we hold responsible for it" (Stevens, 1990, p. 44). Even 
when such projections may be obvious to others, the individual finds it 
difficult to acknowledge what is happening. Jung (1971) considers: 
No matter how obvious it may be to the neutral observer that 
it is a matter of projections, there is little hope that the 
subject will perceive this himself. He must be convinced that 
he throws a very long shadow before he is willing to withdraw 
his emotionally-toned projections from their object. (p. 146) 
In his early relationship with Ogion can be seen an inkling of Ged's 
projected shadow. He feels that Ogion's teaching makes a fool of him and 
he "did not like to be made a fool of' (p. 26). However, Ged's respect for 
Ogion prevents a major projection of his shadow. It is onto Jasper that 
Ged projects his shadow with great ferocity from their first meeting (pp. 
42-43). Ged considers that it is Jasper who is proud, aloof, hateful, and 
boastful, not himself. Jasper elicits strong reactions from Ged, so much so 
that even on convivial occasions of mirth among the students "like all 
Jasper ever said to him, the jest set his teeth on edge• (p. 53). That Ged's 
shadow has been projected onto Jasper is clear from his intense hatred 
and rivalry towards Jasper. Ged is filled with a burning rage and swears: 
to himself to outdo his rival, and not in some illusion match 
but in a test of power. He would prove himself, and humiliate 
Jasper .... Ged did not stop to think why Jasper might hate 
him. He only knew why he hated Jasper .... Jasper stood 
alone as his rival, who must be put to shame. (p. 49) 
While Ged is still a student on Roke he asks the Master Hand how 
to lock changing-spells so that could "put Jasper to shame at last" (p. 4 7). 
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Ged feels Jasper continually makes a fool of him. "Jasper laughed, ill-
humouredly, and went on .... And Ged followed, sullen and sore-hearted, 
knowing that he had behaved like a fool, and blaming Jasper for it" (p. 46). 
Ged's reactions to Jasper are driven by powerful negative emotions. After 
Jasper has performed an illusion for a visitor, the Lady of 0, all present 
are pleased with his efforts and praise him. All that is except forGed who 
"joined his voice to the praises, but not his heart. 'I could have done 
better,' he said to himself, in bitter envy; and all the joy of the evening was 
darkened for him after that" (p. 55). 
Ged is so totally blinded by his hatred of aod rivalry towards Jasper 
and by his own pride that he is unable to see the situation for what it is or 
to realize the danger inherent in his behaviour. Ged would not see, or 
refused to see, that "in this rivalry, which he clung to and fostered as part 
of his own pride, that there was anything of the danger, the darkness, of 
which the Master Hand had mildly warned him" (p. 49). All of Ged's 
behaviour in relation to Jasper is totally out of proportion to the reality of 
the situation. Vetch's reactions, always moderate and sensible, fail to 
bring Ged to his senses. When Ged challenges Jasper to a duel Vetch 
e><claims: ~Duels in sorcery are forbidden to us, and well you know it. Let 
this cease!m (p. 60). But neither Ged nor Jasper listen to him. Vetch tries 
appealing to Ged's sense, but to no avail: Ged ~will you be a man and drop 
this now - come with mem (p. 61). Although Vetch is able to see Ged's 
hatred and jealousy for Jasper he is unable to stop the fateful event that 
willshatt.'" Ged's young life. 
(3) The shndow needs to b.- recognized and assimilated 
The first step in Jungian individuation, or the process towards 
wholeness, is the recognition and assimilation of the shadow. It is 
imperative "to distinguish ourselves from our shadow by recognizing its 
reality as part of our nature" (Jacobi, 1973, p. 114). For Jung: 
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The shadow is a moral problem that challenges the whole ego-
personality, for no one can become conscious of the shadow 
without considerable moral effort. To become conscious of it 
involves recognizing the dark aspects of the personality as 
real and present. This act is the essential condition for any 
kind of self-knowledge, and it therefore, as a rule, meets with 
considerable resistance. (Jung, 1971, p. 145) 
It is only after recognition of the shadow that "the painful and lengthy 
work of self-education begins • a work, we might say, that is the 
psychological equivalent of the labours of Hercules" (Jung, von Franz, 
Henderson, Jacobi & Jaffe, 1978, p. 174). Wholeness and completeness of 
the self cannot be achieved without recognition and assimilation of the 
shadow. "The goal of the self is wholeness" (Stevens, 1990, p. 41). Since 
the shadow will not go away, much as the ego would like this scenario, it 
must be lived with. Moreno observes that the "question is no longer how 
we can get rid of our shadow, but rather how we can live with our dark side 
without becoming dark ourselves. Shadow and consciousness have to live 
together" (1974, p. 45). Wholeness of being can only be achieved by a 
union of ego and shadow. According to Jung, psychological and spiritual 
health are not achievable without learning to live with the shadow. An 
individual can "only be well and sane when the quarrel between him and 
his shadow ... [is] dissolved and reconciled" (Vander Post, 1977, p. 219). 
The shadow, though not necessarily an opponent, may often b,, 
viewed as an enemy and must always be lived with. "Whether the shadow 
becomes our friend or enemy depends largely upon ourselves .... The 
shadow only becomes hostile when he is ignored or misunderstood" (Jung, 
von Franz, Henderson, Jacobi & Jaffe, 1978, p. 182). Without recognition 
and assimilation of the shadow an individual will not find wholeness. No 
matter the pain and difficulty experienced in dealing with the shadow the 
"assimilation of the shadow is a crucial step on the way to individuation" 
(Stevens, 1990, p. 46). 
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After Ged has released his shadow he is much humbled and shaken 
by the experience. Although he would like to ~stay. To learn. To undo ... 
the evil'" (p. 67) this proves to be a vain hope. While completing his 
training on Roke he dreams of the shadow but does ~not know what it was 
- the thing that came out of the spell and cleaved to mem (p. 68). Ged's 
recognition of the shadow is slow, but at Low Torning he senses the 
shadow "was drawn to him" and acknowledges it as "being his creature" 
(p. 83). Yet Ged does not know "in what form it could come, having no real 
form of its own as yet, and how it would come, and when it would come" (p. 
83). Ged's progress toward recognition of his shadow can be seen in his 
refusal of the temptations offered by both Yevaud (p. 90) and Serret (pp. 
112-113) to provide him with his shadow's name. Ged's behaviour is far 
more responsible and he is a much humbler person. It is a very different 
Ged who admits his weakness and ignorance to the Doorkeeper (p. 74) 
than the Ged who arrived arrogant and angry years earlier (p. 40). It is 
also a very different Ged who admits to Ogion that ~I have come back to 
you as I left: a foolm (p. 118) than the Ged who "hungered to learn, to gain 
power" (p. 26) and wished "for glory" (p. 32). 
No one can really tell Ged what to do, though Ogion tells him that 
~ou must seek what seeks you. You must hunt the hunter .... and seek 
the very source and that which lies before the source'" (p. 120). Ged fully 
realizes that he cannot keep running from his shadow as it "'will surely 
fmd me again ... And all my strength is spent in the running'" (p. 121). 
Ged decides to follow his master's advice and goes hunting, in search of his 
shadow and the source. This is the great Jungian turning point in the 
journey towards wholeness: that of turning around and seeking and trying 
to recognize one's shadow. However, to begin with Ged hopes to destroy 
his shadow, even if it means destroying himself. 
Ged recognizes the shadow as his shadow but not that it is an 
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essential part of his being. He sees it very much as an enemy to be 
destroyed and is still driven by a terror of his shadow. "He knew only the 
torment of dread, and the certainty that he must go ahead and do what he 
had set out to do: hunt down the evil, follow his terror to its source" (p. 
136). Out at sea he thinks that when he meets his shadow he can grasp it 
and "drag it with the weight of his body and the weight of his own death 
into the darkness of the deep sea" (p. 125). In the middle of the sea, alone, 
and hoping to destroy his shadow he summons it: "'I am here, I Ged the 
Sparrowhawk, and I summon my shadowm (p. 126). But, finally Ged 
recognizes that he cannot destroy his shadow. In the East Reach, Ged 
tries to attack the shadow but finds nothing in his empty hands. But this 
meeting has a profound effect on Ged and marks a deep recognition of the 
shadow and his relationship to it: 
All terror was gone. All joy was gone. It was a chase no longer. 
He was neither hunted nor hunter, now. For the third time 
they had met and touched: he had of his own will turned to the 
shadow, seeking to hold it with living hands. He had not held it, 
but he had forged between them a bond, a link that had no 
breaking-point. There was no need to hunt the thing down .... 
When they had come to the time and place for their last 
meeting they would meet . . . . He knew now, and the 
knowledge was hard, that his task had never been to undo 
what he had done, but to finish what he had begun. (p. 138) 
As Ged begins to recogoize his shadow it begins to lose its power 
over him. Ged eventually recognizes his shadow for what it is; he accepts 
it, joins with it, and becomes whole. His journey to this point has been 
painful and difficult. Ged's assimilation of his shadow is a slow process 
that progresses as his recognition of his shadow grows. In the end Ged 
knows not only the shadow's name but also what he must do: 
Ged lifted up the staff high, and the radiance of it brightened 
intolerably .... In that light ... the thing came towards Ged. It 
grew together and shrank and blackened, crawling on four 
short taloned legs upon the sand. But still it came forward, 
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lifting up to him a blind unformed snout without lips or eyes or 
ears. AB they came right together it became utterly black in 
the white mage-radiance that burned about it, and it heaved 
itself upright. In silence man a'ld shadow met face to face, and 
stopped. 
Aloud and clearly breaking that old silence, Ged spoke the 
shadow's name, and in the same moment the shadow spoke 
without lips or tongue, saying the same word: 'Ged'. And the 
two voices were one. 
Ged reached out his hands, dropping his stsff, and took hold 
of his shadow, of the black self that reached out to him. Light 
and darkness met, and joined, and were one. (p. 164) 
In naming his shadow with his own name Ged assimilates the shadow into 
himself, as part of himself, and "made himself whole" (p. 166). 
(4) The shadow is frightening 
Dealing with the shadow is a difficult and terrifying process. "Bitter 
as the cup may be, no one can be spared it" (Jacobi, 1973, p. 114). Jung 
describes the initial confrontation with the shadow as "an ethical problem 
of the first magnitude" (Jung, 1959, p. 78) and "the first step on the inner 
way, a test sufficient to frighten off most people" (Jung, 1959, p. 304). 
Recognition of the shadow is strongly resisted by the ego because it has 
no desire to associate with the shadow. "To own one's shadow is ... a 
painful, and potentially terrifYing experience" (Stevens, 1990, pp. 43-44). 
The terror experienced at even glimpsing one's shadow is the reason that 
many people repress the shadow. Repression is preferable to recognition, 
simply because the individual often "cannot bring himself to accept all 
this darkness as a part of himself" (Jacobi, 1973, p. 113). However, "the 
less conscious a man is of his shadow, the blacker and denser the shadow 
becomes" (Moreno, 197 4, p. 41). 
Ged is terrified of his shadow and has great difficulty recognizing it. 
He also has to overcome his fear and loathing of it and his desire to kill it. 
Ged first begins to sense his shadow when still an apprentice to Ogion on 
Gont. He reads from a Lore· Book and finds himself fixed upon reading a 
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certain spell and is terrified of the darkness he feels closing in on him: 
His eyes were fixed, and he could not lift them till he had 
finished reading all the spell. 
Then raising his head he saw it was dark in the house .... 
[The] horror grew in him, seeming to hold him in his chair. He 
was cold. Looking over his shoulder he saw that something 
was crouching beside the closed door, a shapeless clot of 
shadow darker than the darkness. It seemed to reach out 
towards him, and to whisper, and to call him in a whisper: but 
he could not understand the words. 
The door was flung wide. A man entered with a white light 
flaming from him, a great bright figure who spoke aloud, 
fiercely and suddenly. The darkness and the whispering ceased 
and were dispelled. (pp. 30-31) 
Ged's initial encounter with what Ogion later describes as "'but the 
foreboding of it, the shadow of a shadowm (p. 120) should be enough to 
alert him to the dangers of his pride and thirst for knowledge. Ged's first 
partial glimpse and sensing of his shadow was a truly terrifying 
experience for him, yet he soon forgets this experience. When Ogion 
reprimands Ged he says to him, '"You will never work that spell but in peril 
of your power and your lifem (p. 31). But Ged does not listen to Ogion's 
warning and it is this spell that he later uses on Roke to raise a spirit from 
the dead. In defence Ged complains to Ogion that he has been taught 
nothing. But again, Ged learns nothing because he does not want to 
recognize his shadow and is driven by a lust for power. 
While a student on Roke Ged finds that certain spells make him 
uneasy for no reason he is able to discern: 
There were certain runes on certain pages of the Lore-Book 
that seemed familiar to him, though he did not remember in 
what book he had ever seen them before. There were certain 
phrases that must be said in spells of Summoning that he did 
not like to say. They made him think, for an instant, of 
shadows in a dark room, of a shut door and shadows reaching 
out to him from the corner by the door. Hastily he put such 
thoughts or memories aside and went on. These moments of 
fear and darkness, he said to himself, were the shadows 
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merely of his ignorance. The more he learned, the less he would 
have to fear, until finally in his full power as wizard he need 
fear nothing in the world, nothing at all. (pp. 57-58) 
Ged does not want to recognize his shadow, so dispels his fear and strange 
feelings by a foolish and blind certainty that with power comes an 
absence offear. However, Ged has to painfully learn that this is not so. 
After Ged is sent to Low Torning to protect the village from dragons 
he meets his shadow again when, in a foolish attempt to save Pechvarry's 
son from certain death, he crosses into the land of the dead and finds his 
shadow waiting for him (p. 80). Ged almost loses his life and his dreams 
are plagued by the shadow. When he wakes from his dreams he is "weak 
and cold" and terrified (p. 83). In both dreams and thoughts of the shadow 
"he felt always the same cold dread: sense and power drained out of him, 
leaving him stupid and astray. He raged at his cowardice, but that did no 
good. He sought for some protection, but there was none" (p. 83). 
In his dreams and waking thoughts he sees the shadow as a 
shapeless mass of darkness or a creature with no head because he is too 
terrified to recognize this 'creature' as his shadow, as a part of himself. 
Ged tries to run away from his shadow and leaves Low Torning. He flees 
to Roke but finds his path is thwarted by the "high, enwoven, ancient 
spells" that protect the mage-island (p. 94). He has dreadful feelings of"a 
foreboding of doom" (p. 94) and felt "the doom ... [was]lying ahead on 
every road" (p. 95). Ged continues running but is unable to cope with the 
shadow's hunting of him. He is exhausted, distraught, terrified, doesn't 
know what to do, and discovers to his horror that the shadow knows his 
true name so is able to gain power over him (p. 101). Ged's actions and 
thoughts are initially driven by his terror of the shadow. Eventually, in his 
slow process of recognizing and assimilating his shadow Ged discovers 
that "all terror was gone" (p. 138). 
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(5) The s4adow is UIU'!llentinc 
Although a person may prefer to avoid meeting the shadow, the 
shadow is unrelenting in its determination to be acknowledged and 
accepted. The journey towards wholeness demands such meetings take 
place. Jung observes that there is a "passionate drive within the shadowy 
part of oneself that reason may not prevail against it ... [because] the 
shadow contains the overwhelming power of irresistible impulse" (Jung, 
von Franz, Henderson, Jacobi & Jaffe, 1978, p. 182). How the individual 
deals with the shadow's unrelenting impulse will determine, to a large 
extent, how the shadow behaves. For Jung (1991): 
The shadow is a living part of the personality and therefore 
wants to live with it in some form. It cannot be argued out of 
existence or rationalized into harmlessness. This problem is 
exceedingly difficult, becauGe it not only challenges the whole 
man, but reminds him at the same time of his helplessness 
and ineffectuality. (pp. 20-21) 
It is the shadow that contains the instinct towards completeness and 
wholeness, not the ego. Indeed, it is the shadow that is a collaborator in 
the interests of the unconscious tendencies and drives of the self. 
If an individual continues to repress his/her shadow and refuses to 
acknowledge its existence the shadow will find other channels in its 
attempts to 'live' as part of the whole personality. The shadow becomes 
"pathological only when we assume that we do not have it; because then 
it has us" (Whitmont, 1969, p. 168). The ego has to learn that the shadow 
cannot by eliminated and has a right to 'live'. As a continually repressed 
entity, the shadow "is liable to burst forth suddenly in a moment of 
awareness, upsetting the ego and breeding neurosis" (Moreno, 1974, p. 
43). Jung attributed neurosis to a refusal to engage with the shadow. The 
will is not able to sustain repression of the shadow without it becoming "a 
serious and often unsupportable burden" (Jacobi, 1973, p. 112). 
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G.ld's shadow is unrelenting in its pursuit ofG.ld because it wants 
union with Ged. When Ged first sees a hint of it in Ogion's cabin it "seemed 
to reach out towards him ... and to call to him in a whisper" (p. 31). After 
G.ld has released his shadow on Roke its immediate reaction is to leap 
onto G.Jd and cling to him (p. 64). When he tries to save Pechvarry's son 
his shadow "whispered at him, though there were no words in its 
whispering, and it reached out towards him" (p. 81). Always the shadow is 
trying to communicate with Ged and trying to reach out to him, "seeking 
to draw near to him" (pp. 82-83). G.ld admits to Ogion that the shadow's 
~desire is to meet me face to facem (p. 120). Because G.ld cannot bear to 
look on his shadow it becomes his enemy and though it remained his 
enemy for a long time it also remained unrelenting in its passionate drive 
to he united with G.ld. The unrecognized shadow wreaks havoc. The 
shadow grows more hostile as G.ld ignores it, flees from it, and fights it. 
The more Ged fights against the shadow the more the shadow fights 
against Ged. Ged's shadow demands existence, drawing on G.ld's energy 
for its 'life' and exhibits the Jungian passionate drive towards wholeness of 
being. It is interesting that when G.ld meets his shadow at the wall 
between life and death "it stood on the side of the living, and he on the side 
of the dead" (p. 81). This is strongly reflective of the ideas in Jungian 
psychology that the recognition and assimilation of the shadow is 
necessary for wholeness of self and that the shadow's unrelenting drive is 
towards 'life' while repression and avoidance of the shadow by the ego will 
lead to a type of 'death' or neurosis. 
Taoist Balance 
A different Rousseauistic interpretation could seek to centre the 
structure of the text by referring to the Taoist concept of balance. Taoism 
is an important aspect in Le Guin's work and personal philosophy and she 
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readily acknowledges the pervasive influence of Taoism in her novels. In 
an interview (McCaffrey, 1990) Le Guin explains that she has been 
strongly influenced since childhood by Taoism: "I happened to grow up 
with Lao Tzu. I read the Tao Te Ching by the time I was thirteen or so, 
and it just got under my skin" (p. 174). Cogell (1979) observes that 
"Taoist philosophy is a basic pattern" in Le Guin's works (p. 153). While 
most critics have noted this aspect, studies with reference to the 
Earthsea novels have not been detailed. Le Guin considers that Taoism, 
particularly the Yin-Yang balance of opposites, is not only "a central 
theme in my work. It's a central theme period" (Bittner, 1984, p. x). 
Slusser (1976) observes that Le Guin's exploration of evil in the 
Earthsea novels is from a background of "Yin and Yang, not a Manichean 
contention between light as good and darkness as evil" (p. 35). He notes 
that for Le Guin, who believes strongly in balance and in the dynamics of 
polarity, Taoism "has always been the strongest single force behind her 
work" (p. 3). Cummins (1990) looks at the concern in the novels for the 
interdependency of all things (p. 11) and the centrality of the Equilibrium 
in Earthsea (p. 25), pointing out that Taoism is "the only religion Le Guin 
has admitted to" (p. 33). Indeed, Le Guin (1979) considers herself to be "a 
congenital non-Christian" (p. 55). Bucknall (1981) makes the point that 
Le Guin's ideas about the relationship of light and dark are Taoist rather 
than Christian (p. 42). She observes that in Earthsea light and darkness 
"represent the polarities of life and death, knowledge and ignorance, 
wisdom and stupidity, the power to act and the impotence of possession" 
(p. 41). Bittner (1984) notes in passing that the foundation ofLe Guin's 
ethics is Taoist (p. 4). 
Taoism, a Chinese religion, is primarily concerned with balance and 
wholeness in all things and is written about at length in the works of Lao 
Tzu and Chuang Tzu. The emphasis on balance and relativity is the first 
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great principle of Taoism, which is also a means of living and a doctrine 
(Waley, 1958, pp. 50-51). Le Guin (1979) considers the Taoist world to be 
orderly but its laws "are not imposed from above ... but exist in things 
and are to be found -discovered" (p. 49). In Taoism there is a "repeated 
emphasis on the eternal, the unchanging" (Smart, 1977 a, p. 257). There 
are four aspects of Taoist balance that can be explored in Taoism and A 
Wizard ofEarthsea: the Tao, Yin-Yang, Wu-Wei and Te. 
(1) The Tao 
The Tao, or the Way, is a manner of living that is balanced in all 
aspects and is both the path that humans follow and the rhythmic pulse 
of the universe. Smart (1977a) suggests that the Tao, or true Way, is 
"unchanging, eternal, for it exists within and beyond the world of constant 
change. It is nameless, for it is the true breath of the universe, not to be 
caught and entangled by human concepts, by names" (p. 257). Smith 
(1991) looks at the Tao as the "way of ultimate reality" (p. 198), while 
Watts (1975) goes further in his observation that the Tao is the "ultimate 
reality and energy of the universe, the Ground of Being and Nonbeing" (p. 
40). Waley (1958) also considers the Tao to be "the ultimate reality in 
which all attributes are united" (p. 50). According to Lao Tzu (1963) 
"Turning back is how the way moves; I Weakness is the means the way 
employs" (p. 101); in other words, the Tao moves forward by going 
backwards (p. 102). The Tao is enigmatic and ineffahle: 
You may look at it and not see it ... You may listen to it but 
not hear it ... You may touch it but not feel it .... It runs on 
and on and cannot be named .... We call it the form that 
never forms, the image that never materializes. When the tao 
becomes a thing, it ... eludes. (MeN aughton, 1971, p. 11) 
There is a recognized difficulty in trying to convey in words what 
the Tao is. Cooper (1972) suggests that the Tao "cannot be conveyed 
70 
either by words or silence" (p. 9). The Tao "is forever nameless" (Lao Tzu, 
1963, p. 91). It is also important to realize that there is "no analogy 
between Tao and the Western ideas of God, and of divine or natural law, 
which can be obeyed or disobeyed" (Watts, 1975, p. 37). The Tao is not a 
God who controls creation, rather it is an almost a priori balfmce existing 
in the universe. Jochim (1986) describes the Tao as a way of looking at 
the universe as "an organismic whole whose essential structure and 
energy abide in every constituent part" (p. 8). Cooper (1981) also 
emphasizes that the Tao is everywhere and in all aspects of life (p. 22). 
In Taoism water is considered to be the natural phenomenon most 
closely resembling the Tao and is often used as a symbol of the Way. "The 
highest good is like water. Water ... does not strain. It approaches the 
tao" (McNaughton, 1971, p. 13). Smith (1991) observes that Taoists: 
were struck by the way it [water] would support objects and 
carry them effortlessly ... Similarly, one who understsnds the 
basic life force knows that it will sustain one if one stops 
thrashing and flailing and trusts oneself to its support. (p. 209) 
A Wizard of Earthsea revolves around balance and unbalance: 
before Ged releases his shadow there is balance; after he has released his 
shadow there is unbalance; and, after Ged joins with his shadow there is 
balance again. In Earthsea the Balance and the Pattern underlie all 
things and are known and served by true wizards, who do not use spells 
"unless real need demands" (pp. 16-17). This balance, or Equilibrium, is 
the very essence ofEarihsea and is the way a mage lives. However: 
'A mage can control only what is near him, what he can name 
exactly and wholly. And this is well. If it were not so, the 
wickedness of the powerful or the folly of the wise would long 
ago have sought to change what cannot be changed, and 
Equilibrium would fail. The unbalanced sea would overwhelm 
the islands where we perilously dwell, and in the old silence all 
voices and all names would be lost.' (p. 51) 
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Ogion tries to teach Ged the way of the mage, but he is too full of greed for 
glory and power to learn anything. Ged tried summoning the spirits of the 
dead while still an apprentice to Ogion, who then warned him: 
'Ged, listen to me now. Have you never thought how danger 
must surround power as shadow does light? This sorcery is not 
a game we play for pleasure or praise. Think of this: that 
every word, every act of our Art is said and is done either for 
good, or for evil. Before you speak or do you must know the 
price that is to pay!' (p. 31) 
Later, while still a student on Roke, Ged asks the Master Hand how 
to lock changing spells. However, the mage warns Ged about the dangers 
of upsetting the balance and using spells unwisely: "'The world is in 
balance, in Equilibrium.m (p. 48). Unfortunately, Ged does not Jearn about 
balance and the way of the mage and releases his shadow. In so doing he 
drastically upsets the equilibrium ofEarthsea: 
The shapeless mass of darkness he had lifted split apart. It 
sundered, and a pale spindle of light gleamed between his open 
arms .... It widened and spread, a rent in the darkness oftbe 
earth and night, a ripping open of the fabric of the world. 
Through it blazed a terrible brightness. And through the bright 
misshapen breach clambered something like a clot of black 
shadow, quick and hideous. (p. 63) 
Ged is chastised for working a spell "'not knowing how that spell affects 
the balance oflight and dark, life and death, good and evilm (p. 68). 
Ged finds that being hunted by the shadow and fleeing from it is a 
nightmare existence. Exhausted and terrified he has little idea about how 
to act. Ogion, like a Taoist sage, suggests that Ged must turn around: 
'At the spring of the River Ar I named you,' the mage said, 'a 
stream thatfalls from the mountain to tbe sea. A man would 
know the end he goes to, but he cannot know it if he does not 
turn, and retorn to his beginning, and hold that beginning in his 
being. If he would not be a stick whirled and whelmed in tbe 
stream, he must be the stream itself, all of it, from its spring 
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to its sinking in the sea .... Now turn clear round, and seek 
the very source, and that which lies before the source.' (p. 120) 
So, Ged turns round and in order to go forward he goes back and seeks the 
source of himself and the shadow. Much later, when Ged has begun to 
learn about the Equilibrium and to value it, he realizes, after being saved 
by his little otak, that all things are related and inter-dependent: 
From that time forth he believed that the wise man is one who 
never sets himself apart from other living things, whether 
they have speech or not, and in later years he strove to learn 
what can be learned, in silence, from the eyes of animals, the 
flight of birds, the great slow gestures of trees. (p. 82) 
(2) Yin-Yang 
The Yin-Yang "polarity goes back to very early times" (Smart, 
1977b, p. 216) and came to represent the basic and opposite forces in the 
universe. These opposite forces cannot exist except in a relationship of 
unity, one that is appositively holistic. Yin-Yang is a "cosmic symbol of 
primordial unity and harmony" (Cooper, 1972, p. 27). The Tao is reflected 
in the Yin-Yang and everything involved in this binary opposition "implies 
that which is inseparable, unable to maintain itself except in relationship" 
(Cooper, 1981, p. 14). Yin-Yang polarity should not be confused with ideas 
of conflicting opposition because it is "an explicit duality expressing an 
implicit unity" (Watts, 1975, p. 26). In other words, the Yin-Yang duality 
is not an opposition between good and evil but a union of opposites. The 
"yang is the active, masculine energy, and the yin is the passive, feminine 
one" (Smart, 1977b, p. 216). From these two energies all things arise and 
have form. "If two forces are working in perfect balance a unity is 
achieved; anything that is out of harmony is to he regarded as a failure in 
or disturbance of the balance of the Yin-Yang forces" (Cooper, 1972, p. 
39). Lao Tzu (1963) continually refers to the Yin-Yang polarity: 
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The way that is bright seems dull; 
The way that leads forward seems to lead backwards; 
The way that is even seems rough. 
The highest virtue is like the valley ... 
The great square has no corners ... 
The great image has no shape. (p. 102) 
Great perfection seems chipped ... 
Great fullness seems empty ... 
Great straightness seems bent; 
Great skill seems awkward; 
Great eloquence seems tongue-tied. (p. 106) 
The "two great powers at work in the world can be beneficent or 
hostile according to the conduct of the individual ... in either maintaining 
or disturbing the equilibrium" (Cooper, 1972, p. 40). It is only when the 
Yin-Yang balance is thrown askew that the relationship loses its balanced 
unity. Through the Yin-Yang balance the Tao operates such that "all 
opposites are blended, all contrasts harmonized" (Waley, 1958, p. 52). 
Reflected in Yin-Yang is the idea that the "attainment of maturity, of 
wholeness, is the acceptance and reconciliation of all opposites, of light 
and dark, good and evil, life and death" (Cooper, 1.972, p. 25). 
In Earthsea the Yin-Yang balance can be seen in the concept of the 
Equilibrium. All things are interrelated and in balance. To alter one thing 
can be to disturb other things. Ged, as an apprentice to Ogion, cannot 
understand why his master will not stop the rain so they may be dry: 
[Ged] wondered more and more what was the gTeatness and 
the magic of this great Mage Ogion. For when it rained Ogion 
would not even say the spell that every weatherworker knows, 
to send the storm aside. In a land where sorcerers eome thick, 
like Gont or the Enlades, you may see a raincloud blundering 
slowly from side to side and place to place as one sp,gll shunts 
it onto the next, until at last it is buffeted out over the sea 
where it can rain in peace. But Ogion would let the rain fall 
where it would .... Ged crouched among the dripping bra."lches 
wet and sullen, and wondered what was the good of having 
power if you were too wise to use it, and wished he had gone as 
prentice to that old weatherworker of the Vale, where at least 
he would have slept dry. (pp. 26-27) 
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While village witches and weatherworkers and wicked sorcerers use their 
spells with no consideration for the balance, for the Equilibrium of 
Earthsea, mages live in respect for the balance. Echoing Ogion's words 
and way of living, the Master Summoner explains to his pupils on Roke 
the importance of only using spells when necessary and showed them: 
why the true wizard uses spells only at need, since to summon 
up such earthly forces is to change the earth of which we are a 
part. 'Rain on Roke may be drouth in Osskil,' he said, 'and a 
calm in the East Reach may be storm and ruin in the West, 
unless you know what you are about.' (p. 57) 
Ged is also warned by the Master Hand about upsetting the Equilibrium: 
But you must not change one thing, one pebble, one grain of 
sand, until you know what good and evil will follow the act. The 
world is in balance, in Equilibrium. A wizard's power of 
Changing and of Summoning can shake the balance of the 
world. It is dangerous, that power. It is most perilous. It must 
follow knowledge and serve need. To light a candle is to cast a 
shadow. (p. 4R) 
Ged has yet to learn that in doing little or nothing the mage ruins 
nothing and that all things are interrelated and in balance. Ged moans 
that when he asks a mage for his secrets "he would always talk, like 
Ogion, about balance, and danger, and the dark" (p. 48). In working a 
dangerous spell with no thought as to how it may affect the Equilibrium 
Ged rents the very fabric ofEarthsea temporarily asunder, and "the stuff 
of the world had been tom apart" (p. 65 ). Only the power and knowledge of 
the Archmage, who sacrifices his life, and the Masters can restore 
balance to Earthsea. But it is only Ged who can restore balance within 
himself. Ged disturbs the balance of the Equilibrium because he lets his 
pride and arrogance dominate his behaviour and blind his understanding of 
balance. He bitterly leams the consequences of his actions. Towards the 
end of his journey a much humbled and wiser Ged tells Yarrow about the 
75 
Equilibrium and the power of the world that is in all things, interrelated 
and balanced: 
'All power is one in source and end, I think. Years and 
distances, stars and candles, water and wind and wizardry, the 
craft in a man's hand and the wisdom in a tree's root: they all 
arise together. My name, and yours, and the true name of the 
sun, or a spring of water, or an unborn child, all are syllables of 
the great word that is very slowly spoken by the shining of the 
stars. There is no other power'. (p. 151) 
(3) Wp-Wei 
Through Wu-Wei the Tao is expressed as a way ofliving. Wu-Wei, 
or non-action, is a Taoist term that relates to how a person is to live in the 
world and relate to both self and others. Smith (1991) describes Wu-Wei 
as "creative quietude" (p. 207), while Cooper (1972) translates the term 
as ~actionless activity"' (p. 75) and McNaughton (1971) argues for ~anti­
actionm (p. 85). Jochim (1986) suggests that spontaneity "perhaps best 
captures in a positive value what Lao Tzu meant by nonaction" (p. 132). 
The least use of energy and absence of force perhaps best describes Wu-
Wei (Watta, 1975, p. 82). Wu·Wei is not opposed to action, but purposeful 
action is to be avoided as this upsets the Yin-Yang balance. "Do that 
which consists in taking no action; pursue that which is not meddlesome" 
(Lao Tzu, 1963, p. 124). Interference is considered "the worst product of 
wilful activity" (Jochim, 1986, p. 133). The underlying sense ofWu-Wei is 
tranquil nonaction by which everything is always effortlessly achieved. 
"The way never acts yet nothing is left undone" (Lao Tzu, 1963, p. 96). 
Wu-Wei - "never forcing, never under strain - seems quite effortless" 
(Smith, 1991, p. 209). Wu-Wei encourages harmony through its aversion 
to activity and avoidance of "rebellion against the fundamental laws of 
the universe" (W aley, 1958, p. 55). 
In the life of the Taoist sage can be seen the lived expression ofWu-
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Wei. According to Lao Tzu (1963) the sage does his "utmost to attain 
emptiness [and to] hold firmly to stillness .... Returning to one's roots is 
known as stillness" (p. 72). The Taoist sage teaches using no words and 
extols the virtue "of resorting to no action" (Lao Tzu, p. 104). It "is 
because the sage never attempts to be great that he succeeds in 
becoming great" (Lao Tzu, p. 124). It is also because the sage "does 
nothing [that he] never ruins anything; and, because he does not lay hold 
of anything, loses nothing" (Lao Tzu, p. 125). Cooper (1972) observes that 
the Taoist sage displaY" "quiet acceptance of life in the world as it comes 
and as it is, waiting for the time and the season" (p. 7 4). 
Water is also an important symbol for Wu-Wei. It symbolizes the 
sage's ideal behaviour "because, as it does not compete but rather takes 
the path of least resistance, it stands for nnninterj,rence" (Jochim, 1986, 
p. 133). Water's adaptability to its environment and its ability to change 
its environment are indicative ofhow an individual should follow the Tao: 
Infinitely supple, yet incomparably strong · these virtues of 
water are precisely those ofwu wei as well .... [A person] acts 
without strain, persuades without argument, is eloquent 
without flourish, and achieves results without violence, 
coercion, or pressure .... A final characteristic of water that 
makes it an appropriate analogue to wu wei is the clarity it 
attains through being still. (Smith, 1991, p. 210) 
Ogion the Silent is very much the Taoist sage. "He seldom spoke, 
ate little, slept less" (p. 25) and only used his mage power when 
necessary. Silence and nonaction are basic to the character of Ogion. 
Sometimes it seemed to Ged that the: 
mage's long, listening silence would fill the room, and fill Ged's 
mind, until sometimes it seemed he had forgotten what words 
sounded like: and when Ogion spoke at last it was as if he had, 
just then and for the firnt time, invented speech. Yet the words 
he spoke were no great matters but had to do only with simple 
things, bread and water and weather and sleep. (p. 28) 
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Ogion taught Ged by sayin!( nothinp;, somethin!( which Ged is unable to 
understand. '"When will my apprenticeship begin, Sir?m asks Ged, who is 
simply told in reply by Ogion that ~u has bei(Unm (p. 25). Instead of the 
nonaction and silence demonstrated by Ogion, Ged seeks to act. Ged seeks 
to gain power to do as he wills. He wants 'something' to happen. ~since I 
have been with you I have done nothing, seen nothin~ complains Ged to 
Ogion (p. 31). Ogion responds, "'Now you have seen something ... By the 
door, in the darknessm (p. 31). Yet Ged, though horrified by what he saw 
and felt, still seeks to act. He considers that a wizard should be able "to do 
what he pleased" (p. 48). Ged has yet to understand that a great mage, 
such as Ogion or Archmage N emmerle, is great because he never 
attempts to be great. Nemmerle seals the rent in the fabric of Earthsea 
not by visual acts of great power or loudly spoken spells but by standing 
and whispering: "Nearby a voice was speaking as softly as a tree 
whispers or a fountain plays .... The night was healed. Restored and 
steady lay the balance of light and dark" (p. 64). 
Nor does Ged learn anything of the mage's way from the masters 
on Roke. He is repeatedly warned by them about the dangers of upsetting 
the Equilibrium and why a mage rarely uses his power. It is only after he 
has released his shadow that he begins to understand what the mages 
had been trying to teach him. The Master Summoner gently tells Ged: 
'You thought ... that a mage is one who can do anything. So I 
thought, once. So did we all. And the truth is that as a man's 
real power grows and his knowledge widens, ever the way he 
can follow grows narrower; until at last he chooses nothing, 
but does only and wholly what he must do'. (p. 73) 
Slowly Ged begins the painful lessons ofbeing a true mage. It is not about 
power and glory and action, as he had thought, but about silence and 
humility and nonaction. Nevertheless, he uses considerable energy first 
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fleeing from his shadow and then trying to destroy it before realizing that 
he is neither "hunted nor hunter", and 'knows' that when the time comes 
for their last meeting "they would meet" without hurried exertion on his 
part (p. 138). Ged sensed that "southward the shadow had gone. He need 
cast no finding-charm to know this: he knew it, as certainly as if a fine 
unreeling cord bound him and it together" (p. 141). Ged comes to learn 
that there is much wisdom in the natural world and he "strove to learn 
what can be learned, in silence, from the eyes of animals, the flight of 
birds, the great slow gestures of trees" (p. 82). A much wiser Ged is able to 
say to Murre and Yarrow that ~for a word to be spoken ... there must be 
silence. Before, and afterm (p. 152). 
Far out at sea, on water that, for a while, is water no more Ged 
meets his shadow in silence and stillness: 
All sounds of water, wind, wood, sail were gone, lost in a huge 
profound silence that might have been unbroken forever. The 
boat lay motionless. No breath of wind moved. The sea had 
tuned to sand, shadowy, unstirred. Nothing moved in the dark 
sky or on the dry unreal ground that went on ... into gathering 
darkness .... Ged stood up .... [and] strode forward from the 
boat, but in no direction. There were no directions here, no 
north or south or east or west, only towards and away. (p. 163) 
At last Ged has learnt what it means to be a great mage. He had taken 
Ogion's advice to be ~the stream itself, all of it, from its spring to its 
sinking in the seam (p. 120). Ged had followed his course from Gont to the 
sea and there, in silence and stillness, he had returned to his 'source' and 
become whole. On water that is not water and in profound silence seems a 
particularly Taoist locale to find wholeness of being. 
(4) T11 
Te, or virtue is "the realization or expression of the Tao in actual 
living• (Watts, 1975, p. 107). Te is another Taoist concept that also 
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relates to the living out of the Tao in a harmonious and positive way. "One 
could say that te is a natural virtue, based on inner feelings, as distinct 
from artificial virtue, based on a following of rules" (Watts, 1975, p. 108). 
Te refers to avoidance in life of any type of excess. Harmful qualities that 
can lead to an upsetting of the equilibrium include excesses such as hate, 
pride, envy, greed, and the like and also "greed of possession [and] worship 
of status and luxury" (Cooper, 1981, p. 38). Te emphasizes avoidance of 
worldly values such as wealth, status, assertiveness, and competition. 
"People should avoid being strident and aggressive not only toward other 
people but also toward nature" (Smith, 1991, p. 212). 
In living out Te there is avoidance of unbalance in emotions and life: 
This is why excessive meanness 
Is sure to lead to great expense; 
Too much store 
Is sure to end in immense loss. 
Know contentment 
And you will suffer no disgrace; 
Know when to stop 
And you will meet with no danger. (Lao Tzu, 1963, p. 105) 
In Taoism sin is seen as "a violation of the harmony of the universe ... 
and as such it creates disharmony and, therefore, disquiet in the individual 
in particular and in society in general" (Cooper, 1972, p. 22). To avoid 
upsetting and violating the harmony of the universe, in self and others 
and the natural world, the individual's behaviour should encompass Te. 
Although a central part of Taoist life and philosophy, Te often goes 
unnoticed because it seems so ordinary (Watts, 1975, p. 108). Te is to be 
seen in always following the Tao: "In his every movement a man of great 
virtue I Follows the way and only the way" (Lao Tzu, 1963, p. 78). 
Ged exhibits an excess of emotions that upsets the balance within 
himself, and in Earthsea anythi11g that threatens the Equilibrium is 
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considered unwise and foolish. The true mage serves only the "Balance 
and the Pattern" (p. 16) and acts out of need not desire. ~A wizard's power 
.... must follow knowledge, and serve need'" (p. 48). In this sense, Ged's 
sin, stemming from his pride, arrogance, and greed for power, leads to 
disharmony in himself and in Earthsea. The greed for "mystery and 
mastery of power" (p. 25), the "wish for glory, the will to act" (p. 32), and 
the desire "to be powerful enough to do as he pleased" (p. 48) drive Ged's 
thoughts and actions with no regard for himself or others. Ged comes to 
experience considerable disgrace and danger because he does not know 
contentment and balance in himself nor does he know when to stop his 
unwise behaviour. The balance between light and dark is disrupted by his 
reckless actions. Ged seeks glory, status, and power and has to painfully 
learn the importance of behaving only as a true mage. In the end, he 
finally achieves maturity and wholeness through his acceptance and 
reconciliation with his shadow. 
Ged's growing responsibility for his behaviour is reflected in his 
refusal to gain the name of the shadow from either Yevaud (pp. 88-90) or 
Serret (pp. 108-112). As much as he wanta to know the shadow's name 
he is all too aware of the danger of the temptations offered to him. In 
addition to refusing knowledge of the shadow's name, Ged also refuses 
what could be considerable personal gain. He rejects Yevaud's offer of 
jewels and bargains instead for the dragon's promise "'to never come to 
the Archipelago'" (p. 90). He also refuses Serret's bribe of becoming "'a 
king among menm with her at his side (p 112). However, Ged is slow to 
learn the virtue in always serving the balance no matter the particular 
circumstances. When Ged tries to save Pechvarry's son he disregards the 
natural harmony of the Equilibrium (oflife and death) resulting in further 
illiury and danger to himself. Ged broke "the first Jesson and the last of ... 
[healing lore]: Heal the wound and cure the illness, but let the dying spirit 
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go" (p. 80). In desperation to try and help Pechvarry and his wife by 
saving their son he "mistrusted his own judgement, and thought perhaps 
the child might be saved" (p. 80). By the conclusion of the novel, however, 
Ged has mastered the way of the true mage in both his thoughts and 
actions, now fully understanding why this way must be followed at all 
times. Vetch sees the truth in Ged's assertion that "'it is done. It is overm 
(p. 166) and sings from "the Creatinn of Ea which is the oldest song, it is 
said, 'Only in silence the word, only in dark the light, only in dying life: 
bright the hawk's flight on the empty skym (p. 166). 
Value of the Rousseauistic Interpretation 
These two examples of the Rousseauistic interpretation are 
extremely appealing to religious educators because they use the vehicle of 
the text, in this example a delightful fantasy tale, as a means for teaching 
about the importance of balance in self and the world or the importance of 
incorporatating into the self the dark side of one's nature. Nevertheless, 
Derrida would consider such Rousseauistic interpretations sad and exiled 
because they seek to decipher textual meaning as definitive and to explain 
the human situation in terms of absolute doctrines. This is achieved by 
referring to an external authority, Taoism or Jungian psychology, for its 
meaning. The logocentric impulse in the Rousseauistic interpretation is 
attractive to religious educators because, in stabilizing the structure of 
the text, it seemingly affirms foundations, seeks definitive meaning, and 
provides certitude and principles by which to live, thereby reducing 
anxiety. For Derrida a text can only be interpreted in this way by closure 
and cessation of textual play. It can be seen from the two preceding 
examples how 'natural' the Rousseauistic interpretation seems. The 
meaning looks obvious, intended. Yet, in Derridean terms this is merely 
representative of the ideal of logocentrism, of the seeking of the lost 
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centre, that is not possible in a Post-Structuralist world. However, there 
is a heavy investment in Religious Education of the Rousseauistic 
interpretation because its essence is concerned with seeking "meaning 
and purpose in human existence" (supra uide, p. 11). 
A Rousseauistic interpretation of A Wizard of Earthsea that 
centres on the Jungian shadow would be favoured by religious educators 
as helping students to come to terms with the question of evil in 
themselves. The shadow is Ged's darker side which he does not recognize 
as his and which he empowers by his negative, destructive feelings. By 
uniting with his dark side Ged becomes whole again. Through Ged's 
journey the student can come to understand the pi ace of the shadow in life 
and the folly of ignoring it. Related discussions could also pursue the 
Jungian notion of the collective shadow, expressions of which can be seen 
in discrimination, racism, and group prejudice. The greatest danger of not 
assimilating the individual shadow is the possibility of infection by the 
collective shadow. "If we could see our shadow ... we would be immune to 
any moral or mental infection and insinuation" (Jung, von Franz, 
Henderson, Jacobi & Jaffe, 1978, p. 73). At the core of the collective 
shadow is "the archetype of the enemy, the treacherous stranger, the evil 
intruder" (Stevens, 1990, p. 45), that are dehumanized into monsters who 
must he destroyed. Jung's concern with the personal and collective 
shadow led I>Jm to a consideration of evil, which he saw as "the necessary 
opposite of good" (Jung, 1991, p. 323). Jung viewed evil to he as real and 
necessary as good, seeing them as opposites in a relationship of 
psychological polarity. For Jung the true meaning of Christ "was that 
every individual should live out fully his own natural and specific self as 
truly as Christ had lived his ... and this was only possible if man were 
reintegrated with the shadow" (Van der Post, 1977, p. 240). 
Religious educators would also favour a Rousseauistic 
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interpretation of A Wizard of Earthsea that centres on the Taoist concept 
of balance as encouraging students to consider the necessity of balance in 
all things, in both self and in relationship to others and to the world. 
Through Ged's story the student can come t.o an understanding of the 
absolute necessity of balance. In his arrogance and greed for power Ged 
does not understand that lack of self-discipline and knowledge without 
true wisdom can threaten the Equilibrium. He does not even recognize 
that upsetting the balance is wrong. Nor can he see that even with the 
power to do so he must not. Through Ged students are encouraged to 
understand why self-discipline and responsibility are necessary pre-
requisites for deeply appreciating the inter-relatedness of all things in a 
unified balance and for living as caring people within the complexity of 
human and cosmic life. The Rousseauistic interpretation that centres on 
Taoism can be used as a starting point for discussions regarding the 
differing concepts of good and evil in different religions. Le Guin points out 
that "not many critics have been willing to notice that the view presented 
of!ife and death in Earthsea is not only non-Christian but anti-Christian" 
(McCaffrey, 1990, p. 168). In Le Guin's emphasis on the polarity of light 
and dark, good and evil, is seen reflected the Taoist emphasis on universal 
balance in all things. This is very different to the Christian position in 
which good is seen as ultimately triumphing over and destroying evil. 
Through these Rousseauistic interpretations of A Wizard of 
Earthsea religious educators can also explore other issues of importance 
to Religious Education. For example, topics such as responsibility, 
respect, and friendship can be isolated for study. Ged displays complete 
disregard for others and acts in an irresponsible way that brings about his 
own downfall. Yet, he does eventually learn about the importance of self-
responsibility and grows to wholeness and maturity. Ged experiences the 
warmth, love, and trustworthiness of true friendship in Vetch and comes 
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to both understand and appreciate what it means to be trusted by a 
friend and how to trust that friend himself. Ged also learns the necessity 
of caring for, respecting, and valuing all life. In possibly his most 
vulnerable state Ged is saverl from dying by his otek. 
The Rousseauistic interpretative position is immensely important 
in Religious Education because of its overall concern with divulging a 
specific meaning. There may be more than one meaning, in this study the 
concepts of balance or the shadow, but each meaning is pedagogically 
specific, teaching about balance or the shadow, and is considered 
putative. Such interpretations are inherently valuable in discussions of 
the journey towards wholeness. In addition, religious educators would cite 
Le Guin's strongly professed views on Taoism and the Jungian shadow as 
greatly supportive, if not the raison d'etre, for pursuing such examples of 
the Rousseauistic interpretation of her novel. Necessarily, the style and 
process of teaching using this interpretative position is one directed, 
however gently and encouragingly, by the teacher. It is a reading of the 
text controlled and determined by the teacher to provide textual 
exploration to specific ends. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Nietzsehean Interpretation in Practice 
Through a close textual analysis of A Wizard ofEarthsea using the 
Nietzschean interpretation it is possible to pursue endless threads of 
provisional meaning contained within the text. However, the plurality of 
meaning facilitated by language, and any related slippage, is inherent in 
the words themselves. Words are not forced to me !ill certain things: 
'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful 
tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor 
less.' 
'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words 
mean different things.' 
'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be 
master- that's ali.' (Carroll, 1974, p. 197) 
Humpty Dumpty, while exhibiting a playful approach to language, 
actually assumes the Rousseauistic interpretative stance since it is not 
possible in the Nietzschean interpretation to restrict the meaning of 
words to precisely one thing or to be a master of language. It is most 
certainly not a case of 'making' words ~m2an different thingsm but tha.t 
from the perspective of the Nietzschean interpretation the 'meanings' of 
words themselves are apt to slip and slide in all sorts of odd directions and 
metamorphose into all sorts of strange creatures. 
In the Rousseauistic interpretation, of course, words are seen as 
conveying the intended authorial meaning, which then furnishes definitive 
textual meaning. The Nietzschean interpretation, however, points to the 
instability and fluidity of language from which arises the impossibility of 
meaning. This is not a denial of meaning per se, but is a rejection of 
absolute meaning (that is, there is an infinite deferral of meaning). In this 
position, Derrida sees the plurality of provisional meaning at play in the 
language of the text. Even though the Rousseauistic position may give 
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rise to more than one meaning in A Wizard of Earthsea such meanings 
are putative and absolute in themselves, such as the Taoist concept of 
balance or the Jungian concept of the shadow. In the Nietzschean 
position there is an impossibility of finite meaning; all that is ever possible 
is an infinite abundance of provisional meaning. These threads of 
provisional meaning are not centres that fix the structure of the text, as 
in the Rousseauistic sense, but actually constitute a multiplicity of 
aspects drawn from the language of the text through deconstruction. 
The Nietzschean position uses textual gaps and contradictions to 
deconstruct Le Guin's novel to show what lies lurking beneath its surface. 
In this way language is demonstrated to be not straightforward, and tc be 
actually problematic, in communicating meaning. What appeared to be a 
unified text conveying a particular absolute meaning, as in the 
Rousseauistic interpretation, is shown to be a fragmented text that works 
against itself, giving up a plethora of provisional meanings. While Humpty 
Dumpty boasts that when he makes ~a word do a lot of work ... I always 
pay it extra'" (Carroll, 1974, p. 197), the Nietzschean interpretation 
simply utilizes the instability and fluidity of language to carefully trace 
provisional meanings that the words themselves freely furnish. Rather 
than the reassurance, certitude, and guidance that can come from the 
Rousseauistic position, in the Nietzschean position what results can be 
unsettling, confusing, and disconcerting. Indeed, the familiarity of the 
logocentric impulse, as represented in the Rousseauistic position, feels so 
natural that there is often resistance to the Nietzschean position because 
it seems so threatening and upsetting. The logocentric idea that concepts 
pre-exist language, which are then conveyed by language, is totally 
rejected. Language is seen as pre-existing any sense that is made of the 
world. In the Nietzschean interpretation rather than sadness and fear at 
what this position undermines there is joy and excitement at the infinite 
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possibilities of textual play. 
As a methodological approach the Nietzschean interpretation is a 
potentially indefinite process in which the role of the teacher changes 
from one of directing students to one of facilitating their active and equal 
participation. Pedagogically, deconstruction places its emphasis on 
limitless questioning. Johnson (Salusinszky, 1987) suggests that "in order 
to be truly deconstructive, you would have constantly to move the locus 
of your questions, not just move onto another text" (p 158). Derrida also 
acknowledges this emphasis on questioning that characterizes the 
Nietzschean interpretation. However, in wanting to emphasize the 
affirmation facilitated by this position he adds that deconstruction is not 
totally interrogative but "is affirmative rather than questioning; this 
affirmation goes through some radical questioning, but is not questioning 
in the final analysis"(Salusinszky,1987, p. 20). 
The Nietzschean interpretative position is an affirmation of the 
free play of endless chains of signifiers. There is no end. to the questions 
and there is no end to the infinite possibilities ufinterpretation facilitated 
by incessant textual play. In addition, there is also no 'control' or 'order' or 
'system' or external 'imposition', as characterized by the Rousseauistic 
approach to the text. Rather, it is an infinite, ever-changing, and ever-
evolving maze that characterizes the Nietzschean interpretation, where 
strange questions about "'whether pigs have wingsm (Carroll, 1974, p. 
169) may well be asked. Any utilization of this interpretative position is 
necessarily incomplete and centrifugal, and can only ever be abysmally 
partial and fragmented. What can be positively and successfully 
achieved, however, is the provision of a taste, a delicious inkling, of what 
constitutes the Nietzschean interpretation in practice. Nevertheless, 
even these inklings are also necessarily incomplete, representing only a 
sampling of various aspects that provide no resolution or end-point. 
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Both concomitant and subsequent to these discussions is the 
'organization' (disruption) of material in this chapter. Numbering of 
threads in the following section is purposely jumbled and non-sequential to 
emphasize the essence of the Nietzschean interpretation; that is, the 
multiplicity of play, the fabric like textual structure of innumerable 
interweaving threads of provisional meaning, the non-privileging of one 
thread over another, and joyful playfulness. Wl:at follows, then, is a 
limited pulling of textual threads, a sampling of the weft and warp of the 
text, a farrago of eclectic thoughts arising from textual deconstruction. 
Threads of Meaning 
Numerous threads of provisional meaning can be pursued through 
a Nietzschean interpretation of Le Gain's A Wizard of Earthsea (1993). 
The deconstructive process explores the chasm in the text by exposing 
textual contradictions and inconsistencies. For example, by focussing on 
specific words or phrases the points of textual betrayal can he highlighted 
and the provisional nature oflanguage and meaning demonstrated. 
Thread 25: "'light"' 
By concentrating on the word 'light' it is possible to demonstrate 
the confusion that exists in the text concerning the concepts oflight and 
dark. Ged tells Yarrow and Murre that "'Light is powerm (p. 150), '"All 
power is one in source and endm (p. 151), and '"There is no other powerm (p. 
151). Such statements clearly indicate that light is the only power and is 
both the source and end of all things. Light, then, is three things: it is 
unitary, alpha, and omega. Yet, only a few pages later the reader is 
informed that when Gedjoined with his shadow "Light and darkness met, 
and joined, and were one" (p. 164). This phrase contradicts the previous 
statements in its description of the relationship between light and dark. If 
light is the one power from which all things arise and is the only power 
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how, then, can it meet and join with darkness and become one? It is not 
possible for A (light) to meet and join with B (dark) and become C (one) if 
A is already 'one' and both the beginning and the end of everything, 
including B. Now it appears that light is part of a binary relationship that 
when fused produces a third element, that which is unitary. In addition, 
light clearly cannot be alpha and omega because it is not the source, only 
part of it, and is not the end, only a means to the end. 
Moreover, to add to the confusion the reader is informed, almost at 
the conclusion of the novel, that "'only in dark the lightm (p. 166). This 
phrase is one line from a poem also located on the facing page of the novel 
before commencement of the story proper (p. 12). It is from the Creatinn 
of Ea, which in Earthsea is considered "the oldest song" (p. 166). Its 
repetition at the conclusion of the novel and its description as old, given 
the value attached to the ancient in the Earthsea story, are suggestive of 
some importance. This phrase seems to indicate that it is only possible 
for light to exist in darkness or at least that dark is a necessary 
precondition for light. Without dark it can be deduced that light could not 
exist or function. Light, then, is conveyed as a separate 'contained' entity 
within dark, and whic!: .-equires the dark to be ~inm. The word ~only'" 
stresses the absolute needfulness of light for dark, while the word ~in'" 
indicates that light actually exists within the dark. This implies that dark 
is the originating factor within which light can only be found. This is 
obviously contradictory to the description of dark and light meeting and 
joining and becoming one when Gedjoins with his shadow, clearly the focal 
point of the story of Ged's journey towards wholeness. :;;·dark contains 
light, and light is only possible within dark, then how can dark and light 
meet and join and become one? It is not possible fer A (dark) and B (light) 
to meet ifB (light) is already contained within A (dark). Nor is it possible 
for A (dark) and B (light) to become C (one) if B (light) is already a 
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constituent within A (dark) and therefore in a sense already •C (one). 
Conversely, whether dark needs light to eXist and function raii;'es some 
other interesting questions about the relationship of light and dark so 
bewilderingly referred to in the text. 
There is considerable confusion and contradiction regarding the 
relationship of light and dark in A Wizard of Earthsea. What from the 
Rousseauistic position seemed straightforward and meaningful is from 
the Nietzschean position obfuscating. Students can consider how the 
confusion and contradiction over the word 'light' and 'dark' may be 
reflected in Western society and culture, and even in sacred texts. 
Thread 7,490: "had sent him to read that spell" 
When Ged meets Serret at the Court of the Terrenon he does not 
initially realize that he knows her. It is only when they are trying to 
escape from the wrath of Lord Benderesk that he remembers her: 
there was a fierce witch-look to her beauty; and Ged knew her 
at last • the daughter of the Lord of Re Albi ... who had 
mocked him ... long ago, and had sent him to read that spell 
which loosed the shadow. (p. 114) 
In these few words the entire narrative structure of A Wizard of Earthsea 
collapses in on itself. Ged is suddenly expiated of responsibility for 
releasing his shadow. What, from the Rousseauistic interpretation, is a 
story about owning one's shadow or the necessity of balance is now, in the 
Nietzschean interpretation, irretrievably decimated by the admission 
that the fault lies with a girl who "had sent him to read that spell". This 
little phrase occurs about half way through the novel and effectively 
contradicts all that has preceded it and all that follows it. The story, 
" 
having lost its coherence and direction, no longer makes any sense. 
It would be so easy to overlook this phrase in the context of the 
novel as a whole, but to do so would be to ignore one of those little niggling 
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details to be found in the margin of the text. Not only does Ged now seem 
to possess little will of his own but, of all people, it is a little girl who "sent 
him to read that spell"! This minuscule vestige of the patriarchal order 
brings with it long-standing Western ideas that women are inherently evil 
and are always to blame. It is impossible not to see through this tiny 
textual gap the Eve narrative of blame and guilt. It is all the more 
surprising that this phrase slipped in at the hands of a female author. 
Nevertheless, this indicates the insidious influence of cultural belief that 
can still inform and exert its influence through language when the ideas 
themselves have long been questioned and rejected as not having a 
rightful place in the social order. What has been overtly challenged and 
'removed' in society is demonstrated, by the Nietzschean interpretation of 
A Wizard of Earthsea, to be still in evidence beneath the textual surface, 
subversively disturbing the veneer of apparent societal consensus and 
intention. Pursuing such a thread of provisional meaning obviously 
interweaves with other strands of meaning to do with women and power. 
Thread 343: "'that which lies before the source"' 
Ged is advised by Ogion that to deal with his shadow he must wtum 
clear round, and seek the very source, and that which lies before the 
sourcem (p. 120). Source means beginning or that from which something 
originates. How then can there be something behind the origin? From the 
Rousseauistic interpretation this type of statement 'sounds' as though it 
is very meaningful, but linguistically looks rather nonsensical. 
Nevertheless, in pursuing this thread it is possible to follow the 
analogy begun in the text. That is, Ogion is talking about a stream that 
rises as a spring in the mountain and runs down to the sea. Spring water, 
though subterranean, originally collects from rainfall, so perhaps this is 
"'that which lies before the source'". But, rainfall originates from 
evaporation of ground and sea water. So, is this "'that which lies before 
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the source"'? But, that means that the mysterious "'that which lies before 
the sourcem is actually itself before it becomes itself; that is, it is spring 
water before it has been evaporated and falls as rain which is then 
collected as water in the spring. What does such circularity say about the 
shadow? What is it before it's a shadow and what. is it after? Is the shadow 
Ged, both before and after it becomes a shadow, or is it something else? 
Well, after all Nietzschean interpretations are playful and do 
confound! Such circular discussions reflect linguistic entanglements where 
meanings seem to loop together into nonsensical infinity. Similar 
conundrums can also be seen echoed in religious/philosophical issues to do 
with arche or telos, and what lies before the beginning or after the end, 
where the problematic nature oflanguage is much in evidence. 
Thread 454: "'argue"' 
Pondering whether his shadow has a name or not Ged observes 
that "'where mages argue, dragons may be wisem (p. 148). This seems 
such an innocuous little word in a seemingly simple statement, but in 
considering it carefully in relation to the text as a whole throws the 
apparent unity of the text into disarray and raises some very interesting 
and poignant threads of meaning. The impression given to the reader 
through a surface reading of the novel indicates a very strong cohesive 
view concerning the Equilibrium as the interrelated balance by which all 
things in Earthsea exist. The Archmages, the Masters, GOO., and Vetch, 
representative of the controlling hierarchy in Earthsea, display a general 
consensus of opinion regarding the Equilibrium. Yet, Ged indicates that 
mages do argue and Vetch also supports this in his statement, ~Infinite 
are the arguments of magesm (p. 148). It must be concluded, then, that 
there is actually no cohesive view amongst mages. Perhaps the text tries 
perpetuating the 'party line' but betrays itself, betrays its whole 
structure and meaning, by several little slips. It is precisely such slips 
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that deconstruction utilizes to expose the textual 'subconscious'. Indeed, 
Ged, in a moment of doubt, even wonders whether "'there is no true power 
but the darkm(p. 152). The reader is left to ponder whether Serret, who 
tried to tell Ged that only darkness can be defeated by darkness (p. 112), 
may be right and perhaps the wizards have got it all wrong. 
'fhread 6,921: "'balance"' 
The Master Hand explains to Ged that the ~world is in balance, in 
Equilibriumm (p. 48). By focussing on the word 'balance' and its centrality 
to both the structure of the novel and Earthsea some interesting 
questions about power and gender are raised. The type of questions asked 
of texts in Cultural Criticism in the English classroom can be fruitfully 
applied to texts used in the Religious Education classroom. For example, it 
is possible to gain different insights into A Wizard of Earth sea by asking 
such questions as: How is balance maintained in Earthsea? Who pays for 
the maintenance of this balance? What values, aspects of society, laws, 
and concepts are marginalized or privileged? and, What roles are available 
for women? These type of questions encourage the reader to be critical, 
rather than responsive, and to see the text as something that is 
constructed, rather than as something that reflects reality (O'Neill, 1993, 
p. 24). This deconstructive approach to reading the text in an oppositional 
manner challenges the apparent 'unity' of the text. 
Unlike either of the Rousseauistic interpretations that have been 
discussed the Nietzschean interpretation deconstructs the Equilibrium 
exposing it to be a balance that maintains the existing hierarchy and 
which requires the individual to behave in certain ways so as not to 
disturb this balance. The student is encouraged by such an oppositional 
reading of A Wizard ofEarthsea to consider the place of the individual in 
relation to the existing power structures. Instead of the existence of a pre-
ordained balance that must be understood as necessary for all life and 
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must not be disturbed, as in the Rousseauistic interpretation, balance 
from the Nietzschean position could be interpreted as existing only 
because of the subjugation of the individual and of women generally. If the 
individual tries to exert independence or individual action that runs 
counter to the ordained order (as Ged does) the result will be puuishment 
and alienation. In this interpretation the joining of Ged with his shadow is 
the sad failure of the individual to break the immensely powerful bonds of 
society that hold him in subjugation. 
Thread 525: "perilous" 
The word perilous appears a number of times in the novel. The 
occurrence of the same word in different contexts is intriguing and draws 
attention to its use. For example: there are ancient spells "that kept the 
perilous island [of Roke] safe" (p. 94); without Equilibrium the 
"'unbalanced sea would overwhelm the islands where we perilously dwellm 
(p. 51); and, a wizard's power "'can shake the balance of the world. It is 
dangerous .... [and] most perilous'" (p. 48). It seems odd that mages live 
on a perilous island, possess perilous and dangerous powers, serve the 
Equilibrium, but can potentially upset this balance and cause destruction 
of the islands on which the folk of Earthsea perilously live. Are these 
things connected? It is suggested in the novel that those who serve the 
dark powers, such as sorcerers or village witches, do not serve the 
Equilibrium, yet nor do they seem able to greatly disturb it. It is only the 
mages, who do serve it, that are considered able to do this. Perhaps, then, 
it is the mages who are guilty of the greatest threat to Earthsea, not by 
their serving of the Equilibrium but by their power to shake and rupture 
it. The perilous state ofEarthsea seems inextricably linked to those who 
profess to be its guardians. Pursuing this odd textual thread raises 
questions to do with the power, responsibility, and betrayal. 
In society, the church, or family are those who have the 
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responsibility to serve and protect, but by virtue of their trusted position 
can cause immense damage to those in their care, also potentially guilty 
of the same 'crime' as the mages? Victims of abuse, whether in the family, 
church, or state, would answer 'yes'. Any position of power, or access to 
power, necessitates great responsibility, as the mages are well aware of 
and as Ged bitterly learns. Such power is perilous because those who are 
subject to it live, by virtue of their suhject position, perilously. Such, 
issues, however unpalatable and threatening to society's structures, need 
to be addressed. Those who assert that 'others' are dangerous because 
they serve the 'dark' are likely tc be potentially far more dangerous 
themselves. The deconstructive process ·forces confrontation with the 
contradictions and inequalities in both the novel and society that can be 
so easily smoothed over by language and may often go unnoticed. In 
particular, the Nietzschean position can help the student examine and 
understand how societal structures use language to maintain authority 
and control and to 'deal' with 'issues' that threaten its privileged position, 
and also how that same language betrays what is hidden beneath its 
surface. Of Derrida's two interpretations it is only the Nietzschean 
interpretation that can facilitate such a linguistic and textual expose. 
Thread 9: "dark" 
A consideration of the use of the word 'dark', or its derivatives, is 
suggestive of another provisional thread of meaning that betrays 
apparent textual integrity. This thread of thought obviously crosses and 
intertwines with threads of thought to do with 'light'. There are some odd 
statements about 'dark' in the novel than indicate a puzzling use of the 
word. When Ged first glimpses his shadow, while still an apprentice to 
Ogion on Gont, it is described as "darker than darkness" (p. 30). What 
precisely this statement means is difficult tc ascertain. The word 'darker' 
means to darken or make dark, which itself means to make or be without 
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light or to obscure, while 'darkness' refers to the characteristic of being 
dark. Strictly speaking it is questionable whether that which is already in 
the state of being dark can actually be more so. 
Balance is continually represented as the essence ofEartbsea. For 
example, after Archmage Nemmerle has returned Earthsea to 
Equilibrium "restored and steady lay the balance of light and dark" (p. 64). 
However, there is also evidence of an oppositional conception of light as 
good and dark as evil. The phrase "never in the service of ... dark" (p. 
166) is suggestive of dark being evil and to be avoided, not merely a 
balance to light. This establishes an oppositional relationship with light 
that places dark with evil and light with good. The use of the word 'dark' to 
describe that which is evil or wicked, and therefore antithetical to light 
and good, has a long linguistic history in the West: "And God saw the light, 
that it was good: and God divided the light from the darkness" (Gen. 1:4, 
King James Version, KJV). Although Le Guin claims to be Taoist not 
Christian in her philosophical outlook, the division of light and dark and 
the view of light as good have heavily influenced the West for many 
centuries and this cultural background cannot easily be dispensed with. 
The influence of this dichotomous division, and its inherent 
labelling, is perhaps far too pervasive and insidious to avoid. Even in 
trying to resist a particular attitude the linguistic weight of centuries of 
Western meaning makes its appearance in the text as niggling details 
which plague the text and upset authorial intention. It is through such 
troublesome trifles that deconstruction is able to dig down to the hidden 
depths of the text and harass it, by disturbing the apparent smoothness 
of the textual surface. In A Wizard of Earth sea the use of the terms 'light' 
and 'dark' sometimes suggests a balancing of equal opposites and 
sometimes the linking of dark with evil and light with good. Students could 
be encouraged to examine how they use the terms 'light' and 'dark', what 
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meanings they attach to the use of these words, and whether they use 
them in a confused and inconsistent manner as evident in Le Guin's novel. 
Another phrase worth examining is: ~danger must surround power as 
shadow does lightm (p. 31). Once again, dark and its characteristics are 
deemed undesirable, linked to danger while light is deemed, by associated 
deduction, to be linked with not only good but also power. Such strands of 
enquiry intersect at vario·1s points with other discussions about power. 
Thread 3,254: "'not the powe!l'S I servem 
Ogion reprimands Ged for reading a certain spell, explaining to him 
that the ~girl herself is half witch already. It may he the mother who sent 
the girl to talk to you. It may he she who opened the book to the page you 
read. The powPrs she serves are not the powers I servem (p. 31). In such a 
statement Ogion indicates a separation between powers in Earthsea. The 
mages, such as Ogion, serve the Equilibrium where.;', those such as 
Serret serve the "Old Power" (p. 148). The hierarchical order ofEarthsea, 
with the mages on Roke holding both power and prestige, is dependent on 
the ~owers that I [the mages) serve'" constituting both the generally 
accepted and authoritative power. Those like Serret, who do not serve the 
same power, are necessarily seen as oppositional and therefore 
threatening, dangerous, and to be avoided. 
Roke, a male enclave where only boys are trained to be wizards, is 
a segregated world of mages and boys that rarely has a female presence: 
That night the Lord ofO was a guest of the school .... [and] 
with him was his lady, slender and young, bright as new 
copper, her black hair crowned with opals. It was seldom that 
any woman sat in the halls of the Great House, and some of 
the old Masters looked at her sidelong, disapproving. But the 
young men looked at her with all their eyes. (pp. 53-54) 
The implied celibacy and virtual exclusion of women and all things female 
indicates a very closed existence and world-view. It is perhaps noteworthy 
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that while both men and women are born with power 'uch as Ged and 
Serret, it is only boys that need years of training. This may well be 
another thread of meaning to pursue: female power grows to fruition while 
male power must be trained. The Nietzschean interpretation exposes 
that the 'other' must remain 'other' if the extant powers wish to retain 
their position. This segregated world of the mages feeds their fear and 
suspicion of women since it is not possible to understand something of 
which one has no knowledge. That which is not understood tends to be 
feared, and that which is least understood tends to be most feared. In 
society, too, it is those not understood that are feared and rejected. Only in 
recent decades have lesbians and homosexuals become more understood 
and accepted and therefore less feared and marginalized. 
Ged says that ~the Old Powers of earth are not for men to usem (p. 
111). Strictly analyzing the words of this statement indicates that the Old 
Powers, which are not for men, may, by inference, actually be for women. 
The resistance, fear, and rejection that Ged and Ogion display toward this 
'other' power seems indicative that it is part of the general fear of, and 
separation from, women that characterizes the mages' world. That this 
'other' power is always referred to as old is suggestive that the powers 
which women such as Serret and h"r mother serve predate the powers 
that the mages serve. In this oppositional positioning of powers served by 
the mages and those served by, but not exclusively, women is perhaps a 
linguistic echo of Western history in which very early matriarchal 
societies were usurp..:d and replaced by patriarchal societies, which have 
generally held sway until relatively recent times. Students could be 
encouraged to extend their Nietzschean examination of A Wizard of 
Earthsea in terms of these divisions of power allegiance to an 
examination of contemporary society. The advent and growth of women's 
issues and women's groups this century were a retaliation against the 
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long-standing Western patriarchal society and an attempt to empower 
the female position. Within this context what does the recent advent and 
growth of men's issues and men's groups signify? 
Thread 2,011: "'eastm 
On Roke the Master Hand explains to Ged the importance of 
balance, the Equilibrium, in Earthsea and says to him, "'To light a candle 
is to cast a shadowm (p. 48). A surface reading of this statement seems 
~b·rious enough: when a candle is lit it casts a shadow. A Rousseauistic 
interpretation is likely to 'extract' from this the idea of causation in that 
all actions and thoughts imply effects, quite possibly imbibing such an 
interpretative stance with a sense of religiosity. The approach taken in 
the Nietzschean interpretation, however, is quite disparate in intent, 
manner, and result. The word 'cast' seems an innocent enough word, but it 
actually facilitates an entry point into the text that causes all sorts of 
problems and difficulties, demonstrating very clearly the fluid nature of 
language. Indeed, the paradoxes and unintended meanings arising from a 
deconstructive approach to the use of this word amounts to what some 
(particularly those of a vehemently Rousseauistic interpretative 
persuasion) may term considerable textual harassment. 
From a perusal of several dictionaries the word 'cast' has a 
considerable variety of meaning. For example, among other meanings, it 
can mean to throw, mould, twist, direct, hold, secure, overthrow, search, 
shed, form, and discard. If the text as a whole is considered in the light of 
even some of these other definitions it begins exhibiting some quite 
startling I.IIld thought-provoking strands of provisional meaning. Cast, as 
in 'to mould', can have positive as well as negative connotations. It can be 
a creative process as in the act of moulding in sculpture or cooking where 
something is poured, placed, or packed into a mould to create a specific 
form. However, it can ale1o be a destructive process as in the act offorcing 
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different things or people to conform to a Rpecific design so it appears they 
have all been 'cast' from the same mould. The School on Roke trains boys 
to be wizards. This can be seen positi'lely, as in creating mages able to 
live and work in accordance with the rules ofRoke. This is likely to be the 
favoured Rousseouistic interpretation as it supports the status quo and 
does not threaten the controlling hierarchy that undertakes the casting of 
adepts. It can also be seen negatively, as in the enforced destruction of 
individuality in a process that casts all manner ot boys ir. the same 
wizard mould. Those who do not make the grade and prove unsatisfactory, 
such as Jasper, are 'casf aside, discarded. 
On Roke those students who are successfully moulded are admitted 
to the ranks of mages while those who are not are discarded or cast aside. 
Such a process does not allow for individual expression of opinion or 
behaviour that runs contrary to the authorities. In this sense, casting of 
the individual, as in to 'mould' and 'twist' the student, prevents the casting 
or 'overthrow' of the controlling mage elite. Ged does prove to be suitably 
moulded in the end, because he acts and thinks in accordance with the 
teachings of the mages on Roke. There is little or no scope for individuality 
in the 'cast' process of producing wizards. Nor is there much scope for 
women who are either cast as ignorant village witches, like Ged's aunt 
(pp. 16-17), powerful but evil sorceresses, like Serret (105-113), or 
domestic, like Yarrow (pp. 149-152). Since boys only are trained on Roke 
females are never cast in the mould of mages. Does this mean they are 
less 'cast' than males or simply that their casting options are fewer? 
Cost, as in to 'hold' or 'secure', suggests a restrictive confinement 
that not only prevents individual action hut also ties or bonds a person, 
preventing movement. In this sense, it is possible to view the text as a 
whole as concerned with restricting the role and options open to 
individuals by casting them, as in to 'hold', to prevent unwanted 
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movement within a prescribed structure. There is also the sense of 
casting them tightly, as in to 'secure', to prevent escape from the social 
and hierarchical order. It is interesting to note in passing that phonically, 
the words 'cast' and 'caste' are identical. Caste, in meaning a rigid social 
system that separates and distinguishes between different classes, 
echoes the hierarchical, restrictive, and divisional structure of Earthsea 
that has been explored through the word 'cast'. 
Another phrase in which 'cast' is used can be found in the 
• eprimand given to Ged by Archmage Gensher who describes Ged's 
released shadow as "'the shadow you cast'" (p. 68). Given previous 
discussions about the impact and influence of possible meanings of the 
word 'cast' on the novel as a whole, Ged's shadow could be explored as 
something moulded or formed by him, as something discarded or rejected 
by him, or as something held and secured by him. All of these raise many 
questio'ls about the shadow and the relationship between it and Ged. For 
example, the idea of the shadow being 'cast' by Ged and thereby stripped 
ofits individuality in the process of moulding shifts the power structure in 
the novel from a mage/Rtudent scenario to a Gedlshadow scenario. The 
shadow tries both attacking (p. 102) and fleeing (p. 127) from Ged, but to 
no avail. In addition, it has been so stripped of its personhood that it 
barely has any form (p. 64) and often takes the form of other people, such 
as Skiorh (pp. 100-101) or Ged (p. 141). 
The shadow initially expresses some autonomous actions but 
succumbs to Ged's completion of the casting process in which Ged realizes 
that "his task had never been to undo what he had begun, but to finish 
what he had begun" (p. 138). In this context the shadow is very much the 
product of an incomplete casting. In being not completely 'cast' perhaps 
explains its lack of form, though it certainly posses~es an embryonic 
personality. That the shadow is bonded to Ged is clear from the 
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description ofGed having"forged between them a bond, a link that had no 
breaking-point" (p. 138). This binding of the shadow to Ged is ve1·y strong 
and eventually the casting line is pulled in. Who does the pulling, though? 
Ged or shadow or both? Although Ged is terrified of his creation he 
eventually overwhelms it and completes the moulding process, casting 
the shadow to himself securely. 
It is very tempting to ask: what if the casting of the shadow had 
not been completed? How would this have affected the shadow, Ged, 
Earthsea? Students could pursue these ideas in relation to society. Does 
society, the family, or church cast individuals to fit the prescribed order? 
And what of those who are incompletely or not properly cast: are they 
cast aside like misshapen misfits or discarded as unsuitable? Are such 
rejects less moulded, confined, restricted, or bound than those who have 
been successfully cast? What advantages or privileges do the 
'successfully cast' have in society, the church, the community, the 
family? Can society function without the casting process, without the 
socialization of its members? Is it only the 'successfully cast' who impact 
on the world? Are Chuang Tzu, Jesus Christ, and Buddha representative 
of the successfully cast or the cast aside, the rejected misfits of the world? 
And what of Hitler or Stalin or Pol Pot? The pursuit of provisional threads 
of meaning and the innumerable questions raised, both to do with the text 
and life in general, are typical not only of the Nietzschean position's 
refusal to arrive at conclusions but also of its incessant asking of even 
more questions instead. Definitive textual meaning is always infinitely 
deferred, but provisional meanings are inevitably thought-provoking, if 
not somewhat disconcerting, and always playful. 
The execution of the Nietzschean interpretation of the text through 
the window of the word 'cast' facilitates an extraordinary and stimulating 
view of the novel from completely different perspectives. An entirely 
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different approach to the use of the word 'cast' would be to concentrate on 
the textual selection of a lighted candle casting a shadow, when a lighted 
candle could equally be said to cast light, not shadow. In pursuing the 
Nietzschean reading of a text students can be encouraged to explore how 
words actually work to mean something and how the context in which 
words are lodged influences how those words are read and meaning 
attributed. In the Nietzschean interpretative approach an understanding 
of how language works to communicate ideas and make meaning is 
facilitated. It also alerts students to how the surface reading of a text 
remains ignorant of the enormous currents and cross-currentA of 
provisional meauings that lurk hidden beneath the surface. Reading the 
text in light of these other meanings of the word 'cast' facilitates a broad 
consideration of textual communication and meaning that fosters a high 
level of critical textual engagement on the part of the student. In the 
Nietzschean interpretative position students are challenged and provoked 
in ways not possible in the Rousseauistic interpretative approach. 
Thread 108: "high, ancient, enwoven spells" 
When thwarted in fleeing from his shadow to Roke, Ged realizes 
that he could not go there because he is "forbidden by the high, en woven, 
ancient spells that kept the perilous island safe" (p. 94). The use of"high", 
"ancient" and "en woven" to describe the most powerful and ancient spells 
in all of Earthsea are indicative of binary opposites. That which is 
low/common, new/revolutionary, and loose/unravelled/separated is 
necessarily placed in an oppositional position to the ancient spells that 
protect Roke. In other words there seems to be a division between the old, 
aristocratic, traditions!, and closed (Roke and all it stands for) and what is 
low, new, and open (that which is oppositional to Roke). 
The thrust of the novel, revolving around Ged and his journey 
towards becoming "one" (p. 164) and "whole" (p. 166), indicates that 
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finished, closed, and completed is the ultimate and highest goal to be 
sought after and achieved. The emphasis is on ordered fusion, a bringing 
together, that by its very process restricts and prevents other 
possibilities. By contrast, the oppositional position is lowly/mundane, 
new/revolutionary, and open/loose. In pursuing such a strand of enquiry 
the Nietzschean interpretative characteristic of isolating the opposite to 
that which is stated in the text facilitates an exploration of the 'unsaid' 
textual discourse. In this way the deconstructive process encourages an 
examination of what the text actually says and promotes by 
concentrating not on what it says but on what it does not say. The 
'unsaid' in society and its institutions can also be similarly explored by 
locating oppositions in the textual fabric of society. 
Thread 869: "shadow" 
There is considerable confusion and contradiction over the use of 
the word 'shadow' in the novel. The shadow is obviously a central motif, 
but it is so variously described that, when carefully examined, its use 
raises more questions than answers. Some of the numerous descriptions 
include: "a shapeless clot of shadow" (p. 30); "something like a clot of 
black shadow, quick and hideous" (p. 64); ~has no namem (p. 68); ~one of 
the powers ofUnlifem (p. 68); ~the shadow of your arrogance, the shadow 
of your ignorance, the shadow you castm (p. 68); "it stood on the side of the 
living" (p. 81); "having no real form of ita own as yet" (p. 83); "like a bear 
with no head" (p. 83); "the gebbeth" (p. 101); ~my shadowm (p. 126); and, 
"crawling on four short taloned legs .... lifting up to him a blind unformed 
snout without lips or ears or eyes .... [or]lips or tongue" (p. 164). Picking 
up on even several of these, the shadow cannot be a power of 'Unlife', 
Ged's creature, a 'gebbeth', and a shapeless clot all at the same time. 
Certainly, the novel indicates the sh&dow is able to change shape 
which suits the narrative process and the apparent authorial intention. 
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However, the Nietzschean interpretative position is able ro probe the text 
for meanings that the author did not intend, but slipped in unnoticed. For 
, example, in describing the shadow as a power of Unlife, a gebbeth, Ged's 
creature, and the shadow he casts displays uncertainty about whether it 
is a separate creature of evil and ill-will or an aspect of Ged that 
represents his darker side. Within the context of the srory the shadow 
represents some aspect of Ged that is released, proves dangerous, and is 
united with Ged so he can be whole. However, the inconsistent 
descriptions of the shadow betray a hesitancy to fully commit ro the idea 
that the shadow is actually a part of Ged, representing his dark side. 
From such discrepancies concerning descriptions of the shadow an 
unease with the shadow, with what it is, and with what it represents can 
be discerned. If the shadow is supposed ro be Ged's darker side that he 
must unite with in order to achieve wholeness then it would seem 
reasonable to expect consistency in descriptions of the shadow as 
actually being Ged's dark side. Many references to the shadow clearly 
position it as being a part of Ged, related ro Ged, connected to Ged, an 
aspect of his darker side, his creature, the shadow he casts, and so on. 
However, there are also references ro the shadow that equally clearly 
describe it as a very separate entity, a 'gebbeth', a power of'Unlife', or a 
shapeless clot ofblackness. These descriptions of the shadow are fewer in 
number compared with descriptions that indicate a relationship between 
Ged and the shadow. Nevertheless, their existence provides gaps for a 
deconstruction of the text that exposes ~onfusion chout the shadow. 
Textusl examination from the Nietzschean interpretative position 
indicates a speculative consideration of the question of evil which is 
unresolved. Le Guin professes an anti-Christian life-stance and 
agreement with Jung's concept of the shadow and the need ro assimilate 
the dark side of one's nature, so foundational to the Rousseauistic 
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interpretation of the novel that centres on Jungian psychology. However, 
inconsistencies in descriptions of the shadow as being representative of 
Ged's dark side indicate that authorial belief did not completely obliterate 
references to the Western concept of evil as something contrary to good. 
Echoes of Western ideas concerning evil can be seen in the descriptions of 
the shadow as a terrifying type of monster or as a power that threatens 
life, seeking to do evil. From such a deconstructive analysis of the text 
students are able to examine the way in which language functions both to 
construct meaning and to undo that meaning, and the way it carries with 
it centuries of cultural baggage that are not easily discarded. 
Thread 484: "true name" 
In Earthsea names play such a vital role that no one knows a 
person's "true name but himself and his namer. He may choose at length 
to tell it to his brother, or his wife .... Who knows a man's name, holds 
that man's life in his keeping" (p. 70). People are known by their 'use' 
names, hut th.eir 'true' names are secret, given by wizards in a naming 
ceremony, and are generally not shared with any other person. Knowledge 
of an individual's 'true' name gives a person power over that individual. 
Only the shadow has no name until Ged names it with his name. 
Nevertheless, at sea Ged and Vetch find it difficult to catch any fish 
because "even when they called out fisherman's charms they caught very 
little, for the fish of the Open Sea do not know their own names and pay 
no heed to magic" (p. 166). Serret also makes mention of names, but she 
refers to '"things not named in the Namer's listsm (p. 110). 
The shadow is described as coming ~from a place where there are 
no namesm (p. 68). That the shadow is considered a threat indicates some 
sort of correlation between name and danger. Only after Ged has named 
the shadow "with his own name" (p. 166) does it cease to be a threat. If 
the Equilibrium were to fail then '"in the old silence all voices and all 
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names would be lost'" (p. 51). Why are names so important in Earthsea, 
particularly 'true' names? If fish live in the Open Sea not knowing theh· 
true names then why are 'true' names so vitally important to most of 
Earthsea. Clearly knowledge of one's true name is not necessary for 
existence. This then leads to questioning about what it is necessaryfor. 
Is the system of true names, for example, tied to the wizard's 
power over Earthsea? Or is it that one's true self is generally kept from 
others, with people rarely interrelating on anything but a superficial level? 
Does this situation become problematic for Ged because he separates 
from part ofhimself, the part that is kept hidden from others? Is the novel 
actually talking about the need to keep one's true self absolutely hidden 
from most other people? Is it the true self that is actually given a 
separate name, not known to others, which represents a separate hidden 
identity? Does the system of 'true' names protect individuality or coerce a 
population into submissive and obedient behaviour? Such questions 
rather upset the Rousseauistic interpretation that sees the novel as a 
story about integrating one's dark side to achieve a balanced, whole 
personhood. Nevertheless, the incessant questioning of the Nietzschean 
interpretative position assists students to be radically critical of the text, 
and also of society, to discover what has been left unsaid amongst the 
words on the 'page'. The pedagogic value of the Nietzschean interpretative 
position is that in affirming free play it directs student attention to the 
multiplicity of meaning contsined in the ever-shifting fluidity of language 
and to what is hidden beneath the textual surface. 
Thread 277: "'change what cennot be changed"' 
The Master Namer tells his pupils that even a mage only controls: 
'what is near him, what be can name exactly and wholly. And 
this is well. If it were not so, the wickedness of the powerful or 
the folly of the wise would long ago have sought to change 
what cannot be changed, and Equilibrium would fail.' (p. 51) 
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Either something can be changed or it cannot. How is it possible to 
change something that it is not possible to change? There seems to be 
confusion over what can be changed and what cannot be changed. This is 
one of the many contradictions in terms that frequent A Wizard of 
Earthsea. Other examples would include "only in silence the word ... only 
in dying life" (p. 12). From the Rousseaui.stic interpretation such phrases 
take on a religious sense in which the seemingly impossible or mystical is 
being communicated. The Nietzschean interpretation, however, examines 
the words themselves. Why do certain words seem to be so profound and 
carry such a weight of meaning when the words themselves carry no such 
profundity? How can words mean more than they mean? 1n asking such 
questions the Nietzschean interpretative position directs students 
towards a critical understanding of the functioning of language, 
particularly within a cultural and religious framework. 
For example, in Christianity phrases such as "But many that are 
first shall be last; and the last first" (Mark 10:31, KJV) or "He that 
findeth his life shall lose it: and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find 
it" (Mt. 10:39) do not make a great deal of sense or furnish any profound 
meaning if the words alone are carefully studied. Likewise, in Taoism 
neither do phrases such as "You may look at it and not see it .. You may 
listen to it but not hear it ... You may touch it but not feel it" 
(McNaughton, 1971, p. 11) make much sense. Indeed, they are not 
necessarily any less nonsensical or more profoundly meaningful than 
phrases such as: "The sun was shining on the sea ... [but it was]/ The 
middle of the night" (Carroll, 197 4, p. 167), ""!heir shoes were clean and 
neat ... [but]/ They hadn't any feetm (p. 168), or "'I only wish I had such 
eyes .... To be able to see Nobody! And at that distance too!m (p. 206). 
It is no more possible to adequately explain, understand, or 
interpret such words as "He that findeth his life shall lose it" or "touch ... !.\ 
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and not feel" than such words as '"The sun was shining ... [in ]the nightm. 
However, what makes the former (Christian and Taoist words) seem 
profound as words of meaning and the latter (Carroll's words) amusing as 
words of nonsense is the religiosity attached to the former, which is 
lacking in the latter. Religious/philosophical phrases can seem 
nonsensical when the textual words are closely examined, but as part of a 
broader context of an 'on-high' delivery of'definitive meaning' they assume 
a status that suggests such words actually convey something of profound 
importance. They also suggest a certain veneration: that which appears 
confusing, baffling, or contradictory is actually conveying 'great' or 
'ancient' wisdom that seems obfuscating only because 'mere mortals' are 
unable to fully understand. 
Similarly, it seems 'natural' to invest certain words in non-religious 
literature, such as poetry, with 'meaning' because of their implied 
'religiosity' or profundity. Hence, phrases such as ~change what cannot be 
cbangedm (p. 51) or "only in dying life" (p. 12) do not mean a great deal 
linguistically but as part of the novel's contextual framework they 
'appear' to mean something profound. The transcendent nature of 
religious thinking and its treatment of sacred texts historically affected 
approaches to secular texts. Such texts were judged and studied by what 
they appeared to 'mean'. That is, there is an approach to secular 
literature that involves the Rousseanistic search for the transcendent. 
This impulse is rejected by the Nietzschean interpretation which seeks to 
expose such logocentric approaches to all texts, disclose the instability of 
language and meaning, and reveal how meaning is constructed. 
Words used in a certain context carry with them not just linguistic 
meaning but also cultural and religious meaning that elevate those words 
to mean more than they actually mean. The deconstructive process uses 
such words to expose the underground meanings of the text. Conversely, 
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the words themselves can be examined to see how discourses can be 
made to function through them. For example, the word 'fall' can open up 
the Christian discourse of the fall of man (humankind), not to mention the 
Eve discourse. Use of the Nietzschean interpretation encourages 
students to be critical of what they read, how they read, and how they 
invest words with meaning. This interpretative position helps students to 
become critical readers rather than responsive readers, and therefore 
critical members of society rather than responsive members. In alerting 
students to how language can be used to communicate certain meanings, 
that lead people to interpret the text in a specific way and to invest in a 
specific meaning, fosters literary criticism that is open and challenging. 
Thread 666: "Weak as woman's magic" 
In Earthsea the options open to women are strictly limited. A 
woman may be a common village witch such as Ged's aunt, or an evil 
sorceress such as Serret, or assume a housewife-type role such as 
Yarrow. Indeed, Yarrow, is the only female in the novel who is described, 
while not in glowing positive terms, at least not in a negative way or a 
way that concentrates on her looks alone: she cooks, spins, keeps house 
for her older brothers, and is "mistress of' her house (p. 149). 
One of the longest descriptions in the novel of a woman concerns 
Ged's maternal aunt: 
There is a saying on Gont, Weak as woman's magic, and there 
is another saying, Wicked as Woman's magic. Now the witch of 
Ten Alders was no black sorceress ... but being an ignorant 
woman .... she often used her crafts to foolish and dubious 
ends. She knew nothing of the Balance and the Pattern which 
the true wizard knows and serves .... Much of her lore was 
mere rubbish and humbug, nor did she know the true spells 
from the false. She knew many curses, and was better at 
causing sickness, perhaps, than curin!( it. ( pp. 16- 17) 
This village witch has limited power, is ignorant, and more troublesome 
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than evil. Like her male counterpart, the weatherworker, she is seen as 
no threat by the mages on Roke. In the characters of Lord Benderesk and 
Serret the evil that both men and women are capable of, from the mage 
point of view, can be seen. However, the linking of female magic to 
'weakness' and 'wickedness' indicates a binary opposition that necessarily 
places male magic as powerful and good. Individual males, such as Lord 
Benderesk, may be evil but magic associated with the male population, as 
a whole, is not described as 'weak' or 'wicked'. This textual gap furnishes a 
view of the novel's sub-conscious where women's magic has been given a 
secondary and inferior role to that of the primary place of male magic, and 
is conceived from the dominant male perspective to be a complication or 
disruption, or at worst a threat, to their privileged position. 
In asking what happens if these positions were to be reversed 
exposes the dependence of the narrative on the opposition of male and 
female magic. If women's magic is seen as powerful and good what does 
this do the text as a whole? To begin with, it means that it is now men's 
magic that is weak and wicked. This indicates that in order for the male 
population, and particularly the mages, to maintain their position they 
must reduce women and their magic to both a lowly and contrary position. 
In this way the threat that women constitute to the social order is kept in 
check and under control. So, from the male point of view women either 
know nothing of the balance like Ged's aunt, ignore it like Serret, or 
willingly uphold it like Yarrow. Women's magic is considered 'weak' and 
'wicked' only because to view it in any other way is a threat to men in 
general and to the mages in particnlar. 
The narrative structure depends on the sublimation of women to 
the 'lower' half of the opposition. If, for example, both men's and women's 
magic were described as powerful and good or weak and wicked this would 
indicate a very different structure. The Nietzschean practice of seeking 
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oppositions and then reversing them facilitates not only a radical 
exploration of the oppositions themselves hut also of how they function in 
the text. The 'weakness' and 'wickedness' of women's magic draws 
attention to the unsaid in the novel. Students can also explore society and 
its institutions for examples of oppositional structures, how these 
operate, and who is privileged or marginalized by them. In this way, the 
underbelly of the societal 'text' can be exposed and examined. In the 
Nietzschean interpretation it is always the unsaid in the text that proves 
to have the most to say and to be the most provocative and challenging. 
In 'rocking the boat' the Nietzschean position demonstrates to students 
how and why the boat seemed steady in the first place. 
Value of the Nieb ""hean Interpretation 
The Nietzschean position facilitates interpretations that are both 
challenging and playful, and also infinite. Deconstruction of A Wizard of 
Earthsea is a mode of reading that can proceed indefinitely. The sample of 
threads that have been pursued are merely illustrative of the endless 
tapestry of provisional meaning that is possible from the Nietzschean 
position. Moreover, such discussions themselves are also potentially 
indefinite. Any Nietzsche an interpretation, therefore, a! ways remains 
partial and evolving because the very process itself is infinite. It would be 
in keeping with the Nietzschean position to deconstruct the text of a 
previous deconstruction, creating even more textual play and provisional 
meaning. The possibilities of this interpretative position, as illustrated in 
this chapter, are quite literally limitless, inevitably raising more and more 
questions and conundrums. The relentless questioning that characterizes 
the Nietzschean position is where Derrida situates "the pedagogic effect 
of deconstruction" (Salusinszky, 1987, p. 158). Answers and final 
resolutions are not part of the makeup of the Nietzschean interpretation, 
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as they are of the Rousseauistic interpretation. This process encourages 
and challenges critical reflection and response as the reader has to 
'discover' threads and th€n choose which onet! to follow. 
While it is obvious why the Roussetmistic interpretati'Jn, in its 
concern with finding meaning, is attractive to religious educators it may 
not be as immediately obvious why the Nietzschean interpretation should 
also be attractive to religious educakrs. Pedagogically, this position could 
be seen as potentially problematic because having students explore the 
absence of finite meaning in literature, the absence of the transcendental 
signified, is possibly not helpful to students grappling with growing up and 
finding meaning in their lives. Nevertheless, this position farilitates a fail-
safe mechanism that forestalls religious (or sectarian) chauvinism and 
messianism. Thus, the situation where a religious educator 'teaches' that 
a text is only about a particular thing, divulging a particular 'message', is 
an impossibility in the Nietzschean position. The call for Religious 
Education to be "practised in ways that are broad and inclusive" (supra 
vide, p. 11) is affirmed and enabled by the Nietzschean interpretation. 
Moreo,·er, it is only the Nietzschean interpretative position that 
helps the reader to understand the constructedness of text and of 
meaning. In pointing to the instability of language, this Derridean 
interpretation demonstrates how words are used and how meaning is 
made. Derrida considers deconstruction to be an important part of 
education and, indeed, feels that it "must have effects on teaching at all 
levels. I would say this without hesitation" (Salusinszky, 1987, p. 14). 
Students can be encouraged to relate what they have explored in a 
deconstruction of A Wizard of Earthsea to society generally, to 
themselves, to the church, and to other texts (secular and sacred). While 
the Rousseauistic position is valuable because of its concern with the 
search for definitive meaning, the Nietzschean position is valuable in its 
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denial of definitive meaniiljl;. The Nietzschean interpretation affords a far 
greater scope for meaning than does the Rousseauistic interpretation 
because it enriches the reading of literature in Religious Education hy 
Lroadening awareness e.nd understanding of texts and life, by 
demonstrating the constructed nature of language and texts, and by 
investigating the process of making meaning. Johnson considers that: 
The kind of truth that the text was conveying was much more 
complex and profound than a simple determination of meaning 
could possibly suggest. It seems to me that the most effective 
teaclring that would derive from deconstruction would begin by 
emphasizing how much more meaningful the text might 
potentially be, rather than how much Jess meaningful it cou!d 
be, by deciding to respect its silences, or respect its forking 
paths. (Salusinszky, 1987, pp. 162-163) 
The teaching style employed in the Nietzschean interpretation 
could well be described as a democratic journey without end. Although the 
teacher may have specific aspects he/she wishes the students to explore, 
the nature of this interpretative position is that original input from the 
students is as vital and privileged as that of the teacher. If students are 
to develop into critical readers and come to understand the 
constructedness of language, text, and meaning their involvement in the 
deconstructive process is essential. In the Nietzschean position both 
teacher and students corporately own the journeys of textual exploration, 
whether the text be a novel, a sacred writing, a social structure, another 
culture, or a different belief system. In the classroom such corporate 
ownership would arise from individual, group, and class work. 
The possibilities for the reading of literature in the Religious 
Education classroom from the Nietzschean position are endless, fun, and 
'meaningful'. Nor is deconstruction something that can ouly be applied to 
texts. Bradbury (1985) considers that deconstruction "offers us not so 
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utilized by the Nietzschean position. Crossan's description of the parable 
as testing the limits oflanguage and the excitement involved in sailing "as 
close as possible into the wind" (1988, p. 29) are reminiscent of joy and 
lack of safety in the Nietzschean position. The emphasis on imagination 
and faotasy in Religious Education provides an excellent foundation upon 
which to pursue the Nietzschean interpretation, and is a natural 
extension of their use. The possibility of the 'other' is a pre-requisite hoth 
of seeking the transcendental and using the Nietzschean interpret&tion. 
Le Guin (1979) observes that some people "are afraid of dragons because 
they are afraid of freedom" (p. 44). Likewise, it could be observed of some 
people that they are afraid of the Nietzschean interpretation because 
they are afraid of the freedom it furnishes, afraid of the freedom to pursue 
the free play of endless chains of signifiers. 
The value of the Nietzschean position is immense. The time has 
come in the reading ofliterature in the Religious Education classroom to 
not only talk ahout the search for meaning, what Derrida would describe 
as the Rousseauistic seeking of absolute meaning. The time has also 
come to talk about the many possibilities, the often extraordinary and 
startling possibilities, of other sorts of meaning, what Derrida would term 
the Nietzschean play of provisional meanings: 
"The time has come", the Walrus said, 
"To talk of many things: 
Of shoes- and ships- and sealing-wax-
Of cabbages - and kings -
And why the sea is boiling hot-
And whether pigs have wings." (Carroll, 1974, p. 169) 
And what does such Nietzschean 'talking' constitute in the final analyeis? 
To return, yet again, to Derrida: "What deconstruction is not? everything 
of course! What is deconstruction? nothing of course!" (Wood & 
Bernasconi, 1988, p. 5). Johnson, an eminent practitioner of 
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deconstruction in the United States of America, very much echoes 
Derrida's thoughts: "When I give a talk that is asking certain questions, 
and Ym asked after it 'Was that deconstructive?' I always have to answer 
'Yes, and no, and I don't knowm (Salusinszky, 1987, p. 173). 
Reading a text from the Nietzschean position is a kaleidoscope of 
possibilities. It is a fun exercise in generating successive threads of 
meaning, none of which are considered preferred, superior, or the most 
true. The Nietzschean interpretation does not 'make' words '"mean 
different thingsm (Carroll, 1974, p. 197) but, in revealing the instability of 
language, exposes the different meanings already inherent in the words 
themselves. For Derrida the Nietzschean deconstructive process is 
ineffable yet it effortlessly facilitates both relentless questioning and 
joyous affirmation, furnishing an infinite array of provisional meanings 
and a veritable melangery of never-ending possibilities. The emphasis on 
questioning forms part of a guiding principle for Derrida: "that we should 
question, that we shouldn't sleep, [and] that we shouldn't take any 
concept for granted" (Salusinszky, 1987, p. 17). The Nietzschean 
interpretation of A Wizard of Earthsea stimulates the creative 
imagination producing a plethora of textual threads. Reading the novel 
from this position there are no signifieds, as in the Rousseauistic position, 
only endless chains of signifiers. Rather than an emphasis on 
essentialism, so systemic in the Rousseauistic position, there is an 
emphasis on multiplicity in the Nietzschean position. It may seem 
problematic to the religious educator that the Nietzschean and 
Rousseauistic interpretations are so oppositional but Derrida suggests a 
way forward that is immensely valuable for those involved in teaching 
Religious Education. 
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CHAPTERSIX 
Relevance and Value of the Study 
The Derridean Common Ground 
In the irreconcilable nature of the Rousseauistic and Nietzschean 
interpretations Derrida contrasts grounded and ungrounded modes of 
interpretation as represented by the polar opposition between Rousseau 
and Nietzsche. Derrida is pointing to the diametric opposition between 
decipherment and play, theism and atheism, and logocentrism and 
deconstruction (Hart, 1991, p. 121). The theories of Rousseau assume a 
ground or centre or presence, producing a natural theism, whereas the 
theories of Nietzsche reject any metaphysical concept of true Being or 
presence or centre, producing atheism and the doctrine of God's death. For 
Derrida, there is a binary opposition between Rousseau's belief in the 
transcendent, representing a logocentric outlook, and Nietzsche's radical 
decentring, representing free play. 
Derrida's theories have "often been read as urging us to choose the 
second interpretation of interpretation" (Culler, 1983, p. 132). However, 
Derrida (1978) suggests not choice between two alternatives but common 
ground: he is calling for the act of conceiving "of the common ground" (p. 
293). It is this "common ground", this 'co-existence' of opposites, that 
makes Derrida's interpretations so valuable as an approach for reading 
literature in Religious Education. Although Derrida prefers the 
Nietzschean position he claims that there is no question of choosing: 
For my part, although these two interpretations must 
acknowledge and accentuate their differences and define their 
irreducibility, I do not believe that today there is any question 
of choosing . .. because we must try to conceive of the 
common ground, and the differance of this irreducible 
difference. (Derrida, 1978, p. 293) 
These two positions, then, are not reducible to other elements from which 
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a common ground may be found and the differences between them must 
be noted and highlighted. Nevertheless, although the interpretations "are 
absolutely irreconcilable", 'seeming' to prohibit each other, Derrida insists 
on conceiving of the common ground and the "differance of this irreducible 
difference" (p. 293). Indeed, differance "disallows our choosing between the 
Rousseauistic and the Nietzschean theories of interpretation" (Hart, 
1991, p. 122). Derrida (1978) emphasizes that even "to live them 
simultaneously", to seek the common ground, they remain absolutely 
irreducible and irreconcilable (p. 293 ). 
Derrida applauds the free play that is facilitated by the 
Nietzschean interpretation but also acknowledges that "even today the 
notion of a structure lacking any center represents the unthinkable itself" 
(Derrida, 1978, p. 279). The common ground of the irreducible 
Rousseauistic and Nietzschean interpretations furnishes a pluralistic 
approach that is multifaceted, challenging, and stimulating. Derrida's two 
interpretations look toward a common ground that accommodates both: 
one that satisfies the need for centres and one that challenges and 
encourages play. In Chapter Four, the Rousseauistic emphasis on the 
centre was explored through the Jungian concept of the shadow in which 
Ged's story is seen as a journey to wholeness culminating in the 
assimilation of his shadow when they "met, and joined, and were one" (Le 
Guin, 1993, p. 164). Alternatively, in Chapter Five the Nietzschean 
emphasis on free play was explored with reference to a number of 
provisional meanings such as "had sent him to read that spell" (p. 114) in 
which the apparent unity of the novel collapses when Ged blames a girl 
for releasing his shadow. The Derridean common ground does not require 
choice between these two interpretative processes but facilitates both: 
centres, such as the Jungian concept of the shadow, and play, such as the 
textual gap "had sent him to read that spell". 
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The neologism differance was coined by Derrida to indicate that 
meaning is found in difference and is infinitely deferred. "To spell differaoce 
with an a instead of an e is of course to press against the limits of a 
logocentric language" (Culler, 1981, p. 41). In French the 'a' can be 
discerned only in the written word, not in the spoken word. Derrida intends 
"that differance should function not as a concept ... hut as one set of 
marks in a signifying chain which exceeds and disturbs the classical 
economy of language and representation" (Norris, 1987, p. 15). While 
Derrida accepts the Saussurean emphasis on difference he rejects 
Saussure's fusion of signified and signifier: 
Dif{erance . .. designates both a "passive" difference already in 
place as the condition of signification and an act of differing 
which produces differences. An analogous English term is 
spacing, which designates both an arrangement and an act of 
distribution or arranging. (Culler, 1983, p. 97) 
There is an endless chain of signifiers never fused to signifieds. Meaning is 
permanently and infinitely deferred. In this space between the signified 
and the signifier there is endless play. For Derrida (1987) differance is "the 
systematic play of differences, of the traces of differences, of the spacing 
by means of which elements are related to each other" (p. 27). 
With respect to the two interpretations, Derrida is suggesting that 
the common ground is one of differance. It is in differance (comprising both 
difference and deferral) that the two interpretations of interpretation, 
which "must acknowledge and accentuate their differences and define 
their irreducibility", can co-exist (Derrida, 1978, p. 293). Caputo (1989) 
comments that the role of differance is to: 
establish the conditions within which discourse functions. It 
founds (and un-founds, undermines) languages, vocabularies, 
showing how they are both possible and impossible, that is, 
incapable of a closure which would give them self-sufficiency 
and a feeling of success in nailing things down. (p. 28) 
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It is Derrida's "common ground" of differance that furnishes such 
positive implications for reading literature in Religious Education. 
Meaning is found not only in difference but is also infinitely deferred. For 
Derrida (1991) in "a language, in the system oflanguage, there are only 
differences" (p. 64) which "are 'produced'- deferred- bydifferance" (p. 66). 
The particular value of Derrida's theoretical position is that it seeks a 
common ground that acknowledges anxiety at the loss of the logocentric 
but joyously affirms free play. Choice is not permitted between these 
dichotomous interpretetions and the Derridean common ground facilitates 
e reading of literature that allows for both interpretetions (seeking the 
centre and playing with signifiers). The intertwining of difference and 
deferral is all encompassing. Within the Nietzschean position is the 
implicit presence of its opposite, the Rousseauistic position, and vice 
versa. Deconstruction, the Nietzschean position, affords marginal 
readings and endless threads of provisional meaning; while the 
Rousseauistic position affords the search for, and examination of, the 
centre, of many possible centres. In this way, it is possible to read A 
Wizard ofEarthsea from both the Rousseauistic interpretation concerned 
with a centre of Taoist balance, as explored in Chapter Four, and the 
Nietzschean interpretation concerned with chains of signifiers to do with 
"light", as explored in Chapter Five. 
V!!lue of the Derrideap Approach 
It may be argued that Post-Structuralism (particularly 
Nietzscbean deconstruction) with its emphasis on the impossibility of 
final meaning is contrapositive to Religious Education with its emphasis 
on the search for definitive meaning. Barry (1995) observes that linguistic 
"anxiety ... is a keynote of the post-structuralist outlook" (p. 65) that 
unfortunately tends to result in what could be described as "terminal 
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anxieties about the possibility of achieving any knowledge through 
language" (p. 64). The impossibility of definitive meaning may produce 
anxiety, as seen in the wake left by Hartman, the American 
deconstructionist, "who plunged into deconstruction with gay abandon and 
left ... a recklessly scattered trail of fragmentary texts" (Selden, 1985, p. 
94). Nevertheless Post-Structuralism generally, and deconstruction in 
particular, can prcduce anxiety due to the lack of stable reference points. 
The universe is one of "radical uncertainty, since we can have no access 
to any fixed landmark which is beyond linguistic processing, and hence we 
have no standard by which to measure anything" (Barry, 1995, p. 61). In 
addition, the impossibility of absolute meaning and the incessant asking 
of questions that produce no answers but only more questions means that 
it can no longer be asked of a text "'What does it mean?' without 
simultaneously asking, 'What are the conditions by which it means? What 
does its meaning mean?m (Moon, 1990, p. 14). 
The influence of modern literary theory becomes potentially 
dubious if it furnishes no 'useful meaning' in the real world of suffering and 
pain, joy and happiness. Eagleton humorously observes of one strand of 
Post-Modernism, which could equally apply to Post-Structuralism, that 
living in a world that has moved beyond logocentrism is to: 
live dangerously, decentredly, without ends or grounds or 
origins, letting rip the odd snarl of sardonic laughter and 
dancing ecstatically on the brink of the abyss. It is hard to 
know what this would mean in practice - how exactly one 
would live 'decentredly' in Chipping Norton, and whether 
dancing on the brink of the abyss is compatible with, say, 
wearing hom-rimmed spectacles or returning one's library 
books on time. (1996, p. 64) 
The unsettling effects of any modem literary theory and its relation 
to a person's lived experience oflife are serious issues that impact directly 
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on the theory's value and relevance to hum,m life. Such considerations 
are vitally importsnt to Religious Education with its emphasis on "the 
myriad waya in which meaning and purpose in human existence has been 
and is sought" (supra vide, p. 11). However, in Derrida's "two 
interpretations of interpretation" i• a positive yet challenging theoretical 
stance for reading literature in Religious Education that both reassures 
and unsettles at the same time. Reading A Wizard of Earthsea from 
Derrida's two interpretative positions both reassures, as in the concept of 
Taoist balance seen reflected in the "Equilibrium" (illustrated in Chapter 
Four), and unsettles, as in threads of meaning to do with "argue" 
(illustrated in Chapter Five). 
The Derridean common ground facilitates an approach that not 
only advocates playfulness, characteristic of the Nietzschean 
interpretation, but also recognizes anxiety associated with the loss of the 
centre. Derrid• acknowledges the human need for fixing centres into 
structures in order to explain, provide "reassuring certitude", and 
overcome anxiety (Derrida, 1978, p. 279). The value of the Derridean 
approach is that it emphasizes the common ground of both interpretative 
positions, and not the selection of one to the exclusion of the other. To 
choose only one interpretation is not only to severely limit the potential of 
any interpretative process but also to misunderstand Derrida's two 
interpretative positions. Choosing to read the Le Guin novel, for example, 
from either a Rousseauistic interpretation concerned with Taoist 'balance' 
or a Nietzschean interpretation concerned with threads of meaning about 
'balance' not only drastically confinee and restricts the interpretative 
possibilities but totally misconstrues the Derridean common ground. 
In practice, it is the Rousseauistic position that dominates reading 
practices in Religious Education because of the emphasis on the search 
for meaning. In Chapter Fout the two examples of this interpretation 
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(Jungian and Taoist) likely to be adopted by religious educators in reading 
A Wizard ofEarthsea, because of their concern with providing definitive 
explanations and meaning, were discussed. Developments in Religious 
Education mean that now, on the whole, the meaning extracted from a 
text is no longer championed as the 'Truth'. Instead there are a variety of 
truths or centres or origins that can be found in the text; but there is still, 
in Derridean terms, a centre. For example, in A Wizard of Eartbsea it is 
possible to examine it as pointing to Taoist philosophy or Jungian 
psychology. This approach to reading literature still seeks to understand 
the structure by giving it a <"entre, and bringing to an end play and the 
order of the sign (at least temporarily until the next truth is sought). Such 
reading practices, while valuable as a means of exploring meaning, do not 
do away with or move beyond seeking the centre. 
There is also value to be gained in the Nietzschean position, which 
affirms the noncentre. Marginal readings are encouraged and in pursuing 
multiple threads of meaning it is demonstrated how meaning is both 
constructed and invested in. In Chapter Five, exploring the use of the 
words 'dark' and 1ight' in the novel revealed the instability oflanguage in 
communicating meaning and indicated how certain meanings are 
constructed and invested in to the exclusion of others. Taken singularly, 
the Nietzschean position prohibits the value to be gained by seeking the 
centre, by pursuing Taoist or Jungian concepts; and the Rousseauistic 
position prohibits the value to be gained by pursuing endless threads of 
provisional meaning about 'dark' or 'light'. However, taken together, as 
Derrida insists, the common ground of the irreducible Rousseauistic and 
Nietzschean interpretations furnishes multiple interpretations that are 
rich, nourishing, thought-provoking, and meaningful. There is both centre 
and play, both reassurance and challenge, both the Jungian concept of 
the shadow (as discussed in Chapter Four) and threads of provisional 
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meaning such as "dark" (Gs explored in Chapter Five). 
The place of story ir, Religious Education is well-established, and 
the emphasis on fantasy and imagination as tools of transcendence have 
been passionately pursued by a number of writers and educators. These 
fruitful approaches in Religious Education to the role of story, 
imagination, and fantasy can be greatly enhanced by Derridean theory. 
Imagination and fantasy, by their very nature, challenge and transcend 
the mundane and cognitive world. The scope for endlessly creative, open, 
stimulating, questioning, and even dangerous play afforded by the 
Nietzschean interpretation immensely enriches the already potent force 
of imagination and fantasy to speak of mystery, 'meaning', and enigma. 
Exploration ofNietzschean threads to do with "cast", for example, enable 
a reading of A Wizard of Earthsea that is both creative and stimulating 
as well as challenging, even frightening. 
Derrida considers that centring a structure belongs to a logocentric 
view of the world. There is obviously a human need for centres, and even 
Derrida accepts that structures cannot exist without centres, which no 
doubt explains the extraordinary place of story in all cultures. Stories help 
make sense of this seemingly chaotic world by demonstrating the 
shapefulness within the shapelessness. This is why literature, both 
religious and secular, has so much value for human society. And this is 
why Derrida's two "interpretations of interpretation" are so important for 
the reading of literature in Religious Education: they provide a way to read 
literature that allows for the shapefulness to form out of the 
shapelessness and then dissolve back into it, infinitely. The Derridean 
approach facilitates a reading of literature that not only seeks absolute 
meaning by centring the structure, such as ou the Jungian concept of the 
shadow in Ged's journey towards wholeness, but that also deconstructs 
the structure by playing with threads of provisional meaning, such as 
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~sourcem that undermine the surface unity of the text. In practice, then, 
learning about the human situation and concern with the search for 
meaning (the foundational position of Religious Education) are greatly 
enhanced and extended by pursuing the Derridean common ground that 
incorporates both the Rousseauistic and Nietzschean interpretations -
one that satisfies the need for centres, by centring the novel on the Taoist 
concept of balance, and one that questions and encourages play, by 
playing with words such as 'perilous'. 
As a methodological approach for reading literature in Religious 
Education the Derridean common ground facilitates a rich, rewarding, fun, 
serious, finite, and infinite search for meaning. As illustrated in this thesis, 
it will be possible to read A Wizard of Earthsea, or any text, finding 
centres and following threads without having to choose between one 
interpretative position or the other, between one that is closed and one 
that is not. Hence, for example, in A Wizard of Earthsea the 
Rousseauistic interpretation allows for exploration of different centres, 
such as Taoism or Jungian psychology, while the Nietzschean 
interpretation facilitates free play in the text in its pursuit of various 
threads of meaning, no one of which is seen as dominant or preferred over 
another. The inclusivity of the Derridean common ground, incorporating 
both l(ousseauistic and Nietzschean interpretations, allows for both 
centres and play. Therein, lies the value of Derrida's ideas for reading 
literature in Religious Education. The reading practices in Religious 
Education that commonly only pursue the Rousseauistic interpretation 
can be significantly broadened by the addition of the Nietzschean 
interpretation. Derrida advocates the common ground of these two 
irreconcilable interpretations, one that accommodates both the 
Nietzschean impossibility of transcendent meaning and the 
Rousseauistic search for absolute meaning. As a methodological process 
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for reading literature in Religious Education the Derridean common 
ground supports the concerns of religious educators like Grimmitt (1978; 
1987), Horder (1975) and Hull (1982), as discussed in Chapters One and 
Two, that Religious Education be broad, open, and inclusive. 
Application to other Texts 
From an initial study of A Wizard of Earthsea students could be 
encouraged to explore the intertextuality of some of the issues raised by 
examining other texts, sacred or secular, that deal with the idea of the 
shadow or dark side of human nature. The surface reading of such stories 
as Andersen's The Shadow, Stevenson's The Strange case of Dr. Jekyll 
and Mr. Hyde, Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray, and the Old Testament 
story of Cain and Abel suggests they are concerno)d with the perpetual 
duality of human nature. For example, a Rousseauistic interpretation of 
The Shadow could read it as a cruel story about a man who loses his 
shadow, finds the roles reversed as the shadow becomes the man and the 
man becomes the shadow, and in the end dies as the shadow completely 
becomes the 'man'. Le Guin (1979) describes Andersen's fairytale as a 
story that "says that a man who will not confront and accept his shadow 
is & lost soul" (p. 62). Unlike A Wizard of Earth sea, however, in this tale 
there is no union with the shadow. Rather, the shadow triumphs, 
marrying the princess, and the man is executed. Examining how texts 
explore similar issues can lead to a broader discussion of issues than is 
possible from study of a text in isolation. The variety of ways of dealing 
with the 'shadow' in different stories (positive union, death) provides 
considerable scope for discussing how humankind deals with its dual 
nature and the uneasy co-existence of good and evil. 
However, as with A Wizard ofEarthsea, it is possible to interpret 
these stories from a Nietzschean position. In deconstructing the texts to 
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see what is hidden beneath the surface the textual subconscious can be 
explored for provisional meanings. For example, in The Shadow the use of 
the word 'clever' provides a Nietzschean gap by which to dig beneath the 
textual surface: the man considers that the shadow "ought to be clever 
enough" (Andersen, n.d., p. 372) to carry out the man's request to 
separate from his body; and, the princess describes the shadow, who has 
now become the man, as "a clever man" and the man as "a clever 
shadow" (p. 380). Such descriptions present an interesting corollary to 
descriptions of both Ged and his shadow. In both stories the shadow is 
clever and cunning, but one leads to union and one leads to death of the 
man. Likewise, in Stevenson's The Strange case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. 
Hvde there can be found gaps and silences by which to pursue 
Nietzschean deconstruction. The phrase "Cain's heresy" (Stevenson, 
1984, p. 645) is suggestive of an entrance into the subterranean depths of 
the novel to play with the intertextuality of the Cain and Abel discourse. 
Use of the Derridean common ground does not always have to 
result in reading stories that deal with similar issues, although parallels 
furnish useful discussion points and will often present themselves as a 
matter of course. Wells' enigmatic tale The Door in the Wall follows the 
story of a man filled with regret for not entering the door in the wall "that 
goes into peace, into delight, into a beauty beyond dreaming, a kindness no 
man on earth can know" (Wells, 1974, pp. 159-160). Worldly concerns and 
demands prevent him from entering this special world, which he had 
glimpsed as a child. A Nietzschean interpretation that concentrates on 
the words "door" and "wall" facilitates a playful deconstruction of the text 
that raises questions about life, destiny, responsibility, freedom, and 
choice. A Rousseauistic interpretation could explore the Christian notion 
of worldly duty and success and the presence of 'mystery' in life that 
speaks of another world beyond this world. 
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The parables and stories of Jesus provide material that can either 
be examined from both Derridean interpretative positions or as, Crossan 
(1988) su!Q(ests, there can be an exploration of parable as the antithesis 
to myth and religion. Parable destabilizes, fragmer.ts, upsets, and 
threatens much as the Nietzschean interpretative position does, while 
religion and myth stabilizes, unifies, reassures, and supports much as the 
Rousseauistic interpretation does. Derrida's ideas concerning the co~ 
existence of two irreconcilable interpretative positions are similar to 
Crossan's ideas about 'story' in which parable and religion/myth are 
"binary or polar opposites" (p. 40). Crossan interprets the stories of Jesus 
as parables "which shatter the deep structure of our accepted world" (p. 
100). He argues that some of the stories of Jesus, originally intended as 
parables, were transformed by the early Church "into moral examples or 
exemplary stories andlor historical allegories" (p. 101). There is much 
scope for applying the Derridellll interpretative approach and Crossan's 
ideas to a textual analysis of the Biblical stories and parables of Jesus. 
Myth and the Rousseauistic interpretation tend to be on a grand scale, 
provide overarching meaning, and are universalistic. Parable and the 
Nietzschean interpr.etation might be described as iconoclastic and 
subversive, localized and particular, and individually interpretative. 
The approaches to reading literature suggested in this thesis can 
be modified for use with younger students. Indeed, children often have less 
resistance to looking at something in a new way than older 
adolescents/adults, because they are less 'schooled' in convention. For 
example, with children the folk tale of St. George and the dragon could be 
read from the two Derridean interpretative positions. Exploring it as a 
tale about St. George who rescues the princess and kills the evil dragon 
would constitute the Rousseanistic interpretation. Such a reading is 
centred on the Christian ideas of good and evil. Approaching the text from 
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the Nietzschean interpretation alerts children to the fun that can be had 
in playing with the other stories 'behind' the story. Questions could be 
asked and scenarios presented that suggest alternative ways of viewing 
the story, of finding hidden stories behind the traditional version of the 
tale: What happens if St. George is scared of dragons? Suppose the dragon 
had turned himself into a princess and turned the princess into a dragon 
so the dragon-as-princess would get to live in a castle with St. George. 
In this way, such a folktale can be used as a way of leaning about 
the Christian idea of good triumphing over evil and also about how stories 
and meanings are constructed. Issues such as how good and bad are 
represented in stories, what it means to be good or had, what it means to 
be male or female, and what it means to be different can be discussed at a 
basic level. Beginning with the tale of St. George, children could also 
explore Eastern tales about dragons which tend to be depicted, unlike 
those in Western tales, as good. While the methodology remains 
essentially the same the material and approaches can be age-modified. 
GenemJ.Application in Religious Education 
The value of Derrid.a's two interpretative positions in Religious 
Education is not restricted as a methodology to only reading literature. 
The utilization ofliterary critical theory in the field of religious studies is 
well established. Culler (1988) observes that the critiquing of religion is: 
the proudest heritage of comparative literary studies, and 
certainly one region in which literary criticism has helped 
transform Western culture. At the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, one might say without greatly oversimplifying, 
Protestants took the Bible to be the word of God; by the 
beginning of the twentieth century, this belief was untenable in 
intellectual circles. What had been responsible for this change 
was scholars' and critics' h1sistence that techniques of textual 
and critical analysis which had been developed for classical 
literature be applied to Biblical writings. (p. 79) 
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The impact of modern literary theory on theology is part of this 
continuum of textual criticism. It behoves religious educators to also 
encompass modern literary theory in the critical study of literature. 
Religion has had a pervasive influence on all cultures so the "role religion 
plays in the discourse of ... culture makes it imperative that it not 
escape serious intellectual challenge" (Culler, 1988, p. 82). 
Application of Derrida's "two interpretations of interpretation" to 
exploring general religious and life issues is concomitant with current 
theological trends. There are many theological issues pertinent to 
Religious Education which may benefit from the application of the 
Derridean common ground as a methodological approach. For example, 
there have been developments in the area of Christology, in the concern 
for Christology'fi-om below' as opposed to Christology 'from above', and in 
the area ofMariology, with the contrast between the virgin/holy discourse 
and the Eve/sioful discourse. 
O'Collins (1977) observes that Christology 'from above' is no longer 
entirely tenable in the changed climate of twentieth century liberal 
scholarship, and almost "all contemporary thinking about Jesus Christ 
begins not 'fi-om above' but 'from belowm (p. 13). Christology 'from below' 
is a more acceptable expression of the person and work of Jesus Christ in 
contemporary society. O'Collins suggests that Christology 'from below': 
may follow Kttng's lead and study the experience, ideologies 
and faiths of human beings in the late twentieth century 
before going on to consider what the gospels indicate about the 
earthly existence of Jesus .... [or] may simply go straight into 
the hmnanicyofJesus. (1977, pp.13-14) 
The inherent value of Christology 'from below' is that it focusses on Jesus 
in relation to the human condition. Nolan (1976) notes that it was in 
Jesus' acceptance of people, particularly the poor and sinners, that he 
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became the very human face of God because in treating them as friends 
he "had taken away their shame, humiliation and guilt .... They were 
now acceptable to Gnd. Their sinfulness, ignorance and uncleanness had 
been overlooked" (p. 39). Cbristology 'from above' stresses creeds and 
dogma whereas Christology 'from below' stresses the stories about Jesus 
in the synoptic gospels. O'Collins (1977) observes that both Christologies 
have their difficulties, however, "most contemporary theologians prefer to 
attempt a Christology 'fro_a below' and practise Augustine's principle, 
'Through the man Christ you move to the God Christm (pp. 17-18). 
Bausch (1984) uses the term 'high Christology' to refer to 
Christology associated with the divinity of Jesus. For Bausch, high 
Christology, or Christology'from above', is concerned with "the Jesus who 
walks on water, performs miracles, speaks long Johannine sentences. 
This is the imperial Pancrator [sic]" (p. 21). Emphasizing the divinity of 
Jesus creates a separation between the divine and the human. Nolan 
(1976) stresses the bringing together of the human and divine Jesus: 
We cannot deduce anything about Jesus from what we think 
we know abo••t God; me must now deduce everything about 
God from wt • ..c. we do know about Jesus .... To say ... that 
Jesus is divine does not change our understanding of Jesus; it 
changes our understanding of divinity. (p. 137) 
The tensions between Christology 'from above' and Christology 
'from below' can be usefully approached using Derrida's interpretative 
positions. Just as the Derridean common ground allows for the human 
need for the transcendent and the plurality of infinitely deferred meaning 
so Christologyfrom above and below, when taken together, acknowledges 
both the divinity and humanity of Jesus Christ. 
The figure of Mary is central to Christianity, particularly to Roman 
Catholicism, but her influence extends far beyond the Church: 
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Whether we regard the Virgin Mary as the most sublime and 
beautiful image in man's struggle towards the good and the 
pure, or the most pitiable production of ignorance and 
superstition, she represents a central theme in the history of 
western attitudes to women. She is one of the few female 
figures to have attained the status of myth - a myth that for 
nearly two thousand years has coursed through our culture. 
{VVarner, 1990,p.xxv) 
An examination of Mary in the Matthean and Lukan birth narratives 
from the Rousseauistic interpretative position presents an understanding 
of Mary as the 'mother of God', which can then be further explored 
through developments in Church ideology and litsrature. Whereas, a 
Nietzschean intsrpretation could deconstruct the Marian mythology from 
the starting point of the 'Virgin Mother', unleashing a deconstructive 
process that could lead to an examination of the place of women in the 
Church and the roles available to them. A particularly important aspect 
of any study of Mary is the dichotomy between eviVsexuality and 
holinessfvirginity. Warner (1990) observes that "it is almost impossible to 
overestimats the effect that the characteristic Christian association of 
sex and sin and death has had on the attitudes of our civilization" (p. 50). 
Alternatively, beginning with an examination of the position of 
women from the Rousseauistic &nd Nietzschean interpretations in A 
Wizard ofEarthsea an exploration could then be extended to the historical 
place of women in the Church. The point in the text where Ged recognizes 
Serret as the girl "who had mocked him ... and had sent him to read that 
spell which loosed the shadow" (Le Guin, 1993, p. 114) becomes in a 
Rousseauistic 0\nalysis an example of the 'unacceptable' female (as 
opposed to the 'acceptable' female in the person of Yarrow) and from the 
Nietzschean position an entry point into the Eve narrative. The binary 
relationship between Eve and Mary, the second Eve, provides much 
material for discussions about good and evil, men and women. Adams, 
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quoted by Warner (1990), indicates that the "study of Our Lady ... leads 
directly back to Eve, and lays bare the whole subject of sex" (p. 49). 
Although these examples are from the Christian faith there is no 
reason why the Derridean approach to reading literature and examining 
issues should not also be used in relation to other faith systems. For 
example, Cupitt (1!191) discusses 'story anti-story' in relation to Zen 
Buddhism, in which he sees there being a search for the unknowable and 
ineffable even though this search is acknowledged as impossible given the 
constraints of the linguistic world we inhabit: 
Zen itself recognizes ... the paradox of trying to use language 
to speak of or gesture towards an un-thing outside language .. 
. . Like other Eastern religions it dreams of escape. The escape 
from textuality ... is enlightenment. There is no way 'out' of a 
chain of written signs like this one .... Each sign relates only 
the others that come before and after it. (p. 134) 
Cupitt's study suggests that approaching Zen Buddhism from the 
Derridean perspective would be a fruitful and fascinating encow~ter. 
Cupitt notes that for any religion the belief in transcendence or God was a 
belief "in the possibility of mastering language from a standpoint outside 
it. Hence the traditional emphasis on silence, stillness, concentration and 
the control of one's thoughts" (p. 142). 
Like Zen, aspects of Taoism seem particularly suited to the 
Derridean common ground. While Taoism as a religion expresses a 
logocentric concern with the centre it also emphasizes 'unknowing' as a 
way of 'knowing', and in its "philosophy, language, knowledge, and being 
are at odds with one another" (Pon, 1996, p. 331). The Tao is both a goal 
and a way ofliving, and cannot adequately be expressed in either language 
or silence. In particular, the stories of Chuang-Tzu embrace "a much 
more personal and individualistic form of mysticism than that of' Lao Tzu 
(Hinnells, 1984, p. 90). His work exhibits anarchic characteristics that 
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are suggestive of the Nietzschean interpretative position. Pon (1996) 
explores these stories "as a radical suspension of ... human-centered 
reality or consciousness" (p. 333). She suggests that Chuang-Tzu 
combines an uncertainty about language and reality and "plays with the 
conventions of language and subverts its purposes and functions" (p. 
332). In Chuang-Tzu's concern with the limitations of language that 
creates distance from the Tao can be seen the tension between the 
Derridean common ground of the two irreconcilable interpretations (play 
oflanguage and seeking the Taoist centre). Pon sees language for Chuang-
Tzu as being "both inherently limiting and inexhaustible" (p. 331). 
Religious Education can utilize many avenues for exploring religion 
and religious issues and, in addition to literature, could include theatre, 
music, fine art, and film. The value of the Derridean approach can be 
utilized to study film, parUcularly documentaries where the unspoken text 
can be explored to great profit. The Derridean common ground can also be 
applied to visual arts in an examination of the way in which artists play 
with the foreground/focus (positive space) and background (negative 
space). In much ofEscher's work, for example, neither the foreground nor 
the background can exist without the other, and indeed, trying to decide 
which is which is impossible (infra vide, p. 154). In sculpture the very act 
of making casts is an intriguing entry point for discussions raised in A 
Wizard of Earthsea about cast, space, shadow, balance, and so on. 
Students could actually work in clay, producing their own moulds for 
casting. The process of creation requires playing with positive and 
negative, cast and space, shadow and balance. In printmaking, too, there 
is a positive and negative reversal in the construction of printing blocks 
from which to take prints. Humans see in 'relationship'; in art, as in 
language, meaning is found in difference and, in being variously 
'cor.structed', meaning is also infinitely deferred. There are many 
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possibilities in the visual arts for exploring the issues raised by reading 
literature in Religious Education from the Derridean common ground. 
Sometimes, 'hands-on' can explicate understanding in ways that are not 
possible from purely mental gymnastics. 
New Horizons: An "unnameable ... infant" 
Derrida describes trying to conceive of the common ground of the 
two irreconcilable interpretations as a: 
conception, formation, gestation, and labor we are only 
catching a glimpse of today. I employ these words, I admit, 
with a glance towards the operation of childbearing- but also 
with a glance toward those who ... turn their eyes away 
when faced by the as yet unnamable which is proclaiming 
itself and which can do so ... only under the species of the 
nonspecies, in the formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form 
of monstrosity. (Derrida, 1978, p. 293) 
Such a description could equally apply to the 'birth' of the conjoining of 
Derridean theory (or any modern literary theory) and Religious Education. 
This 'common ground' can be viewed positively or negatively. Some may 
find it terrifying and look on it as a monstrosity. Others, even though 
perhaps averting their eyes, may recognize it as a formless 'infant' having 
as yet no 'category', but which is, nevertheless, proclaiming its arrival. In 
this sense (in the Derridean sense of the common ground, of pushing 
against boundaries, and of conceiving of that which is in the process of 
becoming) this thesis is very much an "as yet unnamable ... infant". 
Looking into the abyss, peering at the "as yet unnamable which is 
proclaiming itself', trying to conceive of the common ground of the 
Derridean interpretations, and also of Religious Education and Derridean 
theory, is a difficult task. It is rather like looking at Escher prints in 
which, for example, a step-ladder is to be seen both outside and inside the 
building at the same time (infra vide, p. 155). In a sense it is impossible to 
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fully 'perceive' both versions at the same time - perception must be 
switched between the two possibilities. Nevertheless, when perceiving one 
version, awareness of the alternative possibility remains. It seems that in 
much of Escher's work that undermines perspective can be seen a visual 
version ofDerrida's two interpretative positions in application and also of 
the nexus of Religious Education and Derridean theory. Although Escher 
manipulates his images they nevertheless hold together as some sort of 
decentred yet centred 'unnamable creation' that is proclaiming its right to 
exist. The common ground in these images is the 'union' of two 
irreconcilable perspectives. Ail with these images so also with the two 
interpretative positions and with Religious Education and Derridean 
theory. There is a switching back and forth of 'mental perception' from 
one perspective/interpretation/area to the other and from this interplay 
and exertion arises the common ground. 
Derrida, in his "two interpretations of interpretation" suggests a 
way of 'simultaneously' reading literature in all its difference, in both the 
Rousseauistic and Nietzschean positions, by pinpointing "the di{ferance of 
this irreducible difference" (1978, p. 293). This is, indeed, to be found 
dancing on the edge of the abyss. But it is a dance that is both 
Rousseauistic and Nietzschean, both decipherment and free play, both 
centred and noncentred, both reassuring and frightening, both grounded 
and ungrounded, both closed and not closed. In other words, it is to be as 
fully human as possible with all the contradictions. The Derridean 
common ground provides a rich, rewarding and challenging way of peering 
"through a glass, darkly" (1 Cor. 13:12, KJV) to catch a glimpse both of 
reassuring certitude and oflabyrinthine meanderings. The value inherent 
in the Derridean common ground is that it facilitates a movement away 
from a limited position of restrictive reading practices to a position that 
fosters a much wider potential for meaning. 
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Drawing together what at fli"St seems antithetical areas (Religious 
Education and modern literary theory) is a potentially hazardous 
endeavour. There are no signposts or landmarks to assist with navigation. 
Such a journey is both terrifying and exhilarating. The teaching process is 
also potentially hazardous. Using the Derridean common ground as a 
methodology for reading literature, or for approaching religious and life 
issues, results in a classroom that is partly decentred. While lessons using 
the Rousseauistic interpretation are likely to be centred on teacher· 
directed study, lessons using the Nietzschean interpretation would require 
redevelopment and a different mind-set for both teacher and students. 
The teacher would assume a decentred role that facilitates student 
exploration and students would assume a very active role. Many changes 
are likely: teaching roles and strategies altered, programming and 
preparation re-formatted, assignments and assessment revised, lessons 
remodelled, and new types of questions generated. In practice, this may 
involve much greater class time devoted to individual work, an increased 
use of paired and group work, and 'round-table' discussions by the class as 
a whole. The teacher may initially suggest 'possible threads' to 
demonstrate the deconstructive process, particularly if students are not 
familiar with this methodology, but equally the students would be both 
encouraged and e><pected to produce their own deconstructions. Teaching 
may seem uncertain using the Nietzschean position, but only because 
teachers are accustomed to directing, controlling, and determining. 
Utilizqtion of the Derridean approach means that in practice some 
lessons, tho•e using the Rousseauistic interpretation, may resemble 
'normal' teacbe,·-centred teaching but other lessons, those using the 
Nietzschean interpretation, will be decentred jow·neys undertaken by 
teacher and students. In teaching terms, the Derridean common ground 
combines the irreconcilability and irreducibility of centred and decentred 
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teaching. Fantasy stories like A Wizard of Earthsea are well-suited to 
initial student contact with any modern literary theory. By its very 
nature fantasy is 'removed' from reality and is therefore a safe vehicle by 
which to begin studies of the constructs of text, society, and belief. 
The studies of A Wizard of Earthsea undertaken in Chapters Four 
and Five furnish data clearly indicating that reading the novel from the 
Derridean common ground reveals it to be reflective of the tensions, 
complexities, and contradictions of life. Indeed, from the Derridean 
perspective it is no longer a novel that neatly 'explains' life/issues. Rather, 
in highlighting the ambiguities and struggles of life, it has the potential to 
alter how students engage with and respond to the text and life. In this 
thesis the interpretation of material in Chapters Four and Five suggests 
considerable scope for the religious educator in pursuing how "meaning 
and purpose in human existence ... is sought" (supra vide, p. 11). 
The value and relevance of this thesis lies in extending the 
boundaries of the influence of other disciplines on Religious Education, as 
already achieved by Grimmitt (1978; 1987), to new horizons. This thesis 
demonstrates the enormous value to be gained by using Derrida's "two 
interpretations of interpretation" as a methodological process for reading 
literature in Religious Education, which can also be used for exploring 
general religious issues. Use of the Derridean common ground provides an 
approach in Religious Education underpinning the consensus view in 
contemporary approaches in Religious Education that emphasizes the 
necessity ofinclusivity, plurality, and openness and the rejection of closed 
and exclusive positions (supra vide, pp. 8-11 & pp. 13-16). 
However, in true Nietzschean style, the 'end' of this journey is not 
an end, but merely a point in a journey. This thesis, an "unnameable ... 
infant", implies new horizons of infinite journeying. Some of these are 
hinted at in Appendix B. 
140 
CHAPrERSEVEN 
Conclusion 
BeoommenclatioPB for Further Re!!earcb 
Further research could embody a number of different directions. 
Indeed, the plurality of potential future developments in this exciting 
nexus of modern litsrsry theory and Religious Education seems to be, 
given that this thesis appears to be the only study undertaken in this 
area, very much in its infancy. A combination of additional theoretical 
study and empirical research is considered necesssry. 
One possible area for further research could involve the application 
of the methodology used in this thesis to the other three Earthsea novels. 
Given that A Wizard ofEarthsea, the first novel, was first published in 
1968 and Tehanu, the fourth and last novel, was first published in 1990 
means that the four novels were written over a twenty-two year period. A 
comparative examination of the four novels in terms of Derrida's "two 
interpretations of interpretations" could prove an interesting study. For 
example, the strong hint in Tehanu of the new Archmage being a woman 
and the lack of closure at the end of the novel indicates the possibility of 
exploring altogether different Rousseauistic and Nietzschean 
interpretations than have heen explored in A Wizard of Earthsea. 
One of the initial directions of further research could involve the 
creation of a curriculum package based on the conceptual framework 
outlined in this thesis. This could then he utilized in the Religious 
Education classroom as part of an empirical study to test the validity of 
the hypothesis theoretically examined and demonstrated in this thesis. 
The curriculum package would need to be carefully constructed so as to 
provide a balanced reading of the text from both the Rousseauistic and 
Nietzschean interpretations. Consideration would also need to be given to 
possible student resistance to radically different reading practices and to 
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critical rather than responsive reading. 
While the discussions in this thesis are indicative of use in upper 
secondary highschool, the methodological approach can be adapted for 
use in both lower secondary and upper primary. Curricula could be 
produced and empirical studies undertaken across a variety of age-
groups. The creation of a comprehensive framework, such as devised by 
Grimmitt (1978), for use across both upper primary and secondary years 
is recommended as another aim of further research and work. 
Further research cvuld at some stage also involve examination of 
the value of other literary theoretical approaches, such as those 
discussed in Appendix B, for reading literature in Religious Education. This 
is likely to be an enormous undertaking as modern literary theory 
constitutes a vast, pluralistic, and ever expanding discipline. 
Conclusion 
Words, spoken or written, are liable to greater misunderstanding, 
according to Post-Structuralists, than is ever admitted. Yet, people seem 
so 'normalized' by this type of experience that it becomes 'natural' and 
therefore 'invisible'. Meaning is considered obvious: yet disagreement, 
upset, even war, attest to the monotonous regularity of human 
miscomprehension and misconstruction. Embedded in this appalling 
linguistic mire is the special status attached to meaning and truth. Not 
only is meaning often considered obvious and natural, but it is then 
privileged as 'Truth'. These troublesome issues are no more evident than 
in 'stories' (whether individual stories or stories that developed into potent 
religions, myths, and philosophies), and can be particularly scrutinized in 
literature. Derrida's concern with the logocentric impulse in Western 
thonght pinpoints a problematic tendency of giving centres to structures 
in order to furnish definitive meaning, to ultimately explain. Although the 
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Derridean position rejects such logocentric attitudes to meaning and truth 
the Derridean common ground of the two interpretative positions 
facilitates both the search for the centre and the free play of signifiers. 
Moreover, this cummon ground forestalls and alleviates problems 
associated with both the messianic certainty of absolute meaning and 
truth in text and life (the Rousseauistic interpretation at its worst) and 
despair and anxiety associated with the hopelessness of ever achieving 
absolute meaning in text or life (the Nietzschean interpretation at its 
worst). As one aspect of modern literary theory Derrida's "two 
interpretations of interpretation" facilitates a valuable approach for 
reading literature and to life in general. 
The legacy of modern literary theory can be seen surreptitiously 
influencing our lives. Today many people are able to recognize the 
'constructed' nature of advertisements and that the 'truth' contained in 
them are constructions of reality in order to sell particular products. In 
the English class students analyze the texts of literature, film, television, 
and the media to develop an understanding of how language and images 
are used to communicate certain meanings, how such messages (and 
therefore the meanings contained within those messages) are 
constructed, and what social or cultural discourses are operating that 
marginalize or privilege certain groups or individuals. In Religious 
Education, too, modem literary theory should be making its presence felt. 
Religious Education does not exist in splendid isolation. It has 
responded to developments in theology, pedagogy, psychology, and 
sociology, to name but a few disciplines. Religious educators have 
emphasized not only the importance of acknowledging developments in 
other areas of human learning, and how these may impact on and 
influence Religious Education, but have expressed the necessity of 
responding to such changes. However, religious educators do not seem to 
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have explored the potential of developments in modem literary theory to 
also impact on Religious Education. 
Modem literary theory has developed a plethora of approaches to 
language, society, and literature, and in particular, such theories have 
vast implications for how literature is read and studied. English Education 
has responded to such literary critical developments by devising new 
methods of reading, studying, and teaching literature. Such changes 
emphasize the creation of critical readers and the development of 
awareness for, and understanding of, the constructed nature of text, 
society, and meaning. There is no reason why modem literary theory 
should not also be examined for its impact on reading literature in 
Religious Education. The already central and valuable place of 'story' in 
Religious Education, and the associated richness of fantasy and 
imagination, can be considerably expanded by acknowledging and 
responding to developments in modern literary theory and their propitious 
implications for the reading of literature. Modern literruy theory has the 
potential to facilitate pluralistic avenues for exploring meaning, which 
collectively provide a multifaceted, potent, and beneficent methodological 
tool and process for reading and studying literature in Religious Education 
and for examining religious and life issues. The Derridean approach to 
reading literature facilitates an excellent way in Religious Education to 
appreciate how "meaning and purpose ... is sought", which though 
concentrating on the "cognitive" dimension does not preclude the 
"affective" dimension (supra vide, p. 11). The use of Derrida's "two 
interpretations of interpretation" for reading and studying A Wizard of 
Eartbsea has effectively demonstrated its value as a methodological 
approach for reading literature in Religious Education. 
The contribution of this thesis is its exrunination of the valuable 
impact ofDerridean theory on reading literature in Religious Education. It 
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would seem this area of study has not previously been undertaken. Post-
Structuralism's emphasis on the impossibility of absolute meaning seems 
antithetical to Religious Education's emphasis on the search for final 
meaning. However, Derrida's common ground of the two irreconcilable 
interpreu.tive positions suggests a reading of literature that allows for 
both the Rousseauistic concem with centre and definitive meaning and 
the Nietzschean concern with free play and provisional meaning. 
The hypothesis of this thesis that "the Derridean common ground 
of the Rousseauistic and Nietzschean interpretations will broaden and 
enhance the reading of literature in Religious Education by facilitating 
both the search for the centre (search for finite meaning) and the free 
play of signifiers (pw'Suit of infinitely deferred and pluralistic meaning)" 
(supra vide, p. 8) has been exemplified by a close textual analysis of A 
Wizard of Earthsea. It has also been briefly explored that such an 
approach to reading literature in Religious Education may equally apply 
to sacred and religious texts as well as to theological and religious issues. 
Looking into the linguistic abyss of Post-Structuralism and 
searching for absolute meaning and provisional meaning, trying to 
conceive of the Derridean common ground that encompasses both the 
Rousseauistic search for the signified and the Nietzschean free play of 
signifiers, is rather like looking "through a glass, darkly" (1 Cor. 13:12, 
KJV). As an act of faith, which in no way undermines the reading of 
literature from a Derridean perspective or the value therein, one could add 
"but then face to face" (1 Cor. 13:12). 
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APPENDIX A 
M.C. Escher's "Circle Limit IV (Heaven and Hell)" 
© 1997 Cordon Art- Baarn- Holbwd. All rights reserved. 
(Boo!, Ernst, Kist, Locher & Wierda, 1992, p. 322) 
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M.C. Escher's "Belvedere" 
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APPENDIXB 
Value of Other Modern Literary Theoretical Approaches 
While Derrida's "two interpretations of interpretation" is a valuable 
methodological process for reading literature in Religious Education it 
would be anathema and contrary to the ethos of modern literary theory 
generally and Post-Structuralism in particular, let alone Derridean 
theory, to suggest that there are not also other equally valuable literary 
theoretical approaches. Bartbes (1996b, p. 195) uses a Biblical quotation 
to describe textual plurality, which could equally describe theoretical 
plurality: "My name is Legion: for we are many" (Mark 5: 9, KJV). 
The plurality of literary theoretical approaches facilitates a variety 
of ways of exploring text and meaning. It would be a logocentric attitude 
indeed to champion one particular approach as somehow 'the' valuable 
modern literary theoretical approach for reading literature in Religious 
Education. Barthes (1996b) observes of textual plurality that the "plural 
of demoniacal texture which opposes text to work can bring with it 
fundamental changes in reading, and precisely in areas where monologism 
appears to be the Law" (p. 195). Likewise, the "plural of demoniacal" 
literary approaches which oppose pluralistic reading practices to 
logocentric reading practices can also bring with it fundamental changes 
to reading practices that result in a broader and richer consideration of 
the quest for meaning. In this way, monologism gives way to pluralism in 
the practice of reading literature in Religious Education. 
There is an enormous range of different theoretical positions in 
modern literary theory. All these positions have, in their own way, the 
potential to enhance and enrich how literature is read in Religious 
Education, thereby contributing, also in their own way, to the "exploration 
of the myriad ways in which meaning and purpose in human existence 
has been and is sought" (supra vide, p. 11). Nevertheless, it was 
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considered that an examination in depth was preferable to a cursory 
overview, hence the necessity of making a single choice from the plethora 
of possibilities. As a result, this thesis examines only one small aspect of 
modern literary theory. Even Derrida's theory is expansive and close 
attention to his ideas regarding 'supplement' (words always supplement or 
substitute reality) or 'phonocentrism' (the privileging of speech over 
writing) would be profitable studies in themselves. In particular, given the 
value assigned to the spoken word in A Wizard of Earthsea the Derridean 
concept of phonocentrism would furnish a fascinating approach to the 
novel. It needs to be emphasized that rather than Derrida's two 
interpretative positions this thesis could have focused on the value for 
reading literature in Religious Education of any rmmbeJ' uf other modern 
literary theoretical approaches, including other aspects of Derridean 
theory. 
For example, an examination ofBaudrillard's ideas concerning the 
culture of'hyperreality' and 'the loss of the real', which he sees as arising 
from a loss of distinction between 'real' and 'imagined' brought about by 
the pervasive influence of film, television, and advertising (Barry, 1995, p. 
87), would have heen particularly interesting. For a feminist approach a 
study of Cixous' ideas concerning the masculine economy of profit and the 
feminine economy of gift (Cixous, 1996) would have been worthwhile. Or a 
more general approach combining various theoretical ideas, as evidenced 
in Cultural Criticism used in English Education, could have been explored. 
Indeed, there are many strikingly interesting and challenging modern 
literary theories to choose from, all of which could variously and positively 
impact on how literature is read and studied in Religious Education. As a 
taste of the value to he found in the multiplicity of modern literary theory 
for reading literature in Religious Education a brief overview of some of 
the ideas of Foucault, Althusser, and Bakhtin in relation to AWizartl of 
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Earthsea will illustrate the imperative of not privileging, by an act of 
isolation, one theorist over other theorists. 
Foucault 
Foucault represents another tangent of Post-Structuralist thought 
whose ideas, unlike Derrida, focus on the relationship of discourse and 
power, and history and ideology. "Like other post-structuralists Foucault 
regards discourse as a central human activity, but .... is interested in 
the historical dimension of discursive change" (Selden, 1985, p. 98). 
Foucault points to the observation that discourses are always involved 
with power. A 'Hitler' or the Irish Republican Army or the Australian 
Goverrunent exercise real power through discourse that has real effects 
on many people's lives. Also sometimes called New Historicism, 
Foucault's ideas are concerned with personal freedom and state control. 
Foucault's "pervasive image of the State is that of 'panoptic' 
(meaning all-seeing) surveillance .... [maintained] not by physical force 
and intimidation, but by the power of its 'discursive practices'" (Barry, 
1995, p. 176). The panopticon was designed by Jeremy Bentham in the 
eighteenth century as a prison which allowed for hitherto unprecedented 
surveillance of prisoners and isolation of the prisoners from each other. It 
was a circular prison that "consisted of tiered ranks of cells which could all 
be surveyed by a single warder positioned at the centre of the circle" 
(Barry, 1995, p. 176). Whereas Derrida is interested in textual discourse 
and interpretation, Foucault is interested in the political structures that 
limit the freedom of the individual and maintain the power of the state. 
"The Panopticon ... must be understood as a generalizable model of 
functioning; a way of defining power relations in terms of the everyday life 
of men" (Foucault, 1992, p. 87). An analysis of this Foucauldian concept 
as it impacts on how A Wizard ofEarthsea is read and meaning achieved 
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raises some thought-provoking issues. 
For example, the hierarchical structure of Earthsea could be seen 
as reflecting Foucault's panopticon. The wizards, who themselves have a 
rigid hierarchical structure, represent the centre of the panopticon and 
from their privileged position they control and monitor all of Earthsea. 
Their power of control is maintained by what Foucault terms "discursive 
practices" (Barry, 1995, p. 176). For the wizards, particularly the 
Archmage and Masters, their discourse comprises a special and privileged 
knowledge of spoken and written words that exercise enormous power. No 
other inhabitants of Earthsea have access to such power except the 
dragons or those who dally with the Dark Powers. Such characters, like 
Yevaud, Serret, or Lord Benderesk, are represented in the novel as 
threats to the balance and order of Earthsea. The dragons are feared by 
the wizards and mages because not only do they possess awesome power 
but they operate totally outside the power structures on Roke. Such 
'outsiders' to the Earthsea-panopticon threaten it because they 
undermine the discursive power of those who control it. 
It is interesting to observe that the wizards have considerably 
reduced powers of observation and surveillance over those who exist 
outside their discursive realm. In addition, it might be argued that only 
those outside the panopticon exercise individual freedom. Those who live 
under the control of the wizards in the panoptic state of Earthsea may be 
seen as existing only in accordance with the power structures of the 
wizards and as actually experiencing little freedom because anything that 
threatens the structure of Earthsea is considered subversive and is not 
accepted. In this sense, tt.:ey are isolated from each other in their lack of 
knowing anything other than the status quo. 
In Earthsea there is very much a sense of'insiders' and 'outsiders'. 
Those 'outside' include marauding pirates, witches, dragons, and the like 
159 
(those who exist in a contrary fashion to the dictates of the Earthsea-
panopticon and are hence considered dangerous or evil). While those 
'inside' include a variety of lords, wizards, farmers, merchante, seafarers, 
and so on (those who exist in a compliant way to the State control exerted 
by the mages). Ged's journey takes him from inside the panopticon to 
outside it and then back again. His shadow is very much representative of 
the 'outsiders' who often exercise power over aspects of Earthsea or those 
in it, but ultimately succumb to the enforced structure of the mages. 
Indeed, the shadow could be seen as championing the New Historicist 
concerns with the "liberal id:.;a\s of personal freedom and accepting and 
celebrating all forms of difference and 'deviancem (Barry, 1995, p. 175). 
Reading the novel from such a Foucauldian perspective facilitates a 
different aspect to the examination of the human quest for meaning and 
purpose than is afforded by the Derridean position. 
Alth!!!lser 
Althusser considers that "it is through ideology that individuals are 
constituted as 'subjects' - (mis)recognizing themselves as free and 
autonomous beings with unique subjectivities" (Rice & Waugh, 1996, p. 
52). His theories concern ideology and the interpellation of the individual 
as subject (who thereafter becomes a subject who is also 'subject to'), 
Althusser postulates that "all ideology hails or interpellates concrete 
individuals as concrete subjects, by the functioning of the category of the 
subject" (A!thusser, 1996, p. 58). Althusser asserts that ideology: 
'acts' or 'functions' in such a way that it 'recruits' subjects 
among the individuals ... , or 'transforms' the individuals into 
subjects ... by that very precise operation I have called 
interpellation or hailing. (Althusser, 1996, p. 58) 
For Althusser, interpellation describes the situation were it appears that 
160 
choice is possible but in fact it is not. Interpellation or hailing is "the way 
the individual is encouraged li.o see herself or himself as an entity free and 
independent of social forces" (Barry, 1995, p. 165). 
These theories may prove very useful as a methodological 
approach for reading literature in Religious Education because they are 
concerned with the place of the individual in society and how the individual 
is both situated in and subject to that society by ideology. For example, in 
A Wizard of Esrthsea th!J existence of true names which are not generally 
shared with anyone else makes for some interesting discussions in light of 
Althusser's concept of interpellation. In Earthsea no one has power over 
an individual without knowledge of that person's true name. The shadow 
has power over Ged only because it does know his true name and can 
therefore transform Ged from individual into a subject that is subject to 
the shadow's will. 
Bakhtin 
Bakhtin's theories are particularly interesting because he lived in 
Stalinist Russia and was unaware of post-Saussurean developments in 
the West. For Bakhtin language "was a field of ideological contention" 
(Eagleton, 1983, p. 117). In contrast to Derrida, Bakbtin is not interested 
in abstract linguistics "but rather language conceived as ideologically 
saturated" (B1ikhtin, 1996, p. 232). For him words are not only linguistic 
signs but also socio-political signe t'llat attribute value. At any "moment 
of its evoluti,on, language is stratified not only into linguistic dialects, ... 
but also ... into languages that are socio-ideologicallanguages" (Bakbtin, 
1996, p. 232). Bakhtin suggests there are two opposing forces 
simultan<.l<lusly operating in language, the centripetal and the centrifugal. 
He does not historically situate a Derridean-type eruption in the life of 
languat~e but points to historical literary developments in which these 
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forces can be examined. For example, Bakhtin sees in the epic the 
functioning of the centripetal force and in the 'novelizing' novel the 
functioning of the centrifugal force. Bakhtin considers that the 'unitary 
language' (the single 'official' language) operates in the midst of 
heteroglossia (the many 'other' languages). The unitary language 
"constitutes the theoretical expression of the historical process of 
linguistic unification and centralization, an expression of the centripetal 
forces oflanguage" (Bakhtin, 1996, p. 231). The heteroglossia, containing 
centrifugal forces, operates in an "uninterrupted process of 
decentralization and disunification" (Bakhtin, 1996, p. 233). 
Bakhtin, working in a socio-political framework, is concerned with 
the interaction of opposing forces within language in relation to the social, 
historical, and ideological. "Ail a living, socio-ideological concrete thing ... 
[language]lies on the borderline between oneself and the other" (Bakhtin, 
1994, p. 77). Meaning, in both literature and life, is determined by the 
relationship between 'self and 'other'. While meaning for Derrida is 
concerned with provisional meaning in the Nietzschean position or the 
search for absolute meaning in the Rousseauistic position, Bakhtin is 
concerned with meaning as inextricably bound up with addressivity. 
Bakhtin situates meaning in the relationship between the addresser and 
the addressee. "The word ... is directly, blatantly, oriented toward a 
future answer-word: it provokes an answer, anticipates it and structures 
itself in the answer's direction" (Bakhtin, 1994, p. 76). 
A great deal of information about character identity in A Wizard of 
Earthsea comes from character interplay. For example, much is learnt 
about Ged from his relationship to other characters, such as Jasper, 
Vetch, or Ogion, as well as from his relationship to his shadow. The 
tellBion between the centripetal and centrifugal forces can a! so be seen in 
addressivity. Whether characters function centripetally or centrifugally, 
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however, is dependent on which characters are in dialogic relationship. 
Ged initially functions as a centrifugal force against the centripetal force 
of the School ofRoke. However, after he has released his shadow, it is now 
the shadow that functions as the centrifugal force and Ged who functions 
as the centripetal force. Meaning is only achieved in the dialogue between 
the addresser and the addressee and not, as with Derrida, in textual 
linguistic structure. Bakhtin emphasizes the social and historical 
contexts in which such dialogues take place. For Bakhtin (1994) all 
utterances take "meaning and shape at a particular historical moment in 
a socially specific environment" (p. 76). 
Although both Derrida (in the Nietzschean position) and Bakhtin 
view meaning as something that is not fixed and as being infinitely 
potential and open rather than finitely completed and closed, it is Bakhtin 
alone who suggests that meaning is shared: that is, meaning belongs to 
everyone. "The word in language is half someone else's" (Bakhtin, 1994, p. 
77). For Bakhtin the locus of meaning is in the dialogue between the 
speaker and the recipient rather than, as with Derrida, in the signifier. 
The conflicting tensions between the centripetal and centrifugal forces 
can be seen in the tensions between the heteroglossia and the unitary 
language. Every word, and therefore meaning, "participates in the 
'unitary language' ... and at the same time partakes of social and 
historical heteroglossia" (Bakhtin, 1996, p. 233). In Bakhtin's theory the 
novelist re-works the heteroglossia so that a plethora oflanguages can be 
discerned from within the novel's dialogues. His emphasis on the dialogic 
discourse encompasses concerns with addressivity and meaning and the 
underlying dialogic nature of existence. 
In A Wizard of Earthsea the dialogic discourse can be 
examined in the different languages evident in the novel. Traces of the 
unitary language (the centripetal forces) can be discerned in references to 
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the maintenance of the Equilibrium by the Master Hand (Le Guin, 1993, 
p, 48) while the heteroglossia (the centrifugal forces) can be seen in 
references to the usurping of the Equilibrium hy Serret (p. 112). Bakhtin's 
interest in language as a socio-ideological phenomenon inevitably 
furnishes an approach to reading literature that is less concerned with 
linguistics and semiotics than is Derrida's approach. 
Both Derrida and Bakhtin express considerable interest in 
language and meaning. Derrida, in his two types of interpretation, 
advocates a simultaneous reading of literature in all its difference: one 
that, from the Rousseauistic and Nietzschean positions, seeks centres 
and follows threads. Bakhtin suggests a socio-ideological approach to 
literature that encompasses an understanding that meaning is shared 
and is inextricably tied up in the dialogic relationship of the addresser and 
the addressee. Both Derrida and Bakhtin are concerned with the common 
ground of diametrically opposed but simultaneously lived positions: for 
Derrida the common ground of the Rousseauistic and Nietzschean 
interpretations and for Bakhtin a common ground of centripetal and 
centrifugal forces. Moreover, the implications of their respective theories, 
each fostering a direction and emphasis lacking in the other, provide 
complementary positions from which to read literature in Religious 
Education that are rich and multifaceted, providing a variety of ways for 
studying meaning, society, and the individual. 
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